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ABSTRACT

A WORLD OF OUR OWN: CLIMATE CHANGE ADVOCACY
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Rowan Howard-Williams
Dr. Marwan M. Kraidy
The effects of human impacts on the environment are often not comprehensible to people
and have to be given meaning through communication. Such impacts, most prominently
climate change, have increased to the extent that human actions are the dominant force in
planetary biophysical systems. Yet these impacts are for the most part unintentional and
not subject to democratic control. A critical discourse analysis of campaign material and
media content examines how three advocacy groups – 350, a climate activist
organization, The Breakthrough Institute, a think-tank, and The Nature Conservancy, an
established conservation organization – discursively construct climate change. The three
groups acknowledge the need to more consciously or deliberatively manage
environmental impacts, and yet all have very different assumptions, objectives and tactics
in their advocacy. Analysis of the communication activities of the organizations and how
their ideas are represented and contested in other media shows not only how they
construct the particular issue of climate change but their relationship to societal power
relationships. How the organizations build their case for action involves discursive acts
which define or re-define the boundaries between nature and society and what (and who)
is to be included or excluded from political concern. Unless directly challenged, these
new formations will reproduce existing power structures and inequalities.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: The dreadful burden of choice

In December of 1962, John Steinbeck accepted the Nobel Prize for Literature at
the City Hall in Stockholm. After ruminating in his acceptance speech on the “nature and
direction of literature,” Steinbeck (1962) turned his attention to the greatest existential
threat of the time, the prospect of nuclear annihilation:
The door of nature was unlocked and we were offered the dreadful
burden of choice. We have usurped many of the powers we once ascribed
to God. Fearful and unprepared, we have assumed leadership over the life
or death of the whole world, of all living things. The danger and the glory
and the choice rest finally in man. The test of his perfectibility is at hand.
Having taken Godlike power, we must seek in ourselves for the
responsibility and the wisdom we once prayed some deity might have.
Man himself has become our greatest hazard – and our only hope.
Though the threat of global nuclear war has, for the moment, faded, Steinbeck’s warning
is no less relevant now than it was at the time. A host of new human-created risks has
emerged, climate change chief among them, which imperil the civilization that gave rise
to them along with all other life on Earth. Humanity’s impact on the functioning of the
planet is so pervasive that we have given it a name: the Anthropocene, the age of humans
– a new geological era that is defined by the collective choices made by human societies.
Having this type of influence over the planet fundamentally alters the relationship
of humans to their environment. Environmentalism arose to protect the natural world –
and the people who depend on it – from the destructive consequences of industrialization.
But in the Anthropocene, a world dominated by the impacts of humans, this dynamic is
altered. The reach of human activities is such that it is no longer possible to avoid
1

impacting the natural world. The choice facing humans is not what parts of nature we
wish to protect, but what kind of nature we wish to create – and how to go about creating
it. Human impacts on the environment are for the most part outside the direct experience
of most people, and thus have to be given meaning through communication.
This dissertation analyzes public campaigning and debates over issues of global
environmental risk, with particular focus on climate change. Climate change is
emblematic of humanity’s planetary impacts, its causes tightly bound to the organization
of modern society. Making choices about how to address climate change also therefore
requires addressing social relationships and institutions. The processes which drive
climate change are not for the most part deliberately enacted but are the unexpected
outcomes of political and economic structures and practices. This has large implications
for democratic citizenship. In an era when climatic trends are shaped by human actions,
opening up decision-making processes over the direction of environmental impacts is
crucial, given the potentially huge effects on people’s lives.
The three case studies in this dissertation examine how advocacy groups
discursively construct issues related to climate change and their proposals for redefining
the politics of the human-nature relationships in the Anthropocene, and the resonance of
these ideas in wider public discourse. Questions of power are central to this analysis – if
humanity collectively is responsible for deciding the state of the planet, it is important to
know who gets to decide and how such decisions are made; who in particular bears the
burden of choice. Mediated discourse is fundamental to how climate change is
understood and acted upon, and to the maintenance (and challenging) of societal power
2

relationships more broadly. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how advocacy
organizations contribute to public discourse on politics in the Anthropocene; the
implications of different discursive formations not only for how humans relate to the
natural world but the extent to which they challenge or support social structures bound up
in these relationships and alter the power dynamics of who gets a say in deciding the
future of the planet.

Impact and control
It is a common lament amongst environmentalists that the environmental crises
which face our societies are not being met with the level of social or political action they
seem to warrant. As Ulrich Beck (2010) asks, “Why is there no storming of the Bastille
because of the environmental destruction threatening mankind, why no Red October of
ecology?” (p. 254). There are of course many different answers to this question,
encompassing the particular psychological, political and organizational characteristics of
environmental problems. But behind all of this lies the broader question of how human
society relates to the natural environment which sustains it. The dominant (though not
uncontested) conception of nature in Western societies at least from the scientific and
industrial revolutions saw it as a limitless resource to support human progress and
development, which could be exploited with little regard to the consequences. Initially,
the scale at which the use of natural resources took place meant that this was essentially
true; nature could provide all the resources and absorb all the wastes of human activity.
As industrialization expanded and intensified, its environmental consequences started to
become more apparent.
3

The primary orientation towards the natural world in industrial society was to
dominate and control it, with humans seen as separate from nature. As the environmental
consequences of human industry became increasingly unavoidable, two things have
become apparent in terms of society’s relationship with the environment. One is that the
very distinction between humans and the environment, nature and society, is increasingly
untenable. Of course, this distinction never had much of a solid basis to begin with. As
well as always being a part of the larger ecosystems in which they are embedded, humans
and their societies have always depended on natural resources and processes. But as the
scale and reach of human activity expanded, aided by the vast power unleashed by the
burning of fossil fuels, so too did its impact on the natural world. Indeed, as Bill
McKibben (1989) argued in his book The End of Nature, there is essentially no part of
the planet free from the influence of humans: “the way of life in one part of the world in
one half-century is altering every inch and every hour of the globe” (p. 46). In the
Anthropocene, even the weather we experience is not ‘natural,’ in the sense that the
human influence on the planet’s climate changes planetary weather cycles. Despite the
extent of humankind’s impact on these processes, however, these effects are for the most
part unintentional and uncontrollable. The irony of modernity is that the drive for control
of the natural world, its precise understanding through science and rational use through
industry, has resulted in a loss of control of the processes that it set in motion. Though
climate change, for instance, arises from human activity, its effects are uncertain,
probabilistic and have no simple means of being avoided.
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These two factors – the impact of humankind on the global environment, and its
lack of control over these impacts – have wide-ranging political implications. These
changes have been theorized in number of different ways. For instance, social theorists
including Ulrich Beck (1992) and Bruno Latour (1993) have argued that ecological crises
such as climate change are transforming social relations. A common theme in this
analysis is that politics, in the broadest sense of collective decision-making, must play a
greater role in matters of environmental harm. For Beck (1992), society becomes
increasingly oriented around “risks,” the threats to society that arise from society itself.
Nature and culture, science and politics, are inextricably bound together, with one not
reducible to the other as the externalities of modern societies can no longer be kept
external. Thus, these unintended consequences must be incorporated as part of the normal
process of politics. Latour (2003) conceptualizes environmental risks as networks, dense
entanglements of “unexpected associations between heterogeneous elements” (p. 36).
Tracing these connections and bringing this array of elements into the domain of politics
raises issues of representation, visibility and discourse and points to the importance of
communication. The consequences of our decisions and actions in business, in science
and in everyday life can no longer be ignored or treated as externalities. What is required
is recognition of the uncertainties and ambiguities which link social actions and their
consequences and an acknowledgement that the way we live has huge implications for
planetary biophysical systems – but in ways we cannot necessarily predict or understand.
Once made explicit, these decision-making processes can be opened up to greater
democratic input. The political task of creating the world of the Anthropocene is
5

dependent on communicative processes and their associated power relationships. To a
large extent these decisions are made in the domains of science, business and the private
sector, outside the realm of representative democracy, what Beck (1992) refers to as
‘subpolitics.’ Democratizing these spaces in the interests of citizens, the deliberate
shaping of both the human and natural worlds in line with the values collectively decided
on by society, is a key challenge. But while many theoretical approaches stress dialogue
and consensus, this can work to mask or reinforce power differentials and inequalities
(Mouffe, 2005), and the role of contention and contestation in these processes may be just
as important.

Communicating the environment
Although environmental risks have their manifestations in the physical
environment, they are a product of social action. In that sense, risks are inseparable from
their representations. What people know about environmental threats and how we think
about them will condition how they respond to them (if at all). Risk discourses are
therefore as important as their physical causes or effects. This is not to say the discursive
is more important than the material, but that the two do not exist independently of one
another. Risks are an assemblage of natural, social and technological elements linked
together in complex and often unpredictable ways. Communication is fundamental to
tracing these connections, through the ways in which these various actors interact and
achieve representation, and the articulation of meanings associated with the environment.
Communications media are themselves embedded in larger sociotechnical
structures. As well as being the principal means of circulating discourses about risks,
6

media are (to varying degrees) a part of the same social system which produced the risks.
Much scholarship has implicated mass media as key agents in perpetuating the dominant
industrial-capitalist social order. If environmental risks represent a threat to this system, it
follows that, at least at a broad level, this will affect the representation of such risks in
ways which downplay this threat. This is not totalizing, of course, but the point is that
media are themselves are in part responsible for environmental risks, through both their
role as carriers of norms and ideals about social relations and their representations of
specific environmental issues. Nonetheless, it could equally be argued that what progress
has been made on environmental issues is also a function of media. Content studies have
found a diverse array of perspectives on the environment, even in commercial mass
media, with little in the way of ideological closure (though a common theme is that
relatively little attention is paid to underlying causes). Digital media, of course, allow for
even greater diversity and heterogeneity. It is important to avoid a mediacentric approach,
seeing processes of communication as the major determining factor in social responses to
environmental problems. What appears in media is in a dynamic relationship with
broader social and historical trends. Yet media and communications systems remain
important as spaces where the more concrete manifestations of these trends are played
out and worked through.
Gaining a better understanding of these processes can potentially lead to better
insights about how the unintended consequences of modernity can be taken into account
and integrated into a broader politics of risk. The social theorists who deal with these
issues often acknowledge the importance of media and communication but are light on
7

details and nuance, so there is scope for substantial theoretical contributions in this area.
More generally, how the public understands and responds to risks is in large part a
consequence of their engagement with various forms of media. Identifying how media
are used by actors in environmental debates and the interactions of various discourses can
help to show how ideas of risk are constructed. This also helps clear a path towards a
more democratic participation by the public in matters of risk governance which would
otherwise not be subject to such oversight.
It is crucial, then, to investigate the role played by media in how societies deal
with self-produced threats. The competing dynamics of protecting longstanding
institutional arrangements versus transitioning to a “new modernity” (Beck, 1992) based
on risk will both be present to varying degrees in mediated discourses. The very fact of
communicating about risks involves assumptions, whether implicit or explicit, about the
relationships between science, politics, nature and everyday life. This dissertation
investigates these issues through the analysis of environmental controversies and
campaigns, focusing mainly on the issue of climate change – in many ways the
archetypal example of a modern environmental risk – situated more broadly in the
context of the Anthropocene.
Environmental organizations and advocacy groups are among the primary means
by which environmental issues enter the public sphere. There is a wide spectrum of
environmental groups encompassing many different modes of campaigning. The rapidly
changing media landscape is having a profound influence on how campaign groups
conduct their operations and reach broader publics. The growth of digital media has
8

meant a relative decline in the power of traditional media gatekeepers and the emergence
of new sources of information accessible primarily online. Advocacy groups are amongst
the most important of these new sources, particularly in the realm of risk and crises.
While campaigners previously had to rely on mainstream media to get their message
across (and still do to a large extent), they are much more able to reach audiences directly
and spread their message through digital media. In this way they can potentially
contribute to the subpolitics of risk, through the linking together and mobilization of
diverse publics for the purposes of social change. As decisions over risks are increasingly
made by institutions outside of the traditional democratic institutions of the nation-state,
the democratic potential of more participatory media forms and the extent to which it is
being realized become crucial. It is possible that the debates over modernity’s
consequences that were closed off to traditional democratic institutions are being opened
up through public concern over risk and enabled by digital media. At the same time,
mainstream media remain important through their ability to legitimize various
environmental discourses and make them available to a wider public, and their attention
is still courted by advocacy groups.

Dissertation overview
This dissertation examines the how climate risks are constructed by advocacy
groups and their interactions with various forms of media. The principal method
employed is critical discourse analysis (CDA), a form of qualitative textual analysis.
CDA has a number of advantages for this study. Discourses are “a shared way of
apprehending the world” and “construct meanings and relationships, helping to define
9

common sense and legitimate knowledge” (Dryzek, 2005, p. 9). A discourse contains set
of shared principles which help to organize and make sense of the world in particular
ways. CDA is suited for analyzing issues of political power as it focuses not just on the
text but the social context in which it is embedded and the relationships between other
discourses and power structures. Because environmental issues are not comprehensible to
people in their own right and have to be given meaning through discourse, questions of
power – who gets to define environmental risks, and how they are understood in relation
to other social forces – are particularly salient.
Three case studies are used to explore the different ways in which humans’
relationship to the environment in the Anthropocene is being conceptualized by advocacy
groups and how they are putting these ideas into practice. Each focuses on the activities
of a particular advocacy group representing different environmental discourses. The three
organizations are 350, a climate activist organization, The Breakthrough Institute, a
think-tank, and The Nature Conservancy, an established environmental NGO. All
acknowledge the untenability of the distinction between society and nature, that humans
are a major force influencing the planet’s biophysical systems and thus need to more
consciously or deliberatively manage our environmental impacts, and yet all have very
different assumptions, objectives and tactics in their advocacy. Analysis concentrates on
key moments of public contention, when the activities of the organization are brought
into the public realm and different discourses interact with one another. Texts analyzed
include the organizations’ campaign and advocacy material along with media coverage.
Key points of comparison between the cases are how the organizations construct the
10

boundaries between human society and the natural world, the attitude of the organizations
towards dominant socio-political institutions, and how the organizations see the role of
the public in addressing environmental problems and building a common future.
Chapter 4, ‘Politicizing climate change: Challenging power through fossil fuel
divestment,’ focuses on 350’s campaign to encourage divestment from fossil fuel
companies. 350, founded by environmental writer Bill McKibben in 2007, quickly
established itself as one of the more prominent and successful climate activist
organizations. The specific focus of the chapter is the ‘Fossil Free’ divestment campaign,
which encourages colleges and universities to sell any investments they have in fossil
fuel companies. While superficially economic in nature, the divestment movement aims
for a broad societal transformation, based on confronting power and bringing a
politicized discourse to public debate on climate change. The goal is to weaken the
economic and political power of fossil fuel companies, as part of an effort to assert
greater citizen-led democratic control over institutions currently outside the democratic
process yet which have the power to profoundly shape the future of the planet.
Chapter 5, ‘Ecomodernism: The Breakthrough Institute’s theology for the
Anthropocene,’ examines the activities of think-tank The Breakthrough Institute (BTI)
and its founders, Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus. The BTI explicitly aims to
change the way environmental problems are conceptualized and addressed through
policy, advocating an approach based on innovation and technology rather than trying to
limit human impact. They first came to prominence in 2004 with their highly
controversial report The Death of Environmentalism (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004),
11

which excoriated the environmental movement for what they saw as its failure to deal
with modern environmental risks such as climate change. Keeping up their attacks on
environmentalists and environmental justice advocates, the BTI and its associates also
continued to develop an alternative approach to politics in the Anthropocene which they
called ‘ecomodernism.’ While questioning the assumptions of environmentalism and
pressing the need to take ownership of humanity’s impact on the biosphere, the
ecomodernists’ faith in technology risks leaving structural social inequalities
unaddressed.
Chapter 6, ‘Gardening the Anthropocene: Conservation after the end of nature’
looks at how conservation organizations address the challenge of preserving nature, in an
era when nature is said to have ended. The major focus of the chapter is the largest
American environmental non-profit, The Nature Conservancy (TNC). Traditionally
focused on place-based conservation efforts, TNC has always utilized a nonconfrontational approach based on buying up land and working with corporations and
other stakeholders. The rise of the concept of the Anthropocene and the emergence of
climate change as the central environmental issue have presented a dilemma for TNC, as
it becomes less tenable to speak of protecting an unspoiled, pristine nature. In response,
leading figures within the organization have advanced alternative approaches for
conservation practice – an ‘ecosystem services’ model where the value of natural
resources is quantified based on the benefits they provide to human populations, and a
related intellectual movement known as ‘new conservation’ which promotes conservation
explicitly for human wellbeing rather than protecting nature for its own sake. These
12

moves cause tensions for TNC’s public advocacy and fundraising efforts, which often
rely on ideas of protecting a pristine, untouched nature in order to solicit donations from
the membership base.
All three organizations try to articulate a new politics for the Anthropocene which
redefines humans’ relationship to their impacts on the environment. The ways in which
they go about this are shaped by a number of factors – their political commitments, the
history and legacy of the organization and the people involved, and the need to reach a
particular audience and raise money. The organizations must often negotiate a delicate
balance between their political goals and strategic or financial imperatives. While climate
change politics and advocacy is about the effects humans have on the physical
environment, the erosion of boundaries between human and natural systems means that
the entrenched social institutions and practices which give rise to these impacts are
equally important. While such processes are often not subject to the direct control of
democratic political institutions, they are nonetheless influenced by broader cultural
currents, and it is here that advocacy groups seek a place to intervene. Analysis of the
communication activities of the organizations and how their ideas are represented and
contested in other media shows not only how they construct the particular issue of
climate change but their relationship to societal power structures. How the organizations
build their case for action involves discursive acts which define or re-define the
boundaries between nature and society and what (and who) is to be included or excluded
from political concern. Unless directly challenged, these new formations will reproduce
existing power structures and inequalities. Shaping the future of the entire planet is a
13

daunting and vastly complex undertaking, and no single approach will alone be sufficient.
But given the stakes, it is crucial to ensure that these decision-making processes are able
to be politically contested and are democratically accountable.

14

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

Risk society, reflexive modernization, and the environment
The promises of enlightened modernity, the taming and control of nature and the
triumph of scientific rationality, have also given rise to a host of unintended and
unexpected consequences which threaten the legitimacy of modern institutions. Far from
being tamed or controlled, nature, through its interaction with industrial society, is
unleashing ever-more deadly catastrophes. The structures built to protect humans from
nature are themselves a source of danger. Tindale (1998) argues that “while the preEnlightenment consciousness regarded environmental risks as natural and unavoidable,
the work of God or other unknown forces, the post-Enlightenment consciousness
recognizes that some of them are manufactured” (p. 56). This recognition, however, is
not universal or uncontroversial, and the nature or even the existence of such sociallyproduced threats is often subject to much debate. Climate change is an archetypal
example of a modern risk – the emission of greenhouse gases is a by-product of industrial
society, of things working as they should and yet producing potentially devastating sideeffects. Ulrich Beck’s risk society theory (Beck, 1992) is one of the more comprehensive
and influential theoretical approaches in this area. Beck starts from the position that that
there has been a shift in focus in society, from external dangers – those imposed by
nature, such as natural disasters – to internal dangers – those, that arise from human
society itself, and that through this recognition we are entering a ‘new modernity.’

15

This shift from a ‘first’ to ‘second’ modernity Beck (1992) calls reflexive
modernization. Beck, Bonss and Lau (2003) distinguish it from the usual processes of
change and upheaval which characterize the first modernity in that it not only changes
social structures but calls into question the principles of modernity itself and dissolves its
previously taken-for-granted premises. The premises of first modernity that they identify
– including social relations contained within the nation-state, bounded individualization,
exploitation and control of nature based on scientific rationality, and differentiation of
societal functions – are increasingly subject to challenge. The side-effects and unintended
consequences of modernity make such arrangements increasingly untenable. As Latour
(2003) notes, reflexivity is not about people gaining “an increase in mastery and
consciousness, but only a heightened awareness that mastery is impossible and that
control over actions is now seen as a complete modernist fiction” (p. 36) due to the
intractability of modernity’s unintended consequences. What this means in practice – as
well as how to grasp these changes through academic inquiry – can be unclear, as the
entire system of coordinates within which social change previously happened are
destabilized. Beck et al. (2003) point out that “the institutionalized answers of first
modern society to its self-produced problems – for example, more and better technology,
more economic growth, more scientific research and more specialization – are less
persuasive than they once were, although it is not at all clear what should take their
place” (p. 7).
Bruno Latour’s scholarship also chronicles broad changes in the trajectory of
modern social organization. His starting point is how scientific knowledge and its objects
16

of study in the ‘natural’ world interact with society, or the world of humans. Modernity,
for Latour (1993), is characterized by two sets of practices. One is ‘translation’, which is
the creation and proliferation of ‘hybrids’ of nature and society, of the human and the
non-human, which are linked together in networks. Climate change is an example of a
hybrid; a set of processes and impacts in the physical environment that arise from human
activity. The process that characterizes modernity other is purification, which is the
separation of nature and culture, and a refusal to acknowledge the existence of hybrids.
While purification, separating the world of humans from the world of nature, is
recognized and celebrated by the moderns as the reason for their success, Latour argues
that this success is in fact due to the link between purification and translation, the
simultaneous proliferation of nature-culture hybrids and their banishment. By examining
both of these processes together and taking account of the hybrids and networks that
emerge, we can see that the modern world is not a clean break from the premodern.
Nature and society remain as intimately entangled as they ever were – hence Latour’s
claim that “we have never been modern.” For instance, economic growth depends on the
environment and resources obtained from nature, but recognizing this fact would mean
slowing down the rate of environmental degradation and hence putting a brake on the
economy. As long as the dual processes of entanglement between nature and society, and
their official separation, are allowed to go on in parallel, the principles of industrial
society will remain unchallenged. But as people become more conscious of these selfproduced threats, an “unintended, unplanned and unpolitical” (Beck, 1992, p. 3)
transition begins to take place and certain features of industrial society become socially
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and politically problematic. As Beck (1994) puts it, “The abstraction of nature leads into
industrial society. The integration of nature into society leads beyond industrial society”
(p. 27).
We become able to view these previously hidden processes of translation due to a
crisis of confidence in modernity arising in the late 20th century. Hybrids have
proliferated to such an extent that they can no longer be ignored – whereas hybrids could
previously be purified as belonging to either the social world or the natural, to be dealt
with by either science or politics, new formations mean this is no longer possible. The
moderns “have been victims of their own success” (Latour, 1993, p. 49), in that modern
social and political systems can no longer deal with the problems they have created. An
issue such as climate change manifests mainly through ‘natural’ systems such as the
weather and is discoverable through science – yet it is caused by the actions of humans.
Nature and culture, science and politics, are inextricably bound together, with one not
reducible to the other.
It is clear, then, that Beck and Latour are covering a lot of the same ground. Both
are concerned with the side-effects, the unintended consequences of modernization, and
what happens when they are not able to be dealt with by the set of institutional
arrangements which created them. The connection has been noted by both authors (e.g.
Beck et al., 2003; Latour, 2003). Latour (2003) writes that Beck’s notion of risk is
analogous to his idea of a network, a dense entanglement of “unexpected associations
between heterogeneous elements” (p. 36). The notion of externalities is key to both
theories:
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Put quite simply, second modernity is first modernity plus its
externalities: everything that had been externalized as irrelevant or
impossible to calculate is back in – with a vengeance. This is nowhere
clearer than in the ecological crisis: there is no longer any outside that can
be considered as irrelevant. (Latour, 2003, p. 37)
Climate change is in many ways an archetypal example of the type of risk that
characterizes the shift to reflexive modernization. It is the product of human actions and
yet it did not arise out of a conscious human decision or as a result of something going
wrong. The threats to humanity posed by nuclear weapons, say, or chemical or biological
engineering, remain hypothetical until deliberately activated. Climate change, meanwhile,
arises in most cases not as a result of a conscious decision but as a by-product of our way
of life: catastrophe is almost inevitable if things simply carry on as they are. The heating
of the atmosphere through burning fossil fuels is, in effect, an outcome of an economic
system working as it is supposed to. It is this which makes the issue so fiercely contested.
Most political and economic institutions have a vested interest in the maintenance of the
socio-political status quo, and see the changes advocated as necessary for dealing with
climate change as a threat to their interests. Addressing climate change will, one way or
another, involve significant changes to institutions, and the value systems which underlie
them, which are highly resistant to change.
Related to this, responsibility for causing the problem is difficult to pin down and
subject to debate, and there is a large divide, both spatial and temporal, between causes
and impacts. The institutions of modernity, then, seem ill-equipped to deal with the risks
they have created. This means, following theorists such as Beck, Latour and Giddens
(1994), a wide-ranging reconceptualization of social relations. It is no longer possible to
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ignore the environmental externalities of modernization. Nor it is enough to address
environmental problems only as they arise, as has been the case with much environmental
politics. Rather, these unintended consequences must be incorporated as part of the
normal process of politics; learning, as Latour (2012) puts it, to “love our monsters.” The
implications of this will be explored in the following sections, with consequences for
scientific knowledge, political decision-making and global affairs, amongst others.

Scientific knowledge in risk construction
As it becomes impossible to ignore the problems that are generated by industrial
society, risks take on an increasingly central role in politics. Modernity and industrial
society base much of their legitimacy on the exploitation, and more importantly, the
control, of the natural world. Nature is conceptualized mainly as a resource for economic
growth and a set of variables which could be manipulated for managing the human
population. This came about due to the expansion of scientific rationality as a way of
interpreting the world, and the related rise of industrial modes of production which place
greater demands on natural resources. This perspective is informed by what Dryzek
(2005) calls the ‘promethean discourse,’ which sees the environment solely as a store of
matter and energy to be used in the pursuit of material progress and economic expansion.
Prometheanism, as Dryzek notes, floats free from any sense of environmental constraints,
with the economy and environment seen as completely separate from one another.
Scientific knowledge is instrumental to industrial society. The risks generated as a
result of technoscientific advances and subsequent shift towards reflexivity “extends
scientific skepticism to the inherent foundations and external consequences of science
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itself. In that way both its claim to truth and claim to enlightenment are demystified”
(Beck, 1992, p. 155; emphasis in original). So while there have always been debates over
science in the public realm, Beck’s contention is that under the conditions of the first
modernization these would have been resolved scientifically, without calling into
question the principles of science itself. Some critiques of Beck (e.g. Harding, 2008;
Latour, 2003) have argued that his break between first and second modernities is a little
too clean, and that many of the practices he ascribes to reflexive modernization have
always been present. At any rate, under reflexive modernization, the foundations of
science and by extension the broader project of modernity are increasingly challenged.
Previously taken-for-granted presuppositions about what counted as rational are
politicized, and notions of proof and responsibility are increasingly complicated
(Demeritt, 2006). Additional scientific information is no longer enough to resolve
arguments, as more information simply uncovers more risks and side-effects; and a
pluralization of rationalities and valid claims to knowledge alters the boundaries between
scientific and lay knowledge (Beck et al., 2003). This points to a greater role for public
debate in defining the role and limits of scientific knowledge.
A consequence of the demystification of scientific knowledge claims is that they
are also de-monopolized: scientists lose their exclusive right to make claims about the
world. As Beck (1992, p. 156) puts it, “science becomes more and more necessary, but at
the same time, less and less sufficient, for the socially binding definition of truth”
(emphasis in original). A flood of differentiated, conditional and uncertain knowledge
claims results in a “hyper-complexity of hypothetical knowledge” and
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systematically produced uncertainty [which] spreads to external relations,
and conversely turns the target groups and appliers of scientific results in
politics, business and the public into active coproducers in the social
process of knowledge definition. The ‘objects’ of scientization also
become subjects of it, in the sense that they can and must actively
manipulate the heterogeneous supply of scientific interpretations. (Beck,
1992, p. 157; emphasis in original)
The production and application of scientific results are able to be appropriated by various
groups in society. The increased differentiation of knowledge means not only a choice
between competing and contradictory claims, but the ability to play such claims against
each other in public. The selection criteria for various competing claims include
“compatibility of basic political views, the interests of sponsors, the anticipation of
political implications; in short, political acceptance” (Beck, 1992, p. 168). This, as Beck
notes, is a two-edged sword: while it presents the opportunity to free social practice from
the constraints of science, it can also mean that socially prevailing ideologies can adopt
scientific claims which support their position, potentially leading to a “feudalization of
scientific knowledge practice through economic and political interests” (p. 157).
This fracturing of scientific claims according to ideological position becomes
critical when a society is faced with the type of internal risk which threatens its very
survival. Such scenarios are a threat to the existing socio-political order of a society, as
there are no societal institutions which can adequately prepare for or guarantee order
during the worst possible scenario. The only remaining possibility is to deny that the
danger exists, and there are many institutions which are specialized in doing just that
(Beck, 1999). The justification for this denial is also, of course, found in science:
“ideologies and prejudices, now scientifically armed, are able to defend themselves anew
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against science. They take recourse to science itself in order to reject its claims” (Beck,
1992, p. 169). The type of existential crisis which paves the way for the increased
reflexivity and pluralism in scientific claims-making is therefore liable to be ignored or
contested as a result, because acknowledging its existence also acknowledges the
inadequacy of the socio-political status quo. As Beck (1999) remarks, “political stability
in risk societies is the stability of not thinking about things” (p. 53).
Examples of this abound in debates over climate change. Gelbspan (2004) and
McCright and Dunlap (2000; 2003) chart how the anti-environmental movement
mobilized after 1990 to “construct the non-problematicity of global warming” (McCright
& Dunlap, 2003, p. 348). Conservative think-tanks provided a platform for a handful of
skeptical scientists to disseminate their views through a variety of publication channels,
including the media. At the same time, a massive public relations and lobbying campaign
was mounted by fossil fuel companies. Wider cultural factors such as the Republican
takeover of Congress in 1994 helped to downplay the importance of climate change in the
public arena. Science is still mainly used as a basis for contestation of the issue, with
skeptics arguing that policy decisions must be based on ‘sound science’ and dismissing
the findings of mainstream science as ‘junk science’ (Demeritt, 2006; Jacques, Dunlap, &
Freeman, 2008). Lahsen (2007) found that “deconstructions of science in political arenas
... tend to be partial and ‘lop-sided,’ as actors typically deconstruct the scientific
arguments of their opponents while resorting to objectivist language to promote their own
preferred scientific interpretations and political agendas” (p. 174).

23

Risk politics
A key feature of risk society, then, is the importance of public processes of
deliberation and contestation. Climate change and other risky side-effects of modernity
exist in a “perpetual state of virtuality” (Beck, 2006, p. 332), always something to be
anticipated, and generally invisible for most people except in discourse. Risks are
therefore constructed, and how they are constructed and by whom becomes a key site of
power struggle in society; what Beck (2009) calls “relations of definition.” The public
task of science is to in fact enable controversy and hence democracy:
Debate begins based on the recognition that science offers a multitude of
options; that there are controversies among scientists as well as within the
public; and that the problem is how to resolve all these differences
democratically. (Beck et al., 2003, p. 21).
Public intervention in science becomes more influential, such that “the public sphere ...
would be charged as a second centre of ‘discursive checking’ of scientific laboratory
results in the crossfire of opinions” (Beck, 1992, p. 119). Rather than take science at its
word, there is an erosion of the boundaries between expert and lay knowledge and
science is subjected to the force of public opinion, which helps to separate the good (or
worthwhile for the sake of society) science from the bad: “only a strong competent public
debate ‘armed’ with scientific arguments is capable of separating the scientific wheat
from the chaff” (Beck, 1992, p. 119). This is clearly a problematic notion. If science is
open to contestation from interest groups, on what basis can it inform public policy? How
can the lay public be expected to arbitrate between competing ‘scientific’ viewpoints?
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The perspective on threats to modernity generated from its own institutions is did
not emerge from the environmental movement. In The Public and its Problems, John
Dewey (1927) argued that the public forms not out of concern over actions but their
consequences. More specifically, the indirect and unintended consequences of private
actions, when they affect others not directly involved in the initial actions, become
public. Publics, and hence politics, are based around the recognition and regulation of
these consequences: “The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect
consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those
consequences systematically cared for” (Dewey, 1927, p. 16). As Latour (2011) points
out, Dewey “invented reflexive modernization before the term was coined” (p. 11).
Dewey also points to the complexities and interrelations of industrial society,
operating at a global scale, which impinge in unknown and often unexpected ways on the
everyday lives of citizens:
The local face-to-face community has been invaded by forces so vast, so
remote in initiation, so far-reaching in scope and so complexly indirect in
operation, that they are, from the standpoint of the members of local
social units, unknown. ... An inchoate public is capable of organization
only when indirect consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to
project agencies which order their occurrence. At present, many
consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, but they
cannot said to be known, for they are not, by those who suffer them,
referred to by their origins. (Dewey, 1927, p. 131)
The process of challenging the foundations of industrial society through risk depends on
a widespread and shared knowledge of socially-produced risks. Environmental risks in
particular, though they do have material effects, are often not immediately apparent to
people in their everyday lives – either they take place in far-off locations (e.g. destruction
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of rainforests), happen in ways invisible to the naked eye (e.g. changes in atmospheric
chemistry), or involve threats likely to manifest themselves only in the future (e.g. sealevel rise).
When the institutions of modernity are unable to deal with the problems they
themselves have created, this leads to a destabilization and transformation of the social
order. For Beck (1994), the nature of distributional conflicts in politics shifts from
conflicts over ‘goods’ (jobs, income, social security) to distributional conflicts over
‘bads’, how the risks accompanying goods production can best be handled, prevented,
controlled, and legitimized. This is also accompanied by a process of individualization
(Giddens, 1994; Beck, 1994), which is conceptualised not in terms of atomization or
isolation but a ‘disembedding’ of individuals from communities such that they have to
take responsibility for aspects of their own lives, rather than through their pre-determined
role in a traditional social group. At the same time, this creates new interdependences,
which can extend globally, centered on the risks people have in common. For instance,
the global implications of everyday life choices become more salient, for example as
things like individual purchase decisions affect the life of someone far away or contribute
to global ecological damage (Giddens, 1994).
As the risks created by modern institutions come to the forefront of politics, the
domain of politics itself shifts. Existing political structures and power elites remain intact,
but their political monopoly is undermined and replaced by what Beck calls “subpolitics”
(Beck, 1994). Decisions about risks are made in domains such as science, business and
the private sector. While under industrial capitalism these had been protected from
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politics, their generation of negative externalities can no longer be ignored under
reflexive modernization, and so they are increasingly opened up to political contestation.
Furthermore, many risks are global in nature, in the sense that they do not respect
national borders and have the potential to affect people in many different parts of the
world. Climate change, nuclear accidents, risks associated with genetic modification and
financial crises are all examples of socially-produced risks which are global in their
effects. As people attend to risks, they begin to become aware of their place in a larger
threatened world, leading to an ‘unintended’ or ‘enforced’ cosmopolitanism: “Global
risks tear down national boundaries and jumble together the native with the foreign. The
distant other is becoming the inclusive other – not through mobility but through risk”
(Beck, 2006, p. 331).
Addressing environmental risks, then, requires a reconceptualization of how
science, politics, nature, and everyday life relate to one another. For a variety of theorists,
this involves expanding processes of debate, dialogue and deliberation such that debates
over science and risk are moved out of the closed world of scientific institutions and into
the public realm. Williams and Matheny (1995) propose a ‘dialogic model’ where a
“politically-relevant truth” emerges from open dialog between experts, policymakers and
communities. Science still provides a model for the structuring of substantively rational
human communities, though it is seen as a social process not immune from values and
biases which can be taken into consideration. Similarly, Latour’s “parliament of things”
is a space where all relevant parties in a given risk crisis, representing both the human
and non-human worlds, come together in recognition of their entanglement. Latour
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(2011) argues that two meanings of the word ‘representation’ have merged – the
scientific representation of nature, and the political representation of people. In the
controversy over climate change, for instance,
some of these spokespersons represent the high atmosphere, others the
lobbies of oil and gas, still others nongovernmental organizations, still
others represent, in the classical sense, their electors. The sharp difference
that seemed so important between those who represented things and those
who represented people has simply vanished. What counts is that all those
spokespersons are in the same room, engaged in the same collective
experiment, talking at once about imbroglios of people and things. It does
not mean that everything is political, but that a new politics certainly has
to be devised. (Latour, 2011, p. 4)

The politics of the Anthropocene
The subpolitical processes arising from industrial modernity mean that the
direction of society is being shaped by forces – economic, scientific, technological – over
which the general citizenry has no control. The environmental movement can be seen in
part as an attempt to remedy this; to give citizens a voice in decisions which affect their
lives and futures. This means recognizing the erosion of the boundary between nature and
society, and that humans have an enormous impact on natural processes and systems.
Instead of leaving humanity’s relationship with and impact on nature in the subpolitical
processes of unelected institutions acting largely in their own interests, reflexive
modernization and related approaches seek to take conscious control of these processes in
the interests of citizens; a deliberate shaping of both the human and natural worlds in line
with the values collectively decided on by society. As Stewart Brand (1968) famously
stated in the inaugural edition of the Whole Earth Catalogue, “We are as gods and might
as well get good at it.”
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The idea that the physical environment of the planet is being shaped in large part
by humans is encapsulated in the concept of the Anthropocene. Popularized by
atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and biologist Eugene Stoermer in the early 2000s, the
Anthropocene (meaning ‘age of humans’) was proposed as a name for a new geological
epoch “to emphasize the central role of mankind in geology and ecology” (Krutzen &
Stoermer, 2000). The Anthropocene would replace the Holocene, the current epoch in
which human civilization has developed dating to the end of the last ice age, ten to twelve
thousand years ago. Krutzen and Stoermer cited a range of evidence showing the extent
of human impact on various biological and physical systems, including land use change,
species extinction, the nitrogen cycle, and the ozone hole, as well as the effects of climate
change caused by greenhouse gas emissions. They proposed a start date for the
Anthropocene of the late 18th century, due to the global effects of humankind’s impact
becoming visible around this time, although they acknowledged the exact starting point
was somewhat arbitrary. The term ‘Anthropocene’ has become increasingly prevalent in
scientific and popular discourse as a way of framing and understanding human impact on
the environment.
Scholars from different disciplines have argued for different starting points. Some
anthropologists and archaeologists have argued for a “long Anthropocene” dated to the
beginning of human expansion across the Earth – and particularly the development of
agriculture when human impact on a large scale first became evident (Balter, 2013). The
International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS), a body of geologists which decides on
whether proposed names of geological timespans should be formalized, set up a working
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group to investigate whether the Anthropocene should be officially recognized as part of
Earth’s geologic history. In deciding on division between epochs, the ICS requires
geological evidence, a so-called “golden spike” which shows up in permanent rock layers
– whereas the biological and atmospheric changes observed by biologists and climate
scientists, while having a huge impact on earth, may be less evident in the eventual
geological record. In August 2016, the Anthropocene working group of the ICS proposed
the mid-20th century as the most likely candidate for a golden spike owing to the
worldwide dispersion of plutonium from nuclear tests leaving a permanent signature in
the geological record (Voosen, 2016).
While there are debates amongst geologists about the validity of the concept
(Scourse, 2016) or its exact starting point, the Anthropocene is also a discourse or system
of thought. As Boes and Marshall (2014) argue, “regardless of when the Anthropocene is
agreed to have begun, what is different now is that it is being recognized or named as
such” (p. 66). Schlosberg (2013) poses the key questions for this era:
How do human beings manage the new world we have constructed, or
deconstructed? How do we understand and respond to those impacts and
react to, redesign, and take some sort of conscious control over systems
we now acknowledge we already run? (p. 15).
Crist (2007) argues that the very use of the term “works to entrench its reality and
consequences” (p. 52). She is critical of the concept, contending that
enunciating the Anthropocene further normalizes human interference
with, and use of, every natural system on the planet. Masquerading as
realism, the declaration of the Anthropocene contributes to fixing the
course of history in the specific direction that the concept circumscribes.
(p. 53)
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In one sense, then, the Anthropocene is compatible with a technocratic or resourcemanagerialist approach (see Dryzek, 2005), where all aspects of nature can be described,
predicted and controlled through scientific rationality. The technological solutions and
global governance regimes which arise from this perspective lend themselves to an
expansion of modernity’s project to the entire planetary biosphere (Dibley, 2012). As
Luke (1997) points out, though, the compatibility of this outlook with prevailing sociopolitical regimes has meant that it has been successful in protecting parts of the biosphere
from degradation and exploitation.
Others, however, note the ambivalence and ambiguity in the notion of the
Anthropocene. Lövbrand, Stripple and Wiman (2009) analyze how the concept “both
challenges and reproduces the Enlightenment promise of human self-realization,
autonomy and control” (p. 8). Viewing the earth as an interconnected system and
recognizing the importance of humans within it emphasizes complexity and uncertainty,
and places limits on the ability of scientific knowledge to predict, let alone control, our
environmental future. This perspective, through its incorporation of human impacts,
draws attention to the unintended consequences of modernization and reflexively
examines the institutions of modernity. Control means not just control over non-human
nature but over the institutions and technology which now form a crucial part of the earth
system. This is closer to Brand’s original intention with his ‘we are as gods’ statement,
which counterposed the increasing harms being done by government, big business,
education and organized religion with a developing “realm of intimate, personal power ...
power of the individual to conduct his own education, find his own inspiration, shape his
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own environment” (Brand, 1968, p. 2). Reflexivity and individualization (Beck, 1994;
Giddens, 1994) here are key to designing a more socially and ecologically just society.
Similarly, Schlosberg (2013) sees hope in a localized, embodied “sustainable
materialism” that resists participation in “the flows of power that reproduce practices that
damage ecosystems or contribute to climate change” (p. 16). Latour (2010) uses the term
“compositionism,” referring to the task of deliberately putting together or composing the
world in which we wish to live. He too argues that ‘the Anthropocene’ is a recognition of
the untenability of the barrier between nature and politics. We can no longer seek to
return to a pristine nature, to put things back as they were before human intervention – as
Schlosberg (2013) puts it, “it is no longer possible to look back to history to guide new
practices of management or restoration. In creating the environment of the future, the
human-induced anthropocene has made the past irrelevant” (p. 15). Nor, however, can we
continue on as before, relying on science and innovation to manage nature for us.
Of course, how all of this plays out at the level of actual political action is another
matter. In spite of Beck’s claim that we have transitioned to a new modernity, or that
such a transition is unavoidable, this assumption is not shared by many of the actors
involved in political debates. As Dryzek (2005) chronicles, there are a multitude of
differing approaches to the relationship between humans and their environment, both
within the environmental movement and outside it. The perspective advanced by Beck
and Latour has been critiqued on a number of grounds, principally in that it is too
universalizing and Euro-centric, ignoring cultural differences and the perspectives of
minorities (Harding, 2008). Harding critiques Latour for intentionally ignoring the
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contributions of social movements and identity politics, arguing that his desire to locate a
common ground and escape from a multiplicity of beliefs and interest groups blinds him
to the importance of differences in advancing the growth of knowledge and democratic
politics. “The big news Latour’s account brings,” she argues,
is not that ‘we’ have never been modern, but that bourgeois, Western men
who get to construct philosophies of science and political philosophies
have never achieved the status to which they aspired. (Harding, 2008, p.
45)
Similarly, Dryzek (2005) notes that risks are not as ‘democratic’ as Beck claims –
although climate change affects the rich as well as the poor, risks are still distributed to a
large extent along class lines.
Dryzek also points out that the open and participatory decision-making implied by
reflexive modernization is more suited to corporatist political systems (such as Germany)
rather than those, such as the United States, with a stronger tendency towards economic
liberalism. More broadly, reflexive modernization presumes a non-adversarial approach
to politics, in which, as Mouffe (2005) summarizes,
conflicts can be pacified thanks to the ‘opening up’ of a variety of public
spheres where, through dialogue, people with very different interests will
make decisions about the variety of issues which affect them and develop
a relation of mutual tolerance allowing them to live together. (Mouffe,
2005, p. 48)
She argues that this places too little emphasis on power relations, as the struggles to
democratize the institutions of modernity will involve doing battle with entrenched
interests who are not likely to give up their power. Because the non-adversarial approach
to politics advocated by Beck and Giddens is unlikely to transform existing power
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relations, she contends that they remain “squarely within the traditional parameters of
liberal politics” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 52). This has echoes of Fraser’s (1992) critique of the
model of rational deliberation found in Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, in which
certain groups are systematically excluded and “social inequalities can infect
deliberation, even in the absence of any formal exclusions” (p. 119). Whiteside (2012)
makes a similar critique of Latour’s proposals for a ‘parliament of things’ where political
and scientific representation are merged, arguing that it looks very similar to ordinary
pluralist politics.
Added to this are the trans-national and trans-cultural dimensions of global
climate change, as the issues manifests itself differently in various parts of the world.
Boykoff and Rajan (2007) note that the cultural and historical framework in which
countries relate to the environment is a powerful driver of public opinion and policy
towards climate change. They argue that Britain’s constrained geography and powerful
cultural institutions explains at least in part that country’s different response to climate
change than the United States, which has a stronger emphasis on economic freedom and
personal consumption. Non-Western countries have a very different experience of
modernity than those in the West. Arsel (2005), writing about environmentalism in
Turkey, questions whether the processes of a second (reflexive) modernization are
relevant in a country where the first (industrial) modernization is yet incomplete. And
more broadly, within cultures there can exist a multitude of overlapping temporalities, a
complex articulation of various interconnected strands of tradition and modernity
(Kraidy, 2005; García-Canclini, 1995). While for Schlosberg (2013) we cannot look to
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the past as a guide for creating the environment of the future, the past nonetheless
remains relevant in how human cultures relate to the environment, cultures which are
themselves shaped by their physical place. And where Shellenberger and Nordhaus
(2011), wholeheartedly embracing Latour’s philosophy, see a commitment to
modernization as a salvation from ecological problems, they ignore the differing
meanings and trajectories of modernization in non-Western contexts.

Climate change, discourse and media
Risks such as climate change, as discussed above, are socially constructed,
unknowable except when given meaning through discourse. Knowledge about risks is as
much the outcome of politics as it is science, with the ‘reality’ of risk able to be
“dramatized or minimized, transformed or simply denied” according to prevailing norms
and the outcomes of contestation amongst competing interest groups (Beck, 2009, p. 30).
A number of different authors have identified and categorized common discourses used
in environmental politics (e.g. Dryzek, 2005; Luke, 1997; Hajer, 1995; Bäckstrand and
Lövbrand, 2007).
Risks are outcome of complex processes of interaction between institutions,
expertise, citizens, technologies and the ‘non-human’ or natural world. To a large extent,
these relationships depend on complex negotiations of trust between various actors. In the
risk society, as Giddens (1994) points out, in contrast to enlightenment thinking, risk
moves from being a precise, calculable phenomenon to an uncertain array of scenarios,
whose plausibility is connected to how many people are convinced by them and take
action on that basis. Trust in experts is based purely on the assumption of technical
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competence in a given field, and can be withdrawn at a moment’s notice if assumptions
about the value of that expertise were to change. Trust in “abstract systems is bound up
with collective lifestyle patterns, themselves subject to change ... There is a fundamental
sense in which the whole institutional apparatus of modernity ... depends on potentially
volatile mechanisms of trust” (Giddens, 1994, p. 90). Where individuals ‘invest’ their
trust can have deep subversive impacts on the core institutions of society.
So the extent to which citizens take environmental risks seriously depends on
their level of trust in particular experts, and also in particular media. Humphreys and
Thompson (2014) found that news media coverage of environmental disasters works to
reaffirm viewers’ trust in experts while shielding institutions from systemic critiques. As
Williams and Delli Carpini (2011) argue, information about political issues, including
environmental risks, comes as much from ‘entertainment’ media as it does from news.
Fictional media are a source of knowledge not only about the ‘facts’ of risks, but deeper
‘truths’ about social relations. They argue that to improve public debate on such issues,
all media sources need to in some ways take responsibility for politically-relevant
information they disseminate, although the norms by which this is implemented will vary
by source and genre. Similarly, Silverstone (2006) argues that the playfulness of much
mediated culture complicates the relationship between factual and fictional. While trust is
a crucial component of mediation, it is often about the expectations of the medium or
genre, not the factuality of the story. He argues that
We cannot but trust in the media, for the media, despite their manifest
weaknesses, have to be trusted for social life to continue. But such trust
cannot be blind: it has to be sceptical, it has to be informed; it has to be
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part of the responsibility that is taken in everyday life by audiences: a
demand for accountability, but also a demand for respect. (Silverstone,
2006, p. 127)
Trust, for Silverstone, needs to be conditional and critical, which depends on active
engagement and a relatively high degree of media literacy. Rather than appealing to
dubious information hierarchies, we need to develop a full and sophisticated
understanding of the truth claims made in various media (Williams & Delli Carpini,
2011). As Williams and Delli Carpini point out, though, media literacy can always only
be part of the answer, especially for complex scientific and technical issues such as
environmental risks as most people have limited time and knowledge to make informed
judgments. The role of media professionals then becomes crucial, although any changes
will be driven by shifts in the expectations of audiences.
Media in the risk society
Communications media are a key space where risk controversies can be defined
and debated; they are, as Beck (2009) puts it, the “political site” of risk society. Beck’s
own work tends to undertheorize the role of the media. As discussed below, while he
grants them considerable importance, arguing “that we must attach major significance to
media staging and acknowledge the potential political explosiveness of the media” (Beck,
2010, p. 261), their complexities tend to be downplayed (Anderson, 2006; 2009). And
this is crucial, as complexity in the mediated realm is only increasing through processes
such as fragmentation of media platforms and outlets, increasing globalization of content,
and the proliferation of social media and increasing citizen participation.

37

For Silverstone (2006), the media represent the only viable public space available
to us in a world of global politics and interconnection. He argues that “the world and its
players appear in the media, and for most of us that is the only place they do appear.
Appearance itself becomes, in both sense of the word, the world” (p. 30). He calls this
space the ‘mediapolis,’ the “mediated public space where contemporary political life
increasingly finds its place nationally and globally, and where the materiality of the world
is constructed through (principally) electronically communicated public speech and
action” (p. 31). He acknowledges that viewers of different media see different worlds,
that it is a space fractured by cultural difference and the absence of communication, but
what is significant is that almost everyone sees and constructs the world through the
media, and that “it is through the mediapolis that public and political life increasingly
comes to emerge at all levels of the body politics (or not)” (p. 31). This mediated reality
does not replace the world of lived experience, but is intertwined and constantly engaged
with it. The media are environmental, in the sense of being tightly and dialectically
intertwined with the everyday. From this perspective, the mediated environment is as
important for dealing with risks as the physical environment. Silverstone even argues that
“pollution” of this media environment is as threatening to humanity as pollution of the
natural environment: “Securing the future of the physical environment will be of limited
value unless the symbolic one is equally secured” (p. 177).
Silverstone (2006) is unashamedly mediacentric in his theorization (“If this is
media-centrism, then so be it. It is time to grasp the nettle” (p. 162)), arguing that almost
all aspects of life that could once be conducted in unmediated or private contexts are no
38

longer free to be so. Nonetheless, saying that everything is dependent on the media,
however careful Silverstone might be in depicting them as contested and non-monolithic,
can obscure the material and symbolic forces which shape communication processes
(Kraidy, 2005). As Anderson (2006) points out, media representations of risks are the
product of complex sociocultural processes from both inside and outside media
institutions, and so understanding the communication of risk requires that attention be
paid to such processes.
The media, for Beck, are the where risks are staged; they are not only the means
of transmitting information to the public but where politics happens, where risks are
defined and contested: “the political site of world risk society is not the street but
television, the Internet – in short, the old and the new media” (Beck, 2009, p. 98). While
Beck has given progressively more attention to media as integral to the processes of risk
society, his treatment of them is not especially nuanced (although given that most of his
writing is at the level of broad social theory this is not entirely surprising). The ‘reality’
of risks, for Beck, is constructed through a process of contestation in the media. He
argues that a constructivist perspective is needed in tandem with the realist/scientific
perspective. The world risk society rests not only on scientifically-diagnosed problems,
but ‘transnational discourse coalitions’ (Beck, 2009, p. 86), made up of NGOs,
government agencies, international agreements, industries and scientists, which assert
within the public space the issues of the global environmental agenda. Real risks are thus
socially defined by such actors, who must defend their position against counter-coalitions
who challenge their monopoly over scientific knowledge.
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The metaphor of staging, while emphasizing the constructedness of risks in the
media, also implies a single ‘performance’ and audience. While there are broad
similarities in the ways news organizations cover issues such as climate change (Eide &
Kunelius, 2011; Cottle, 2009), the increasing proliferation of channels and fragmentation
of audiences means there are a multiplicity of often incompatible ‘stagings’. McCright
(2011) argues that the polarization of political elites and increasing balkanization of the
news media along partisan lines lead to greater ideological divisions, rather than
democratic deliberation. Beck also tends to conflate processes of mediation and
representation – the technological means by which the issue is transmitted and received,
and the ways in which it is portrayed in that medium – and treats different media as
“interchangeable means of propagation” (Pinchevski and Liebes, 2010, p. 282). Given the
multiplicity of channels available, the different modalities of various forms of media
technology can have significant consequences for how risks are articulated and
performed.
Cultural symbols therefore acquire key political significance; the question, as
Beck notes, is who defines or invents these symbols and how? Risks only exist in
symbolic form: “Risks are always events that are threatening. Without techniques of
visualization, without symbolic forms, without mass media, etc., risks are nothing at all”
(Beck, 2006, p. 332). It matters little whether or not the ‘objective’ danger to human life
is lower than it has been in the past, that life expectancies are higher than at any point in
history. The point is that the anticipation of disasters and destruction will itself produce a
“compulsion to act” (p. 332) and shape social relations in a certain way.
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There is an assumption in Beck’s writing that the turn to a risk society driven by
an increased awareness of socially-produced threats will lead to mediated messages
which undermine the traditional economic–industrial base of society. In this aspect of
Beck’s theory, the media are conceptualized as mostly playing an agenda-setting role,
drawing attention to environmental issues which results in increased salience of these
issues for members of the audience. At one level is it hard to argue with this – in the case
of environmental risks, for example, the rise in environmental concern and the emergence
of alternative forms of political engagement across the world do appear to support Beck’s
claims. However, as Borne (2009) notes, Beck’s proposal that an increase in
environmentally-aware behavior is a result of a reflexive awareness on the part of the
public relies on an information-deficit model of knowledge transfer. This model has been
heavily criticized on a number of grounds, including that it does not take into account
complex cognitive and social processes, or structural and institutional constraints that
may affect people’s actions. Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies
suggests that attitudes towards science and environmental actions arise out of a multitude
of complex individual and cultural factors (e.g. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh,
2007; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; Olausson, 2011; Potter & Oster, 2008). Borne’s findings
suggest that people hold contradictory attitudes towards environmental protection, aware
of global issues but thinking mainly in terms of their own life-worlds and the risks that
exist within them.
Other studies have made attempts to theoretically and empirically delineate the
role of media in the construction of risks and, more broadly, the interplay between
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environmental issues and communication flows. A nineteen-country study of news
coverage of international climate change negotiations found certain commonalities across
countries. Summing up the findings, Eide and Kunelius (2011) note that coverage had
two parallel features. For the most part, the issue was ‘domesticated’ or made familiar to
local audiences in very different ways depending on national history and traditions and
well as current political and economic interests. News on climate summits was strongly
dominated by national political actors, with nation-states seen as the ‘natural’ units for
the negotiations and the dominant discourse one of “nationally-based realism” (p. 41).
However, there was also a normative dimension to the coverage, with journalists from
different parts of the world treating the event as exceptional and coming together in an
“advocacy of hope moment” (p. 41) which transcended the nationally-based focus but
was also limited by it. They argue the climate summits create a “momentary global public
sphere” (p. 16) which is limited in its political effects, supporting Beck’s (2009)
contention that global risk communities exist primarily in a particular historical moment,
and suggest that while journalism has some autonomy in the transnational field it is also
to a large extent dependent on other powerful actors.
Cottle (2009), drawing from Beck, argues that global crises are endemic to the
contemporary global world and are enacted, or ‘staged’ in that same world through news
media. He writes, for instance, that climate change was, from 2007, staged as a
“constructed global spectacle” (p. 507) of dramatic and spectacularized imagery and
icons of globality. The use of such imagery means that “the abstract science of climate
change is rendered culturally meaningful and environmentally consequential;
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geographically remote spaces become literally perceptible, ‘knowable,’ places of possible
concern” (Cottle, 2009, p. 508). A related study by Lester and Cottle (2009) focused on
the imagery of climate change in television news in a variety of countries. They found
that while images of globality were presented, they were brought back within the
boundaries of the nation-state. Both studies find that while there is the potential for a
cosmopolitanization, global issues are often refracted through the lens of the national. No
singular logic drives coverage, but there is rather a complex interplay of global and local
forces. The “relations of definition” (Beck, 2009) which shape the representation and
visualization of global risks can work to either enhance or undermine the potential of the
media to foster ecological citizenship.
These relationships are also illustrated through the communication activities of
NGOs and campaign groups. Princen and Finger (1994) argue that the shift from national
to global environmental concern was reflected in the rise to dominance of transnational
NGOs and corresponded to a more general emergence of a global civil society in the
1980s. Many such groups operate in different countries around the world, with varying
degrees of local autonomy (Doyle, 2009). Local and national concerns are a major factor
in most awareness-raising activities. Transnational campaigns can efficiently reach large
numbers of people, but may not resonate as strongly. Adapting a message to a particular
national or local context, while potentially increasing its salience, may blunt its impact
somewhat as NGOs try to strike a balance between perceived environmental needs and
the interests of particular publics, abandoning a coherent philosophical approach in favor
of increased visibility (Heinz, Cheng, & Inzuka, 2007). It is not simply that
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environmental discourse is localized in each country, but that elements of both global and
local discourses are evident, such that “varying approaches to environmental activism and
protection are transported, sometimes distorted, and more often offered in seemingly
unproblematic parallel existence” (p. 32).
How publics are constituted in such contexts becomes increasingly complex, as
issues of global concern are brought down to local levels, and movements and campaigns
cross traditional political boundaries. As Cottle (2011) argues,
if the notion of a bounded national public sphere becomes increasingly
difficult to sustain in today’s digital and permeable communications
environment, this becomes even more improbable if simply scaled-up to
the global level and conceptualized as a universal ‘global public sphere.’
(p. 35)
Further, Fraser (2007) notes that the transnational level has no formal citizenship status or
means of influencing corresponding levels of governance. She questions the efficacy of
public opinion when it is not addressed to “a sovereign state capable in principle of
regulating its own territory and solving its citizens’ problems in the public interest” (p.
15). Nonetheless, as issues of political concern cannot be resolved by institutions at a
national level, new formations will inevitably emerge, and can become “constituted
normatively and culturally if not always institutionally and administratively” (Cottle,
2011, p. 36). Subpolitical processes in the Anthropocene extend the influence of humans
over what was previously considered the natural world and bring non-human actors under
political concern. These often do not map onto existing national political formations,
encompassing interactions which affect the entire world or play out within specific
physical geographies. Old structures remain influential, but the politics of climate change
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in the Anthropocene requires a more expansive view of how environmental impacts are
constituted and the means through which they can be influenced.
Studying these phenomena therefore requires a wariness of “methodological
nationalism” (Beck, 2006), and a commitment to tracing the connections that exist
between various actors and discourses. While national institutions and cultures still have
important effects, flows of money, media and environmental impacts can transcend
national borders, destabilizing existing arrangements and leading to
a game in which boundaries, basic rules and basic distinctions are
renegotiated – not only those between the national and the international
spheres, but also those between global business and the state,
transnational civil society movements, supra-national organizations and
national governments and societies. (Beck, 2006, p. 342)
The case studies in this dissertation examine the ways in which non-governmental
organizations are attempting to reconstitute politics and the new spheres of action in
which they seek to gain influence, and how they conceptualize the role of the public in
determining the direction of human influence over planetary systems.
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Chapter 3 – Methods and case studies

Apprehending the power dynamics and democratic implications of political
responses to the Anthropocene requires a contextually grounded approach which
examines the relationships between discursive formations of climate change and broader
cultural and political dynamics. Three case studies are analyzed in detail, to examine how
particular organizations, with differing political commitments and modes of operation,
are attempting to remake climate politics through their advocacy efforts, and their impact
on broader public discourse. The Fossil Free campaign, organized by climate activist
organization 350, deploys a social justice-centered approach and activist techniques to
intervene in the economic realm, through persuading large investors to sell their stocks of
fossil fuel companies. The Breakthrough Institute, a progressive think-tank, operates
mainly at a policy and elite-focused level, promoting an agenda of ‘ecomodernism’
focused on innovation, technology and growth. The Nature Conservancy, one of the
oldest and largest environmental organizations, emphasizes market-oriented ecosystem
services approaches to nature conservation, while insisting that pristine nature no longer
exists in the Anthropocene. The methodological approach used is critical discourse
analysis, which links the analysis of texts to their social context and relationship to power
structures. This chapter gives an overview of critical discourse analysis and its suitability
for studying the dynamics of late modernity and environmental issues in particular. It
then introduces the three case studies in more detail, and outlines the research design,
analytic plan, and primary materials.
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Critical discourse analysis
The primary method employed in this dissertation is critical discourse analysis
(CDA), a form of qualitative textual analysis. The discourse analytic tradition is
particularly suited to studying environmental problems and there is a large amount of
scholarship in this area (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2005; Luke, 1997; Alexander, 2009;
Pettenger, 2007). One characteristic of late modern social life is plurality and
fragmentation. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) point out, this is to a large extent a
question of language. A discourse is a “shared way of apprehending the world” (Dryzek,
2005, p. 9), which is based in a particular use of language based on a particular set of
common definitions, judgments, assumptions, and contentions. Chouliaraki and
Fairclough (1999) argue that the crucial insight in Habermas’ analysis of the public
sphere was that “a public sphere is constituted as a particular way of using language in
public, and the proliferation of public spheres is a proliferation of ways of using language
in public” (p. 5). This presents a problem for democracy and governance of societies; as
if everyone is using their own language there is little scope for identification of common
interests and effective citizen intervention into politics.
This is especially the case under conditions of reflexive modernization, where
traditional democratic structures are being superseded by other forms of power. As noted
above, the tendency towards subpolitics leads to a “decoupling of politics from
government” (Beck, 2009, p. 95) where decisions about social organization are
increasingly made outside the political institutions of the nation-state, through scientific
research, transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations. Critical
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discourse analysis is crucial here in at least two ways. Firstly, in finding effective forms
of dialogue across difference, and secondly, in bringing into democratic control aspects
of the social use of language which are currently outside it (Chouliaraki and Fairclough,
1999). As Beck (1994) points out, overcoming the paralysis that results from
subpoliticization requires the formation of “support networks crossing the boundaries of
systems and institutions, which must be personally connected and preserved” (p. 44). It is
only through these connections that power can be formed or opposed.
Analysis of the discursive strategies of social groups can help to elucidate the
assumptions and connections to power structures which inform their actions. It can also
highlight areas of commonality with other discourses, contributing to the opening of a
space for dialogue between groups, a voicing and expression of difference without
suppression of identity (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Where subpolitics takes the
democracy out of the political process, discourse analysis, with its broader orientation
towards questions of power and social structure, can make a contribution towards the
reclamation of politics by citizens. Berglez and Olausson (2013) point out that while the
depoliticization of climate change in public debate is well-theorized, there is “a need for
discourse analyses that are able to empirically explore the discursive elements that
function as post-political building blocks” (p. 55). This type of interpretive scholarship on
climate change is necessary to allow “alternative questions, neglected issues,
marginalized perspectives and different possibilities” (Blue, 2016, p. 68) to gain traction
in public deliberation.
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A principal advantage of critical discourse analysis as a method is its orientation
towards social context. The object of study is not only the linguistic or semantic features
of the text, but the social structures in which they are embedded and the array of other
discourses to which they relate. As Fairclough (2003) puts it, discourse analysis involves
“‘oscillating’ between a focus on specific texts and a focus on ... the ‘order of discourse’,
the relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself one element of the
relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices” (p. 3). The link between
the two levels of specific text and social practice is made through the way the texts are
analyzed, which involves not only linguistic analysis, but ‘interdiscursive analysis’, or
“seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and
articulate together” (p. 3).
What this suggests for discourse analysis is that careful attention should be paid
not only to the discourse under consideration, but also to the interdiscursive relationships
in the texts which can point to how different discourse types are mixed together
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 59). This combination of analysis of particular
texts along with their broader contexts is especially suited for environmental problems, as
Hajer explains:
Environmental discourse is an astonishing collection of claims and
concerns brought together by a great variety of actors. Yet somehow we
distil seemingly coherent problems out of this jamboree of claims and
concerns. ... [Discourse analysis does] not simply analyse what is being
said, but also includes the institutional context in which this is done and
which co-determines what can be said meaningfully (Hajer, 1995, p. 2).
The question of power relations is vitally important in studying the discourses
surrounding climate change. Discursive practices “situate actors in matrices of power,
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which privilege some interests and marginalise others” (Pettenger, 2007, p. 10).
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2007) note that discourse analysis has proliferated in the study
of global environmental change. Its central insight, they argue, is to identify “power
relationships associated with dominant narratives surrounding ‘environment’ and
‘sustainable development’” (p. 125).
Struggles over meaning and symbolic representation are particularly salient in
environmental politics, with environmental risks being, to a large extent, constructed
through discourse. The conflicts between different discourses and the interactions
between the actors who are involved in their creation make this process dynamic and
fluid as various parties try to attain discursive hegemony:
these conflicts are not to be conceptualized as semi-static plots in which
actors have fixed and well memorized roles of environmentalist, policymaker, scientist, or industrialist. On the contrary, environmental politics
becomes an argumentative struggle in which actors not only try to make
others see the problems according to their views but also seek to position
other actors in a specific way. (Hajer, 1995, p. 53)
The responses to environmental risks are intimately tied to the process of knowledge
construction. As Hajer (1995) points out, policies are not only devised to solve problems,
but problems have to be devised to be able to create policies.
Dryzek (2005) notes that analyzing discourse is about identifying the meanings
and relationships social actors construct through their use of language, which are bound
up with political power. Further, van Leeuwen (2008) makes the point that “there is no
neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories” (p. 24) and that focusing too
closely on the relationship between particular linguistic operations or categories risks
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overlooking relevant information. Meanings, he writes, “belong to culture rather than to
language and cannot be tied to any specific semiotic” (p. 24). This is a key reason
discourse analysis was chosen for this study over quantitative content analysis, which is
more directly linked to particular lexical features of the text. Although a great degree of
sophistication is certainly possible through coding and statistical analysis, discourse
analysis remains much more sensitive to meaning and context in examining the
relationships between texts and societal power structures.
A key tension in environmental risks is that between immediate, local or tangible
concerns on the one hand, and broader processes – in both the socio-political and
ecological domains – on the other. One of the key features of reflexive modernization and
subpolitics is a movement of political power from local and national political institutions
to unelected groups or bodies, such as corporations and NGOs, which do not necessarily
operate within national boundaries and often work at the transnational level. Global
processes are having an increasing impact on everyday life, through flows of goods,
capital and meanings which transcend national borders and the internationalizing of
political structures (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Tarrow, 2005). Environmental
issues also have a tendency towards globalization, with climate change in particular an
issue which is global in its causes and impacts, and which cannot be dealt with through a
patchwork of localized or even national responses but requires coordinated global action.
But this abstraction from tangible everyday reality can be distancing and is often
held up as one of the reasons that action on climate change has not achieved high levels
of popular or political support. Climate change is ultimately a global problem, and
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campaigners seek to respond to it on a proper scale, to build a coordinated global
movement to address what are global problems, and to influence the (sub)political
institutions operating at this level. However, this requires coordination across various
cultural perspectives and different discourses on the environment which arise from the
social context, history, physical geography and institutional arrangements of particular
cultures. While the issues under consideration in different contexts may be broadly
similar, their particular meanings may not be. Burningham and O’Brien (1994) argue that
because the environment generally has no fixed place in the patterns of everyday life, it
becomes a ‘matter for concern’ only when mobilized by particular social actors who act
according to their own goals in particular localized circumstances.
Environmental advocacy organizations have choices as to the level through which
they construct the problem of climate change. These choices are indicative of their
political or ideological commitments – whether they focus, for instance, on the actions
individuals can take in their daily lives and consumption habits or on mobilizing
collective action for broader institutional change; whether they emphasize the effects of
climate change on particular places or the planet as a whole; whether their concern is
more with mitigation of future changes or adaptation to the inevitable. These are not
mutually exclusive, of course, and the ways in which organizations draw from, combine
and reconfigure different environmental discourses in various contexts will be a major
focus of this study. Critical discourse analysis, with its orientation towards the
relationship between particular texts and broader social structures, is uniquely suited for
exploring these dynamics. As Latour (2005) argues, though, it is not enough to simply
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oscillate between the local/particular and the global/contextual or to ‘zoom’ from the
macro to the micro. He points out that “the Big Picture is just that: a picture. And then the
question can be raised: in which movie theatre, in which exhibit gallery is it shown?
Through which optics is it projected? To which audience is it addressed?” (p. 187,
original emphasis). Claims by environmental organizations – or social theorists for that
matter – to define and address environmental problems at a macro level need to be
interrogated critically. It is a matter of looking at where these structural effects are being
produced, and tracing the connections that exist at specific sites between the micro and
macro to determine how particular discourses are disseminated and reproduced.

Research design and analytic plan
This study examines a wide variety of sources in order to gain an understanding
of the types of discourse used by environmental advocacy groups, as well as the
relationships between discourses and between texts and institutions. The three case
studies present sufficient differences that a single framework is not applicable across all
of them, although there will obviously be commonalities. Analysis draws broadly from
Dryzek (2005) and his framework for analyzing discourses. Dryzek argues that
environmental discourses construct stories from the following elements: 1) ontology, or
the basic entities whose existence is recognized or constructed; 2) assumptions about
natural relationships; 3) agents and their motives, whether human or non-human; and 4)
key metaphors and other rhetorical devices. However, unlike Dryzek (2005), who isolates
particular discourses, the case studies presented here examines the various discourses that
are mobilized and deployed by environmental organizations and their interactions with
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other discourses. The emphasis is on interdiscursivity and intertextuality, focusing on the
organization of social relations through texts (Fairclough, 1992; Chouliaraki &
Fairclough, 1999).
Following Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s contention that critical discourse analysis
is particularly suited to studying the changes of late modernity, this study situates the
analysis in terms of a possible shift to reflexive modernization. Beck, Bonss and Lau
(2003) and Latour (2003) developed in consultation with one another a set of analytic
tests where it may be possible to see whether reflexive modernization is occurring. I draw
on three of these here. Firstly, the presentation of objects in a ‘risky’ fashion, with their
unintended consequences an expected part of the decision-making process and
inseparable from the initial facts. Second, a breakdown in the nature-society division,
where the labor of boundary-making becomes more visible and disputes become more
about attempts to draw boundaries. Third, a multiplying of rationalities and claims to
knowledge, and explicit recognition that these differences need to be resolved
democratically rather than scientifically.
Analysis focuses on three general areas. These three areas are interrelated and a
key aspect of the analysis is the linkages and tensions between them. The first area is the
publicly-available material used by the groups in their campaigning and advocacy. These
include organizations’ websites, social media presence, advertisements, and other
publications, and represent the primary spaces where the organizations articulate their
messages for a wider public and attempt to build support. The second area is the
conceptual underpinnings of the organization’s approach, found in books written by the
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founders or leaders of the organization in question – specifically, Break Through: From
the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility by Breakthrough Institute
founders Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2007), Nature's Fortune: How
Business and Society Thrive by Investing in Nature by Nature Conservancy CEO Mark
Tercek (2013), and Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet by 350 founder Bill
McKibben (2010). The third site for analysis is the trajectory of the organization’s
communication efforts in the broader public sphere. Again, as the three organizations
have different goals for their campaigning the material analyzed differs between case
studies. It includes debates and controversies within the environmental community about
the organization and their approach, coverage of the organization in the news media and
which particular aspects of their approach gain the most traction, and the interactions
between different discourses. In each case study, specific moments of public contention,
when different perspectives were debated publicly through news media and other fora,
are selected for particular attention.

Overview of case studies
Popular mobilization: 350 and fossil fuel divestment
One of the more prominent environmental campaign groups in recent years is
350.org, founded in 2007 by author and environmentalist Bill McKibben. Though run by
a relatively small team of organizers, 350 has staged coordinated demonstrations in every
country of the world bar North Korea, relying on self-organization by local groups under
the 350 banner. They use a variety of modes of activism, including demonstrations,
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protest marches, work parties, public art projects and civil disobedience, with an
emphasis on large, visible displays of actions which are circulated through the internet
and mainstream news media. They stress both global connectedness and localized, placebased and embodied action.
McKibben, in his 1989 book The End of Nature, was one of the first popular
authors to put forward the argument there is essentially no part of the planet free from the
influence of humans: “the way of life in one part of the world in one half-century is
altering every inch and every hour of the globe” (p. 46). Even the weather we experience
is not ‘natural,’ in the sense that the human influence on the planet’s climate changes
planetary weather cycles. His 2010 book Eaarth: Making Life on a Tough New Planet
extends this position, arguing that humans have essentially created a wholly different
planet to the one on which we evolved and to which we now must adapt. This adaptation
comes in the form of building more resilient, localized economies, moving infrastructure
‘closer to home,’ and emphasizing resource conservation. Achieving this requires a
fundamental change in social organization and a transformation in politics, industry and
society, hence the need for a global, citizen-led movement. In broad terms, the chapter
considers the ideas and assumptions about society’s relationship to the natural world as
presented in McKibben’s writing, how they are implemented by 350 as campaign group
and by activists in localized contexts, and how all of this is reflected in broader media
coverage and public discourse surrounding their activities.
As the founder and figurehead of 350, McKibben’s philosophy clearly influences
how the organization operates. Chapter 4, ‘Politicizing climate change: Challenging
56

power through fossil fuel divestment’, while considering the organization as a whole, will
focus on the Fossil Free divestment campaign to encourage colleges and universities to
sell any investments they have in fossil fuel companies. The major aim of this campaign
is taking action against the fossil fuel industry. Seen in terms of the ‘subpolitics’ defined
by Beck (1992), the campaign is an effort to assert greater citizen-led democratic control
over institutions currently outside the democratic process yet which have the power to
profoundly shape the future of the planet.
The Fossil Free campaign offers a contrast to other environmentalist interventions
in the economic realm, such as the more individualist ethical investment and ethical
consumption discourses which operate largely within the rules of the economic system.
The divestment campaign highlights the ineffectiveness of individual action and makes
the argument that turning fossil fuel companies into socially unacceptable investments
will succeed in preventing the world’s carbon reserves from being burnt. While critics
argue that university endowments should not be used for social purposes other than the
immediate economic return they provide, the Fossil Free campaign draws on familiar
repertoires of contention, especially (and explicitly) the 1980s divestment campaign
targeting South Africa’s apartheid regime.
The major focus of 350 is building a popular movement. Through their displays of
coordinated action and ongoing campaigns they build support and raise visibility for
climate-related issues. Much of their communication activity is dedicated to email and
social media, which they encourage supporters to share with their networks. Many of
their campaigns also encourage supporters and locally-organized groups to create their
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own images which are then aggregated as a broad collective statement. This means a
larger show of support, but also some loss of control of the message as local groups are
able to interpret it in a variety of diverse ways. The organization thus presents an
interesting case study for examining the tensions between global or holistic approaches to
environmental problems and local or place-based, as they attempt to bring together
concrete local actions to serve an all-encompassing goal of preventing climate change.
Because their campaigns are often oriented towards specific targets – stopping the
Keystone XL pipeline, encouraging divestment from fossil fuel companies – the
discourses from which they draw are often not immediately apparent. They are
articulated more clearly in op-eds written by McKibben and his broader social vision and
path to a sustainable future is outlined in Eaarth. This chapter examines how these
discourses are manifested in 350’s campaigning, especially as they relate to divestment,
and the extent to which they are shared by the organization’s supporters. 350 has had
some considerable impact on public debate in recent years, and attracted a lot of attention
and commentary on the merits of their targets and tactics.
The divestment campaign has been one of the more high-profile climate activist
campaigns, and has established a presence on over 300 college campuses across the US
and more internationally. Unlike the other two organizations 350 does not feature as
much content on their website relating to their background information about the issues
or reasons for acting, with their site serving mainly to offer ways for already motivated
people to get involved and take action. Their general strategy is to attract people to their
campaigns using coverage in other media and awareness-raising events, while using their
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own website and social networking presence to reinforce their message and involve
people in their movement.
The chapter analyzes news media discourse and campaign material from the years
2012 and 2013, taking in the campaign’s launch and subsequent rapid expansion. Articles
related to fossil fuel divestment from print, online and broadcast news outlets were
sourced from the Lexis Nexis database using the search terms ‘divestment’ and ‘fossil
fuel’. Articles were included in the analysis only if they substantively mentioned the
fossil fuel divestment campaign, resulting in a total of 101 articles. These include news
reports, op-eds and opinion columns, and television and radio news transcripts (see Table
1 for a breakdown). Also included in the analysis are articles, resources and blog postings
from 350.org and the divestment campaign’s official website, gofossilfree.org. These
include guides for activists, frequently asked questions and press releases. Along with
these sources, analysis draws on campaign figurehead Bill McKibben’s (2010) book
Eaarth for a broader perspective on how McKibben sees climate activism contributing to
a more general politics of climate change.
Radical modernization: The Breakthrough Institute
The ideas in the concept of the Anthropocene, that humans are to a large degree
responsible for shaping planetary geophysical and biological systems and should more
consciously control our impacts towards more beneficial ends, underpins much
contemporary environmental politics. However, while the Anthropocene may serve as an
organizing principle for a new environmental politics, there is clearly no discursive
closure around the concept and it can be used to support a broad array of policy
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objectives. The work of Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger represents one of the
more direct translations of scholarly theorizing on the topic into policy discourse. Their
highly controversial 2004 essay ‘The Death of Environmentalism’ and follow-up book
Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility
(Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007) draw heavily on Latour’s theorizing. Interestingly,
Latour himself has embraced this approach and become a strong supporter of Nordhaus
and Shellenberger’s efforts. Chapter 5, ‘Ecomodernism: The Breakthrough Institute’s
theology for the Anthropocene’ examines the controversy surrounding the pair’s work –
which is potentially as instructive about the assumptions and underpinnings of
‘mainstream’ environmentalism as it is about Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s ideas – and
their subsequent activities through their think-tank The Breakthrough Institute
culminating in the release of An Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015) in
2015.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger advocate a radical rethink of political approaches to
climate change, away from a pollution-based paradigm and politics of limits. They
instead advance an approach focused on innovation, technology and growth, while also
providing belonging and fulfillment to citizens. In line with the critiques offered by
Mouffe (2005) and Whiteside (2012) of reflexive modernization more generally,
Nordhaus and Shellenberger have little time for agonistic politics, or questions of
institutional change and power relations. Their approach “will see in institutions like the
WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund not a corporate conspiracy
to keep people poor and destroy the environment, but an opportunity to drive a kind of
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development that is both sustainable and equitable” (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2007,
p. 271). In another essay, they call for a “modernization theology” which sees human
development as the key to the preservation of nature, rather than antithetical to it
(Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2011). In practical terms, this effectively depoliticizes
environmental problems, reducing them to a series of obstacles to be overcome through
ever-advancing technology rather than the result of social and economic relationships
designed to benefit certain interests:
The good news is that we already have many nascent, promising
technologies to overcome ecological problems. Stabilizing greenhouse
gas emissions will require a new generation of nuclear power plants to
cheaply replace coal plants as well as, perhaps, to pull carbon dioxide out
of the atmosphere and power desalination plants to irrigate and grow
forests in today's deserts. ... And the solution to the species extinction
problem will involve creating new habitats and new organisms, perhaps
from the DNA of previously extinct ones. (Shellenberger and Nordhaus,
2011)
Despite their calls for a more inclusive politics, citizens are often absent from their
considerations. Breakthrough has had some success in influencing policy, at both the
national and global levels. The organization has attempted to change public discourse on
environmental issues, to the point of abandoning the term ‘environmentalism,’ and in so
doing has attracted considerable controversy. These policy successes and controversies
are illustrative of emerging dynamics within the environmental movement.
The efforts of the Breakthrough Institute are focused mainly at an elite level,
targeting policymakers and environmental leaders rather than the general public directly.
The institute publishes a journal featuring contributions from a range of thinkers around a
central theme, as well as one-off reports on specific topics and opinion-editorial pieces
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for newspapers and magazines. Their aim has been to challenge the often-unexamined
assumptions of the environmental movement and advocate for a new type of progressive
politics. This approach means that their own position and the discourses from which they
are drawing are usually made explicit. Their intellectual genealogy and the theories and
philosophies on which their work is based are explicated in the book Break Through, and
also in many of the Breakthrough Journal issues which feature contributions from
academics as well as practitioners. Additionally, because their work has stirred up
controversy and provoked reaction from within the environmental community it has also
generated discussion and reflection on the approach of other environmental groups.
Chapter 5 examines how the Breakthrough Institute has attempted to reconstruct the
problems of the environment – and climate change in particular, on which they focus
heavily – and the linkages between their intellectual background and their specific policy
proposals and institutional commitments.
The organization itself is relatively small-scale, especially as compared to the
other two case studies. The chapter does not focus to a great extent on the workings of the
institution itself. In saying this, though, think-tanks in climate politics are usually
associated with conservative opposition to climate change and how they have effectively
stymied political action (as chronicled by McCright and Dunlap, 2000; 2003).
Breakthrough thus presents an interesting case of a progressive think-tank promoting
action on climate change (though it is certainly not the only one). However, the chapter is
more concerned with the body of ideas and discourses which The Breakthrough
represents. This can be seen through the work published by its founders as well as its
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loose network of fellows and supporters from academia, business and other
environmental organizations.
The controversy surrounding the release of Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ 2004
essay ‘The Death of Environmentalism’ provides a window into their perspective and its
differences with the mainstream environmental movement. The essay was a topic of
discussion with the environmental community and in the news media following its
release in October of 2004. A search of the Lexis-Nexis database for the phrase “death of
environmentalism”, or references to Shellenberger and Nordhaus, returned 38 relevant
newspaper and magazine articles (20 from newspapers and 18 from magazines and trade
publications) from the time of the report’s release in October 2004 until the end of 2006.
It was not until February 2005 that news organizations began making reference to it and
there were only four articles from 2006, the last in May. Environmental news website
Grist was also a major forum for discussion of the report. Grist republished the report in
January 2005 and followed this with responses from a range of voices in the
environmental community between January and May 2005. Eighteen of these responses
are accessible and are included in this analysis. Coverage and responses to the debate in
mainstream news media also helps to elucidate how Shellenberger and Nordhaus’
perspective fits with broader political discourse. This chapter also examines more recent
publications released by and associated with the Breakthrough Institute. In particular, the
organization’s online publication Breakthrough Journal often deals with social responses
to climate change and environmental problems. Analysis includes thirty-six articles
which address politics and environmentalism in the Anthropocene, along with the book
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Break Through (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007) and An Ecomodernist Manifesto
(Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015), the organization’s statement of principles about politics in the
Anthropocene released in 2015 (see Table 1). Although Breakthrough does not itself aim
for a wide audience, communication is central to its mission of changing the terms of the
debate around environmental problems, advancing a discourse of radical ecological
modernization and new ways of thinking about the relationship between nature and
society.
Nature’s capital: The Nature Conservancy
While some environmental organizations adopt an oppositional approach to the
institutions they see as responsible for environmental harm, others try and work with
them to create change from within. Principally this involves using market-based
approaches to create economic incentives for businesses to adopt environmentallyfriendly measures, and working within the constraints of the political-economic system.
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) is one of the oldest and largest environmental
organizations. It has traditionally focused on land management and conservation, relying
on large donations to buy up threatened ecosystems and working with landowners to
promote environmentally responsible practices. As such the organization has been
critiqued for its close ties to big business and for being ideologically aligned with
institutions responsible for much environmental damage. This is a position TNC for the
most part embraces; CEO Mark Tercek published a book entitled Nature's Fortune: How
Business and Society Thrive by Investing in Nature (Tercek & Adams, 2013).
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Chapter 6, ‘Gardening the Anthropocene: Conservation after the end of nature’
uses TNC as a focal point to examine the discourse of conservation and environmental
protection through economic incentives and market-based solutions. Tercek and others
have been promoting concepts such as ‘natural capital,’ ‘ecosystem services’ and ‘green
infrastructure’ to emphasize the monetary value natural processes and systems have for
companies. Leaders within TNC, particularly chief scientist Peter Kareiva, have been
active in promoting an intellectual movement known as ‘new conservation,’ which argues
for a human-centered conservation where the key metric for action is the ultimate
benefits to people, rather than the intrinsic value of nature. Such concepts recognize the
interconnectedness of nature and society, and advance a form of natural resource
management in line with particular social goals. This is a form of internalizing the
externalities associated with industrialization, but at the same time does not, for the most
past, reflexively address the role that these institutions play in perpetuating environmental
harms and assumes the continuation of existing socio-political structures. As such this
approach has found success amongst businesses and policy-makers. The Anthropocene
throws these issues into sharper relief, and TNC’s increasing focus on global issues such
as climate change brings these tensions to the fore. This discourse has broad implications
for responses to environmental challenges, as it is more likely to gain widespread support
with businesses, and emphasizes certain approaches such as individual over structural
solutions and adaptation over mitigation. TNC’s outreach and campaigning has
traditionally focused on soliciting donations. This case study looks at the discourses
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which are used by TNC in their appeals to the public and how they differ from those
espoused by its leaders in other venues.
The Nature Conservancy is a large and established environmental NGO. They
have for the most part been seen as an establishment-oriented organization, seeking
contributions from large (often corporate) donors and not seeking to challenge the sociopolitical status quo. As climate change has become of greater significance to
environmental organizations of all types, TNC has had to reconcile their market-friendly,
conservation-based approach with the challenges posed by climate change (which cannot
be addressed by simply buying up land). In line with this they have been working on
broadening their approach, focusing more on outreach and public engagement along with
policy work. The vision of green capitalism promoted by Tercek in his book Nature’s
Fortune requires movement in both the government and corporate sectors and TNC is
expanding its efforts to put public pressure on institutions, while still not challenging the
economic or political systems more broadly. Tercek, in his book, particularly focuses on
the concept of natural capital, putting an economic value on the services provided by
ecosystems and incorporating this into decision-making of businesses and governments.
The idea is that that once these actors recognize the value of environmental processes
they will work to protect them. The idea of ‘new conservation’ promoted by key figures
within TNC incorporates this economic discourse into a broader philosophical
realignment of conservation practice, putting humans rather than nature at the heart of
conservation efforts. Chapter 6 uses TNC as a focal point for examining how these
concepts are being adopted in advocacy efforts and the degree to which they are entering
66

public and policy discourse. This includes the challenges presented, in conceptual and
practical terms, for dominant institutional structures and the implications for
environmental politics and the role of the public in addressing environmental problems.
As part of this the chapter looks at the various storylines used by TNC in its advocacy
efforts in different spheres, and how a traditionally place-focused organization is adapting
to address environmental challenges on a global scale.
An important part of the analysis is the variations in discourse and underlying
assumptions about nature found in the organization’s different areas of operation. A key
issue for this chapter is the public debate over new conservation, including the key texts
written by TNC leaders outlining its principles and the backlash they generated. Analysis
includes 32 articles from the period 2011-2015 at the height of the debates, many of them
in response to a controversial essay co-authored by TNC’s chief scientist Peter Kareiva
(Lalasz, Kareiva & Marvier, 2012). Articles are a mix of feature stories by environmental
journalists, and editorials or opinion pieces written by conservation practitioners (see
Table 1). The articles were sourced through web and Lexis Nexis searches for key terms,
and through links and references in the articles themselves, many of which were in direct
conversation with one another. Some of the ideas espoused by new conservationists about
human-centered conservation and putting a price on nature are not commonly seen in
public environmental appeals (and, as Tercek acknowledges, many environmentalists are
uneasy with this line of thinking). The chapter also analyzes advertising and publicity
campaigns by TNC and how the ways in which the organization promotes conservation
to the public is consistent with the outlook of its senior figures. This includes the key
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sections of the organization’s website encouraging people to get involved or donate
money, and sub-sites focusing on specific campaigns or issues. Two in particular
analyzed here are TNC’s tie-in website to the PBS documentary series Earth: A New
Wild and a campaign around the theme of ‘The Future of Nature.’ The TNC website also
includes a blog entitled Conservancy Talk which features posts about TNC’s operations
from Tercek and other leaders in the organization. From 122 posts between 2013 and
2015, 23 which include self-reflexive discussion of TNC’s approach were selected for
analysis. Emails sent to TNC’s members were also included in the analysis; out of 250
emails sent between July 2013 and December 2015, 78 which focused on specific
campaigns or initiatives to protect nature were selected for analysis (see Table 1).
Summary and comparative benchmarks
These three cases represent different approaches for addressing environmental
problems. All three organizations accept the notion that we are living in the
Anthropocene, that humans are a major force influencing the planet’s biophysical
systems and thus need to more consciously or deliberatively manage our environmental
impacts. From this common starting point, however, the three diverge significantly, using
different tactics and advocating different courses of action. This study seeks to identify
the discourses these organizations draw from in their response to climate change and their
commonalities and points of difference. Of course, each organization does not offer a
singular unified approach, but draws on different discourses depending on the context.
This is particularly the case for 350, which embraces a more decentralized mode of
campaigning, and the Breakthrough Institute, which features contributions from a variety
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of contributors. Nonetheless, there are a number of broad areas which can be used to
compare the three cases.


The first of these is the way they deploy the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘the
environment.’ The recognition of the Anthropocene era entails a blurring or
dissolving of the boundaries between human society and the natural world and
an acceptance of the interconnectedness of the two. Yet old categorizations are
hard to break down; as Latour (1993) has argued, this distinction is one of the
fundamental principles on which Western modernity is based. Under
consideration will be the extent to which the organizations challenge the naturesociety binary, and the discursive means by which they do so.



Related to this is the attitude of the organizations towards dominant sociopolitical institutions, in particular the economic system. In some cases there are
obvious surface-level distinctions, with 350 taking a much more oppositional
stance than TNC, but the programs of all three imply broad changes to how the
economy functions. The changes advocated by the organizations, and the
discourses on which they draw in this advocacy are illustrative of their position
within the broader political landscape.



A third area of comparison is the contextual level at which environmental
problems and solutions are pitched. As discussed above, whether climate change
is described in terms of global processes or localized impacts, and whether
potential solutions are located within national or transnational institutions or at
an individual scale is indicative of ideological commitments.
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The final major point of comparison, which to an extent underlies all of the
above, is how the organizations see the role of the public in addressing
environmental problems and, more broadly, in building a common future. This
includes how involved the general public is in the organization’s activities, as
well as the more conceptual position of laypeople in relation to scientific or
political elites.

70

Table 1: List of primary sources
Source Type

Details

Number

Chapter 4
Book

Eaarth

News sources

Newspaper reports

54

Newspaper op-eds

25

Letters to the editor

8

Broadcast transcripts

14

Total

101

Campaign material

Gofossilfree.org
350.org (divestment material)
Emails to supporters

22

Chapter 5
Book

Break Through

News sources

Newspaper reports

7

Newspaper op-eds

12

Magazine reports

8

Magazine op-eds

11

Grist forum responses

18

Total

56

BTI publications

Death of Environmentalism
An Ecomodernist Manifesto
Breakthrough Journal articles

36

Chapter 6
Book

Nature’s Fortune

News and commentary

Magazine or newspaper features

15

Op-eds or blogs

7

Academic journal editorials

9

Total

31

TNC publications and
publicity material

TNC website and promotional campaigns
‘Conservancy Talk’ blog posts

23

Emails to members

78

71

Chapter 4 – Politicizing climate change: Challenging power through
fossil fuel divestment

Introduction: Carbon divestment and the Fossil Free campaign
This chapter is about the fossil fuel divestment movement, perhaps the largest
climate activism campaign in the US in recent years. The Fossil Free campaign is
coordinated and supported by climate activist organization 350 but is made up of many
autonomous and self-organized groups based for the most part at colleges and universities
across the United States and Canada. The stated purpose of the groups is to encourage
institutions to sell off any assets they own of the top two hundred publicly-traded fossil
fuel companies. The main targets are universities, though religious groups, municipal
governments and retirement funds are also facing pressure to divest from fossil fuels. The
campaign works to provide templates and logistical support to divestment activists
working at a local level and build a unified national (and subsequently international)
movement for fossil fuel divestment.
The divestment campaign offers a contrast to other environmentalist interventions
in the economic realm, such as the more individualist ethical investment and ethical
consumption discourses which operate largely within the rules of the economic system. It
highlights the frequent ineffectiveness of individual action and makes the argument that
turning fossil fuel companies into socially unacceptable investments will succeed in
preventing the world’s carbon reserves from being burnt. Divestment has been used as a
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tactic by campaigners on other issues. The Fossil Free campaign draws on familiar
repertoires of contention, especially (and explicitly) the 1980s divestment campaign
targeting South Africa’s apartheid regime. In common with other divestment campaigns,
the ostensible economic aims of the Fossil Free campaign – reducing the stock value of
companies through investors withdrawing their money – are subordinate to broader
political goals of movement-building and pressuring government to enact climate change
legislation. The major arguments in favor of divestment are made in moral rather than
economic terms. The success of the divestment movement can in part be attributed to this
combination of the economic, moral and political dimensions, linking an economic
rationale and visible actions with a strong moral imperative and a broader strategy for
political and social change.
The Fossil Free campaign was launched in the summer of 2012. The idea of
divestment was first mentioned publicly by 350 leader Bill McKibben on an appearance
on Sunday morning MSNBC talk show Up With Chris Hayes on July 8 2012, where in
talking about climate activism he stated, “I think one of the next frontiers for this may
have to do with looking at divestment from the fossil fuel industry, you know,
reminiscent of what happened in the apartheid movement a quarter century ago. We’ve
got to go after that financial power” (MSNBC, 2012). The starting point for the campaign
was a six thousand-word article written by McKibben published in Rolling Stone
magazine, appearing on the magazine’s website on July 19, 2012. Under the headline
‘Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math: Three simple numbers that add up to global
catastrophe – and that make clear who the real enemy is,’ the first half of the article is
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spent laying out the ‘carbon bubble’ argument, that fossil fuel companies base their
market value on reserves of oil, gas and coal that cannot be safely burned. The last
section of the article then introduces the idea of divestment targeting fossil fuel
companies. The stated outcome of the campaign is regulatory action, and specifically
putting a price on carbon emissions – making fossil fuel companies internalize their
externalities. Divestment is presented as a means of reducing the political power of the
industry such that this type of regulation would become possible. After noting the
ineffectiveness of individual action and the weak and halting political progress to date,
McKibben argues divestment can break the political influence of fossil fuel companies.
Achieving this, though, requires a movement, a mass mobilization of angry citizens
working together against the common enemy of the industry, leading to a transformation
of politics and society.
McKibben’s Rolling Stone article was followed up in November 2012 with a
traveling roadshow. Called Do The Math, the show involved McKibben and a cast of
campaigners and activists explaining the merits and logistics of divestment to large
audiences in twenty cities. The campaign quickly gained momentum, and within a month
divestment groups were in place at over 100 campuses. The Fossil Free website provides
resources and advice for groups to start divestment campaigns, and regional coordinators
employed by 350 work with student leaders to develop and expand their campaigns and
coordinate their actions with other groups. This chapter analyzes news media discourse
and campaign material from the years 2012 and 2013, taking in the campaign’s launch
and subsequent rapid expansion. Articles related to fossil fuel divestment from print,
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online and broadcast news outlets were sourced from the Lexis Nexis database using the
search terms ‘divestment’ and ‘fossil fuel’. Articles were included in the analysis only if
they substantively mentioned the fossil fuel divestment campaign, resulting in a total of
101 articles. These include news reports, op-eds and opinion columns, and television and
radio news transcripts (see Table 2). Also included in the analysis are articles, resources
and blog postings from 350.org and the divestment campaign’s official website,
gofossilfree.org. These include guides for activists, frequently asked questions and press
releases. Along with these sources, analysis draws on campaign figurehead Bill
McKibben’s (2010) book Eaarth for a broader perspective on how McKibben sees
climate activism contributing to a more general politics of climate change.
Table 2: List of primary sources for Chapter 4
Source Type

Details

Number

Book

Eaarth

News sources

Newspaper reports

54

Newspaper op-eds

25

Letters to the editor

8

Broadcast transcripts

14

Total

101

Campaign material

Gofossilfree.org
350.org (divestment material)
Emails to supporters

22

The carbon bubble and the financial risk of CO2 regulation
The intellectual justification for the divestment campaign comes largely from a
report released in 2011 by The Carbon Tracker Initiative, a UK-based non-profit set up to
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highlight the links between financial markets and climate change. The report, entitled
‘Unburnable Carbon – Are the World’s Financial Markets Carrying a Carbon Bubble?’
(Leaton, 2011), makes the case that most of the world’s proven reserves of fossil fuels
must not be consumed if we are to avoid the worst effects of climate change. All nations
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process agreed at the
2010 Cancún climate conference on the necessity to limit planetary warming to two
degrees Celsius about pre-industrial levels. The Carbon Tracker report shows that to meet
this target, no more than 565 Gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) can be emitted into the
atmosphere between 2011 and 2050 – the so-called ‘carbon budget.’ However, the
world’s proven reserves of fossil fuels, according to the report, amount to 2795 GtCO2,
about five times the recommended limit. This means that if the two degrees target is to be
met, about 80% of current fossil fuel reserves will need to be left underground. The
report outlines the implications of this for financial markets. At present, fossil fuel
reserves held by companies are treated as assets and contribute to their valuation and
stock price. The report argues that such assets carry considerable risk, as there is a high
chance their value will never be exploited and they will thus become ‘stranded’. This is
the ‘carbon bubble’ of the report’s title, with a large amount of capital being tied up in
stranded assets which will likely not provide any return, with disastrous consequences for
investors – and the global economy as a whole, given the size and value of companies
dealing in fossil fuel extraction. The notion that these companies will not, in fact, extract
(and the public will not burn) these fossil fuel reserves presumes that enough social
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pressure will be brought to bear to prevent it. Of course, such social pressure is precisely
what advocates of divestment hope to foment.
The scope of the Carbon Tracker report is largely limited to financial markets, and
provides recommendations for investors, analysts and regulators in the financial system
to limit their risk of exposure to stranded carbon assets and prevent the carbon bubble
bursting. The report notes that the “current system of market oversight and regulatory
supervision is not adequate to send the required signals to shift capital towards a low
carbon economy at the speed or scale required,” and that “until international regulatory
frameworks and accounting methodologies for valuing reserves change, it is perfectly
logical for investors, and their advisors, analysts, and brokers, to ignore long-term
problems for fear of missing out on short term gain” (Leaton, 2011, p. 18). The
recommendations are primarily aimed at increasing transparency and ensuring that
potentially unburnable carbon is taken into account by financial markets. There is a
particular emphasis on a tighter regulatory framework, with market regulators
encouraged to require companies to report their fossil fuel reserves and emissions.
As the report is entirely focused on the financial sector the science of climate
change is unquestioned, and there is no discussion of its impacts or of any moral
dimension save a brief statement in the introduction of the need to “prevent dangerous
climate change” (Leaton, 2011, p. 4). It is noteworthy that divestment is not mentioned at
all. The report recommends that asset owners “Review your exposure to systemic risk”
and “Assess whether you have interests in potentially stranded assets if only 20% of the
world’s fossil fuel reserves can be burnt” (Leaton, 2011, p. 28). It stops short, however,
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of encouraging investors not to put their money into fossil fuel stock or to sell off any
they currently hold. The stated aim of the report is to transform the structure and
incentive regime of markets such that a carbon bubble can be avoided with a minimum of
economic harm. Carbon Tracker co-founder Mark Campanele, who originally developed
the ‘unburnable carbon’ thesis, noted in a speech in January 2013 that Carbon Tracker
was set up “just specifically to look at a very narrow set of questions around financial
stability, market risk, what the market’s already financed, who’s measuring those risks
and whether we should have a policy response to it” (Campanele, 2013). When asked
about the 350-led divestment campaign, he noted that all of McKibben’s numbers are
“based on our report. We didn't come out calling for divestment. ... [the divestment
campaign] is kind of good to get people thinking about it. It doesn’t get us where we need
to be” (Campanele, 2013). In his view the divestment campaign, while serving to draw
attention to the issue, will not have the impact that action on the part of market regulators
will.

Subpolitics and divestment
While both CarbonTracker and 350 are advocating, essentially, for greater
government regulation of carbon emissions, their overall objectives are otherwise very
different. Where CarbonTracker advocates working with the finance industry to reform
the system from within, 350’s goals are much more expansive. McKibben acknowledges
that the “analysts who wrote the Carbon Tracker report and drew attention to these
numbers had a relatively modest goal – they simply wanted to remind investors that
climate change poses a very real risk to the stock prices of energy companies”
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(McKibben, 2012a). He argues, though, that the rational self-interest of the finance
industry will not be enough to “spark a transformative challenge to fossil fuel. But moral
outrage just might – and that's the real meaning of this new math. It could, plausibly, give
rise to a real movement.” The divestment campaign is just one of several simultaneous
and interrelated initiatives, all of which are geared towards a broader societal
transformation. For CarbonTracker, political action is a distraction that must be
negotiated to get markets functioning more efficiently; for 350, politics is everything, and
an informed, mobilized citizenry a more important outcome than changing investment
rules.
The divestment campaign, while it has historical precedents, represents a
relatively new approach in the domain of climate campaigning. Other interventions in the
economic realm have tended to focus either on socially responsible investing, or
consumer purchasing decisions. Both of these are individualized forms of action, and
neither challenges dominant institutional structures in a significant way. Haigh (2006)
argues that ethical investment portfolios in fact prop up and legitimize the politicaleconomic status of financial institutions. At the same time, this approach also constrains
the actions of NGOs through infiltrating social resistance and incorporating it into
hegemonic institutions. As such, the outcomes are virtually guaranteed to favor the
objectives of investors. This transfers responsibility for addressing social problems to
capital markets, imputing the expansion of capital with a “social imaginary” which in real
terms leaves most social problems unaddressed (Haigh, 2006, p. 995). Similarly, the
green consumption approach places the solutions to climate change within existing
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socioeconomic structures and individualizes responsibility to consumers who are only
able to express their politics through their purchasing decisions.
Seen in terms of the subpolitics defined by Beck (1992), the Fossil Free campaign
is an effort to assert greater citizen-led democratic control over institutions currently
outside the democratic process yet which have the power to profoundly shape the future
of the planet. It is based on collective action and moral outrage, and is acting as much
against the financial system as within it. McKibben (2012a) acknowledges the limits of
individual action in his Rolling Stone article, arguing that “you need to do more than
change light bulbs. You need to change the system.” Similarly, the campaign website
states that “We’re all complicit in fossil fuel consumption, and we should do all that we
can to reduce our own use, but the real culprits – the ones who are rigging the system –
are the fossil fuel companies” (Fossil Free, 2013a).
Divestment as a strategy for social movements has a rich history (Ansar,
Caldecott & Tilbury, 2013), one with which the Fossil Free campaign is actively
engaged. Prior to the campaign’s launch, there were several small and fairly isolated
divestment campaigns related to climate change on university campuses, most of them
targeting the coal industry specifically. Divestment has been a tactic adopted by
campaigners on other issues, most recently involving campaigns to divest university
endowments from tobacco companies, and those associated with the Sudanese
government after the atrocities in Darfur. The most prominent and successful divestment
campaign, which all subsequent efforts have sought to emulate, was the 1980s campaign
targeting companies which had business interests in South Africa.
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The Fossil Free campaign draws explicitly on the South African campaign in two
ways. First, in their repertoire of tactics, the forms of political action used (Tilly and
Wood, 2009): the South African campaign is often cited by McKibben and others as a
successful campaign and therefore the approach should be replicated in this domain.
Secondly, the comparisons lend moral legitimacy to their efforts. The anti-apartheid
campaign is drawn on not only for its tactical repertoire but explicit parallels are drawn
between the two causes. This works in service of the general aim of Fossil Free to
engender a feeling of outrage and give campaigners a clear target for their anger. The
apartheid-era South African government was an obvious villain, and by substituting fossil
fuel companies in its place this campaign is attempting to lend climate change the same
type of moral certitude. McKibben (2012a) writes in Rolling Stone that public action can
transform an industry:
Once, in recent corporate history, anger forced an industry to make basic
changes. That was the campaign in the 1980s demanding divestment from
companies doing business in South Africa.
The article also quotes anti-apartheid leader Archbishop Desmond Tutu about the
importance of the South African divestment efforts, and the Do The Math roadshow
featured a short video message from him lending his support to the Fossil Free campaign.
Though surveys repeatedly find that action on climate change is seen as important by a
large percentage of the public it is also seen as a low priority and has struggled to attract
strong and consistent support (Brulle, Carmichael & Jenkins, 2012). This is in part due to
most people seeing it as distant from everyday concerns, along with uncertainty (or
fatalism) in how to go about addressing it (Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). The
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Fossil Free campaign provides a clearly defined target – “we have met the enemy and
they is Shell,” writes McKibben (2012a) in his Rolling Stone piece – and is presented as
a parallel to a prior campaign whose moral legitimacy and rightness would today be
unquestioned. Given these connections, it is instructive to briefly examine the South
African divestment campaign and its legacy, and how it compares to the approach taken
by the Fossil Free campaigners.
The South African divestment campaign
Anti-apartheid activism in the US goes back to the mid-1960s, when student
campaigners began to put pressure on American companies which did business with
South Africa and its white-minority government. In response to activist pressure, a set of
guidelines, known as the Sullivan Principles, was drawn up under the leadership of civil
rights campaigner and General Motors board member Reverend Leon Sullivan. The
Sullivan Principles set out criteria, which grew more stringent over time, for assessing
companies’ business practices in South Africa and assigned ratings based on the degree
to which they were implemented. During the mid-1970s and early 1980s this was the
dominant way in which universities and other large investors dealt with the situation,
pledging to only invest in companies which signed on to the Sullivan Principles. By the
early 1980s it was becoming clear that the engagement approach was not having the
desired effects – many businesses were still operating in South Africa, and the regime
was showing no signs of changing its policies. Arnold and Hammond (1994) argue that
the Sullivan Principles mainly “served the ideological purpose of providing a moral
rationalization for continuing business in South Africa” (p. 112). Alternatively,
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progressive activists began concentrating their efforts on divestment in the early 1980s,
starting on college campuses and spreading from there. As the campaign built momentum
in the late 1980s, around 150 American college campuses, as well as more than one
hundred state and municipal governments, had divested themselves of any assets in South
African-linked companies (Voorhees, 1999).
Divestment debates in the US split along political and ideological lines. While all
sides publicly opposed the policies of the South African regime, progressive antiapartheid activists called for strong economic sanctions including direct and indirect
corporate withdrawal. The conservative position, which included most business groups,
supported a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ and
called for gradual reforms that would not radically alter the political and
economic status quo within South Africa. On the corporate front, the
conservative position argued that United States businesses operating in
South Africa could serve as a ‘progressive force’ to hasten the end of
apartheid. (Arnold and Hammond, 1994, p. 112)
Arnold and Hammond note that these challenges to the dominant ‘engagement’ approach
were well in advance of shifts in mainstream public opinion on the issue and indeed
helped to open an oppositional discourse, and show that accounting can function as a
contested ideological terrain where dominant ideology can be challenged. 1 Indeed, a key
feature of the divestment campaigns is that their direct economic impact was almost
beside the point. Later analyses have shown that despite the large number of institutions
which divested from South African-affiliated companies, there was little effect on stock
values of companies with South African operations or on South African financial markets
(Teoh, Welch & Wazzan, 1999). Lytle and Joy (1996) in fact found that stock prices of
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firms which announced plans to stay in South Africa performed better than those which
indicated they would leave the country, suggesting that social pressure on markets had in
some cases a negative effect.
The main effect – and purpose – of the divestment campaign was to raise
awareness and drive public opinion. Voorhees (1999) argues that through increasing
public awareness the campaign created a political environment conducive to
Congressional sanctions against South Africa. Divestment provided a focal point for
activism and gave activists a firm target and clear goal. The main aim was to “get people
moving,” in the words of an organizer quoted by Voorhees: “People need and want
something to do on South Africa, and divestment provides them with such an
opportunity” (p. 134). And although the idea was advanced that divestment would hurt
companies financially, this was not a major component of the message:
Some activists theorized that if enough institutions adopted total
divestment policies, the stock prices of the targeted corporations would be
deflated, making it more difficult to finance new stock issues and to resist
hostile takeovers. But most conceded that divestment would have little, if
any, direct economic impact on the targeted companies; the economic
pressure argument, therefore, did not feature prominently in debates.
(Voorhees, 1999, p. 134).
Divestment, then, was a means of building a movement and creating public pressure. The
campaign resulted in many businesses pulling out of South Africa and economic
sanctions being passed by the US Congress in 1986 by a large bipartisan majority (over
President Reagan’s veto). Because the direct financial impact was small, Voorhees
contends that the movement would not have worked if not firstly for its public nature
which mobilized people, and secondly for the threat of escalating political pressure, in
84

particular action by Congress. The psychological impact of a highly visible and
motivated campaign, and the potential for it to spur legislative action was the driving
force behind responses by companies and the South African government. Grassroots
mobilization for divestment was therefore necessary but not sufficient to achieve the aims
of the campaign, and had to work in tandem with broader political and economic forces.
There are obviously parallels between the South African campaign and Fossil
Free, but there are key differences as well. Although companies were the direct targets of
the South African campaign, the ultimate foe was the South African government itself.
Once public pressure built to a certain level, most companies could afford to scale back
their operations in South Africa, enhancing their image in the US while in most cases not
hurting their bottom line to a huge extent. Similarly, the US government could, when
pushed, impose sanctions against South Africa at no great harm to American economic
interests. The fossil fuel industry represents a somewhat different type of target. Fossil
fuel companies are much more central to the economy, and given their massive size it is
even less likely that a divestment campaign will have a direct financial impact on their
profitability. Additionally, the majority of existing fossil fuel reserves are owned or
controlled not by private companies, but by sovereign governments who are not
susceptible to divestment campaigns in any case.
Lines of argument in fossil fuel divestment
Fossil fuel divestment campaigners use a variety of arguments, both economic
and normative, in building their case. This is a strength of the campaign in that it can
appeal to multiple constituencies, but can also pose problems if their arguments appear
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unfocused or in contradiction to one another. Campaigners openly acknowledge that
divestment will not have any financial impact on the companies they are targeting. The
official campaign website on its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page lays out the
connections between the various dimensions of the campaign:
Divestment isn’t primarily an economic strategy, but a moral and political
one. ... the more we can make climate change a deeply moral issue, the
more we will push society towards action. ... divestment builds political
power by forcing our nation’s most prominent institutions and individuals
(many of whom sit on college boards) to choose which side of the issue
they are on. Divestment sparks a big discussion and – as we’re already
seeing in this campaign – gets prominent media attention, moving the
case for action forward. (Fossil Free, 2013a)
The lines of argument used in favor of divestment can be placed into three major
categories. The first are economic arguments, which echo the CarbonTracker analysis
about risks to the value of carbon-based investments and the necessity of divesting to
protect the assets of investors. Selling fossil fuel stocks as a means of driving down the
value of fossil fuel companies would also come under this heading, but is not widely used
as an argument and it is admitted by campaigners that their actions will not have this
effect. Second are moral arguments, focused on the need to take action in order to
prevent catastrophic harm and summed up by Fossil Free’s frequently-repeated slogan “If
it is wrong to wreck the planet, it is wrong to profit form that wreckage.” Third are
political arguments, which are to do with how the existence of the campaign itself is
necessary in order to build a movement to engender political change, both in terms of
specific policy and broader social organization. These three dimensions to the campaign
are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they are tightly interrelated and it is their strategic
deployment in various contexts which accounts for much of the campaign’s success. The
86

following sections nonetheless attempt to separate the three major arguments used by
Fossil Free campaigners, and how the campaign, its opponents and the news media
negotiate the tensions between divestment being positioned as an economic, moral or
political strategy.

Economics
As the research on the South African divestment campaign makes clear, though
divestment is at its surface an economic strategy it is working in service of larger ethical
goals. The economic aspect of it is in some senses simply a means to an end but
irrelevant in and of itself; a way of engaging people with the issue and building
momentum for political action or wider social change. Through waging campaigns
against college administrations and big oil, divestment campaigns, if successful, give a
sense of unity and purpose to the fight against climate change and link individual and
local-level action to broader institutional changes. Nonetheless, for economic arguments
to help serve this purpose they still need to make sense on their own terms. The carbon
bubble idea and the notion of unburnable carbon provides, as noted, the foundation for
the divestment campaign. Based on empirical analysis and supported by a growing
number of reports from economists, think-tanks, intergovernmental institutions and even
a UK parliamentary committee, the carbon bubble argument makes the case that
investment practices involving carbon-intensive companies should change (e.g. Leaton,
2011; Voorhar and Myllyvirta, 2013; House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee, 2014; Lewis, 2014). This does not necessarily mean divestment; and there
are a number of possible different responses by investors, policymakers, regulators and
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citizens which have been proposed to reduce the risk of the carbon bubble bursting. The
challenge for divestment campaigners is to make the link between the two convincing
enough such that they can attract people to the movement and fend off any
counterarguments. It is perhaps not surprising that most of the arguments appearing in
media that are against divestment are economic arguments.
There are two dimensions to economic arguments for divestment.

The first

relates to the goals of the campaign; that is, that divestment will have a meaningful
impact on fossil fuel companies and ultimately help prevent the worst impacts of climate
change. The second is targeted at the divesting institution, making the case that
divestment is economically beneficial; their endowments can still achieve a good return
on investment without fossil fuel stocks in their portfolio, and the inclusion of such
stocks poses an unacceptable risk due to the carbon bubble.
The Fossil Free campaigners are aware of the limitations of divestment as an
economic strategy. They readily acknowledge that the campaign is about more than
simply removing investments for financial reasons, with the economic aspect used to
support the larger mission:
At the core of the campaign is a moral argument – if it’s wrong to wreck
the planet, it’s also wrong to profit from that wreckage – but there is also
strong economic arguments [sic] to make about the need to divest from
the fossil fuel industry. (Fossil Free, 2013b)
The campaigners are well-versed in both the theory and history of divestment campaigns,
encouraging students involved in campus campaigns to conduct research on prior
campaigns in general and at their university in particular. Fossil Free has also involved
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individuals and organizations who played a role in the anti-apartheid campaigns of the
1980s. As such they recognize the role that economic arguments play in the larger
campaign. Katie McChesney, divestment co-coordinator for the mid-Atlantic region, said
in an interview that
we know that the money we’re moving out of fossil fuels, even the
divestment campaigns that we have at colleges and universities, all of the
international community combined with what’s happening in the US, is
not going to be the amount of money that cripples the fossil fuel industry.
... Divestment is one hundred and ten percent a political punch, to
stigmatize the fossil fuel industry, because we are not at a place where the
fossil fuel industry can be crippled, but we do have the financial argument
on our side. (Personal communication, January 24, 2014)
This sentiment is frequently echoed in statements made by campaigners. McKibben often
uses variations on the line, “we know we can’t bankrupt Exxon. But we think we can
politically bankrupt them” (e.g. Green, 2013; New Zealand Herald, 2013; Drajem, 2013;
Rogers, 2013; McKibben, 2013; Hopey, 2013). By going out of their way to
preemptively deflect potential criticisms about the efficacy of divestment as a strategy,
the campaign seeks to shift attention to the political and symbolic dimensions. It is likely
that they are as wary of criticism from others in the environmental movement as from
those outside it. The campaign against the Keystone XL pipeline, also spearheaded by
350, has drawn skeptical responses from other environmental groups – for instance, the
Breakthrough Institute’s Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2014a) argue that stopping the
pipeline will have little impact on greenhouse gas emissions and that the campaign
distracts from more pragmatic solutions. As with Keystone, however, the aim of the
divestment campaign is broader social and political action on climate change, using a
targeted campaign to advance overall aims of 350 as an organization.
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The second economic aspect of divestment relates to the economic benefits
potentially accruing to the institutions which divest. Even if this benefit is not their
primary focus, it is nevertheless an important part of campaigners’ strategy as it attempts
to nullify the primary opposing argument made by universities and other bodies targeted
by divestment campaigns – that divestment presents too much of a financial risk. The
FAQ page on the Fossil Free website, while stressing the moral and political dimensions
of the campaign, makes the case that fossil fuel companies are “risky investments” as
their share price is based on unburnable carbon, and cites several reports which argue that
renewable energy investments are more profitable (Fossil Free, 2013a). News coverage
more commonly features the position that divestment is a necessity despite its potentially
negative financial implications. A feature on the divestment movement in the Chronicle
of Higher Education positions divestment as a trade-off between the social and
educational goals of colleges. It quotes the president of Unity College, an institution
which did divest, as saying that “even if we did suffer a little bit, it would be acceptable”
(Mogilyanskaya, 2013). Campaigners, while playing down the risks to investment returns
– “less than 0.005 per cent” according to one (Fenton, 2013) – almost always qualify
such statements with an appeal to morality, pointing out that financial returns are not the
only standard by which endowments should be judged.
The related argument, that the carbon bubble will render fossil fuel companies
essentially worthless and thus harm the long-term returns on endowments, is even less
prominent. It mainly appears in media coverage in the context of non-college investors
such as pension funds, including articles about votes by the San Francisco and
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Washington D.C. city councils on divesting their city’s retirement funds of fossil fuels
(McDonald, 2013; Mufson, 2013). The argument is usually associated with people from
the finance industry rather than activists, who for the most part are quoted talking about
the moral aspects of divestment. Op-ed pieces by campaigners sometimes make reference
to the long-term risk to endowments of the carbon bubble, but it is never the primary
focus. An op-ed by a divestment campaigner in Canada quotes a report warning of the
dangers of the carbon bubble, and argues that “fossil fuels are no longer going to be
competitive with other forms of energy and that will result in substantial financial losses”
(Petrine, 2013) (though this is towards the end of the piece and presented as subordinate
to moral concerns). While the carbon bubble argument is integral to the divestment
movement, its financial implications – which were the primary concern of
CarbonTracker’s original report on the topic – are very much of secondary importance in
public discourse. Its function for divestment campaigners is not to draw attention to
potential future financial risks, but to make a point about the fossil fuel industry today:
that by planning to burn the 80% of carbon reserves which would take the world past the
two degree limit, the industry is acting in a reckless and immoral fashion and must be
stopped.
One reason that campaigners must be well-versed in the economics of divestment
– and be able to talk about the economic benefits – is that most opposition, at least in the
portion of the campaign covered by this analysis, is on economic grounds. This makes the
fossil fuel campaign somewhat different from the anti-apartheid divestment movement.
As Arnold and Hammond (1994) note, there was little disagreement that action had to be
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taken on apartheid; the differences came in whether to disengage totally or pursue
‘constructive engagement’ with the regime. This latter approach was initially favored by
most businesses as well as President Reagan, which is (reportedly) why he vetoed
legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa (Arnold & Hammond, 1994). A roughly
equivalent position can be seen in the fossil fuel debate. This is the position taken by
advocates of ethical investment described above, but more specifically (in this context)
by those who argue that the stock portfolios of universities and public institutions can be
leveraged to have a positive influence on fossil fuel companies through shareholder
activism, while not harming their endowments. This is a common response of university
administrations when confronted by divestment activists.
A report on divestment released by Swarthmore College, which hosts one of the
most active campus divestment movements, argues that the cost to the college would be
in the millions of dollars. Further, it states that divestment may have
unintended consequences. If Swarthmore were to divest, it could not
participate in shareholder activism efforts, many of which have resulted
in tangible progress. If engaged shareholders were replaced by
shareholders without conscience on these issues, it would not deprive
companies of capital, but would rather make is easier for them to
maintain the status quo. (Welsh and Niemczewski, 2013, p. 3)
Harvard University, which has also seen one of the more active and high-profile
divestment campaigns, responded to divestment activists in similar terms. Speaking to the
New York Times, Harvard Governing Board members argue that divestment would hurt
returns and that a better way to hold fossil fuel companies accountable would be through
Harvard's proxy votes as a shareholder, with a university spokesperson adding that “the
college make its ‘distinctive contributions to society’ through its ‘research and
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educational activities’” (Smith, 2013). More bluntly, a University of California
spokesperson states that “the primary purpose of the university's investments are to make
as much money as we can for the university, for California and for its employees”
(quoted in Murphy, 2013).
The argument that the withdrawal of engaged, ethical shareholders just makes it
easier for companies to continue their objectionable practices may be a sound economic
point, and could well be the reason that Lytle and Joy (1996) found no impact on stock
prices from the South African campaign. The divestment activists, though, have no
interest in changing the business practices of fossil fuel companies; it is the companies’
entire business model which they find objectionable: “there haven’t been any
[shareholder] resolutions that have been able to address the core problem with the
industry: the massive amounts of carbon they insist on dumping into the atmosphere for
free” (Fossil Free, 2013). Furthermore, such an approach would deprive them of the
mobilization aspect of the campaign, which is an essential part of their broader strategy.

Morality
By arguing that endowments should not be used to support social causes, college
administrators and opponents of divestment are separating economic from moral
concerns and drawing a sharp line between their institution’s financial affairs and its
broader social mission. Endowments exist to support the university’s research and
education, the argument goes, and anything which threatens the maximization of returns
is therefore out of consideration. Clearly, however, moral considerations do come into
play when deciding where (or where not) to invest. As the Fossil Free website points out,
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most higher education institutions are putting a large emphasis on sustainability and
environmental initiatives, and do not want to be seen to be lagging on climate change.
Given their status as education institutions it is also difficult for them to completely
ignore the moral dimension of their investment. The most obvious prior example is,
again, the South African divestment campaign. Although it took much struggle over more
than a decade, with many of the same arguments used in opposition, eventually more than
150 institutions did divest themselves of assets in companies which had business in South
Africa.
Since then, there have been other, lower-profile and somewhat less controversial
divestment campaigns targeting universities. Notably, a campaign against the Sudanese
government’s atrocities in the country’s Darfur region spurred a divestment movement
which resulted in at least 61 universities, along with many state and local governments
and other institutional investors, selling assets in companies which had business in Sudan
between 2006 and 2008 (Westermann-Behaylo, 2010; Sudan Divestment Task Force,
2008). There are a number of reasons why the Darfur divestment campaign achieved
these successes in a relatively short timespan. The campaign targeted a fairly small
number of companies, all involved in the country’s oil production. It is straightforward to
draw a line from oil revenues, Sudan’s major source of income, to human rights abuses
perpetrated by government forces. And the morality is a lot more obvious, the acts being
carried out so horrifying that to argue against divestment is to risk the appearance of
complicity. Shareholder activism and constructive engagement seems inadequate, even
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inappropriate; it is difficult to ‘engage’ or ‘work with’ a regime responsible for
systematized torture, rape, mass killings.
The combination of low financial stakes and immediate moral outrage made the
case for divestment from Sudan a relatively easy sell. Climate change, however, is
different on both of these counts. In terms of the amount of money involved, a report
comparing various divestment movements finds that the total market capitalization of the
four firms targeted by the Sudan campaign is around three hundred billion dollars; while
for the two hundred targeted fossil fuel companies it is over four trillion dollars (Ansar et
al., 2013). Fossil fuel stocks tend to perform well, and can make up a sizeable portion of
investment portfolios, so divestment represents both a greater effort and financial risk.
Although campaigners often stress the moral urgency of climate action – appeals to
morality are the primary tactic used by divestment campaigners – climate change
represents a less direct or immediate threat. Public opinion research has repeatedly shown
that while people consider climate change an important issue, it comes near the bottom in
rankings of important political issues and is seen as an abstract risk, distant in both time
and space (Leiserowitz et al., 2014). This is not helped, of course, by the fact that
responsibility for the problem and potential solutions are far from clear, and directly
implicate the habits and lifestyles of most people in developed societies. These
psychological and institutional barriers to climate action are in part what the divestment
campaign is designed to address. What the comparison to the Sudan campaign shows is
that there are moral considerations in investment decisions; that although university
administrators and fund managers argue the sole purpose of endowments is to generate a
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return on investment and not promote social goals, there are in fact ethical lines that
cannot be crossed.
A major aim of the Fossil Free campaign is to redraw these ethical lines. The
moral argument is the most prominent in the campaign materials and op-eds, and is the
argument most commonly associated with campaigners in news articles. The Fossil Free
website boldly states “It’s wrong to profit from wrecking the planet” (Fossil Free, 2014)
and the urgency of taking action to prevent catastrophic harm is repeatedly emphasized.
An important part of the campaigners’ strategy is to call into question what is usually
taken for granted. Through making visible the role of institutions like universities in
financing fossil fuel extraction, the divestment campaign hopes to problematize economic
arrangements that are usually not subject to public scrutiny and force those responsible to
take ethical considerations into account. A leader of the University of Wisconsin
divestment campaign writes in an op-ed that impacting fossil fuel companies’ bottom line
is “not the point,” but that when universities and elected officials “are asked to take a
stand on divestment, it pushes them to take a stand on climate change” (Para, 2013).
Climate change is presented starkly as a moral transgression, and the fossil fuel
companies as its primary causative agents – the representatives against whom action must
be taken. Thus, any practice which supports fossil fuel companies contributes to climate
change is necessarily immoral. A Brown University divestment campaign leader is
quoted in a news article as saying that the university “can’t ignore the dictates of science
and ethics” and therefore must act to divest (Salit, 2013). Through the logic of linking
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climate science to the ethics of divestment, a contested policy choice which has
questionable economic impact becomes an inevitability.
A major argument used by campus campaigners is the necessity of aligning the
values of universities’ educational missions with their financial activities. Spokespeople
repeatedly point out that it is disingenuous for educational institutions to earn money for
their endowments off companies that are causing climate change while simultaneously
claiming to be leading voices for sustainability. A Los Angeles Times feature on the
movement sums up their position:
Student activists, however, insist that colleges need to take the moral
stance. They say it is hypocritical to teach about global warming and
ecological protection while investing in firms the students contend are
hastening climate change by mining and drilling for fuels to be burned in
massive amounts. (Gordon, 2013)
In a Toronto Star op-ed, a Canadian divestment leader writes that “building a sustainable
campus that is bankrolling and profiting from climate change is a Pyrrhic victory at best”
(Fenton, 2013). This argument is also made by the colleges which have chosen to divest.
In this early stage of the campaign, these institutions were mainly small colleges which
distinguished themselves through their environmental focus, and they place this as a key
reason for why they divested. Hampshire college president Jonathan Lash, quoted in a
feature in the Chronicle of Higher Education, stated that Hampshire “made a fundamental
choice that our investment policies are linked to our educational policies” (in
Mogilyanskaya, 2013), and the sustainability director for Unity College told the Times
Higher Education Supplement that “the greening of higher education is for nothing if
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we’re not holding institutions responsible for what they are actually doing about
sustainability” (quoted in Marcus, 2013).
Emphasizing the immorality of being associated with fossil fuel companies feeds
into the larger aim of the divestment movement, which is to attack the reputation and
social standing of these companies, ultimately weakening their political influence. This is
clear in McKibben’s initial Rolling Stone article, in which he singles out the fossil fuel
industry as the major enemy in the fight against climate change. Campaigners state they
are out to remove the “social license” of fossil fuel companies, to turn them into pariahs
in the same way as has been done to the tobacco industry. The phrase ‘social license’ is
brought up numerous times by divestment advocates. Although it is not explicitly
defined, campaigners use it to refer to making the business practices of fossil fuel
companies unacceptable to most people in society, such that politicians and universities
would risk damage to their own reputation by being seen to be associated with them. The
Fossil Free website states that the “goal of the campaign is to weaken [fossil fuel]
companies’ grip over our economy and politics by taking away their social license to
operate in a way that is putting the planet at risk” (Fossil Free, 2013b) and to turn “Big
Oil into Big Tobacco, an industry that no politician wants to be seen with” (Fossil Free,
2013c). The campaigns seek to redefine the business of fossil fuel extraction as an
activity that, while not illegal, breaks accepted norms of conduct to the extent that it is a
moral imperative that it must be stopped. Implied here is that corporate activity which
affects the public can (or should) only be carried out with the public’s consent.2
McKibben (2012b) writes in an op-ed that fossil fuel companies “don’t deserve the social
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license our silence grants them,” and a student activist from Harvard is quoted as saying
that “we would reinstate their social license when they came up with a business plan to
keep global warming within two degrees” (Mufson, 2013).
The idea of a social license is frequently invoked by environmental campaigners
and is an established concept in literature on corporate social responsibility.
Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2004) argue that social obligations on businesses, the
bounds within which they can act without risking a public backlash, often exceed their
legal obligations. Drawing from their case studies of communities affected by
environmental pollution from paper mills, Gunningham et al. write that corporations see
the maintenance of their social license as important and often act beyond their legal
requirements in order to convince the public that they have a right to exist. The
enforcement mechanism of a social license is primarily reputation capital, and by acting
to lower firms’ social standing campaigners aim to reduce their potential influence with
the public, politicians and regulatory agencies. Social license is also important for
policymaking, “opening fruitful possibilities for influencing corporate behavior not just
directly through regulation, but also indirectly (and perhaps more powerfully) by
empowering various institutions of civil society” (p. 309). The concept of social license
has been adopted in recent years by the companies themselves who also attempt to ensure
they can continue their business practices with the goodwill of the community.
Social license is therefore a space of contention, a space where various competing
interests attempt to gain legitimacy for their actions and worldviews. Forbes magazine
declared 2013 “the year of the social license to operate” (Klein, 2012). It is used
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strategically by firms, and, as Ahluwalia and Miller (2014) point out, companies often
seek to enhance their standing in the community in areas unrelated to their environmental
impact – fossil fuel companies sponsoring the arts, in their example. They refer to it as “a
surprisingly overt term adopted with relish by environmental criminals to explain their
strategies for winning over local, national, and international communities’ acceptance and
even welcome” (Ahluwalia and Miller, 2014, p. 1).
Still, if persistent social license demands from communities and campaign groups
are not met, they can be translated into formalized legal requirements. This idea is
utilized by both campaigners and politicians to achieve legislative goals. The Fossil Free
campaign states that one of their ultimate aims is to persuade the US Congress to pass
emissions-reduction laws (Fossil Free, 2013a). For his part, President Obama has on
several occasions appealed to environmentalists to increase pressure on himself and
Congress in order to create the political capital required for greater legislative action. In a
speech at Georgetown University in July 2013, Obama supported the divestment
movement and stated that “what we need in this fight are citizens who will stand up, and
speak up, and compel us to do what this moment demands” and urged the audience to
“remind everyone who represents you at every level of government that sheltering future
generations against the ravages of climate change is a prerequisite for your vote”
(Obama, 2013).
There are, however, a number of limitations on the degree to which social actors
can impose their demands on companies:
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First, in order to articulate social demands, social actors must be able to
determine that a harm has or might well occur and must also have the
organizational competence to develop and effectively articulate demands
to address the harm. Second, legal and political actors must be reasonably
responsive to social actors’ demands; that is, they must see the demands
of social actors as both important and legitimate. Finally, economic
concerns often constrain the degree of beyond-compliance behavior firms
are willing or able to undertake. (Gunningham et al., 2004: 332)
The dynamics of the divestment movement are quite different to the case studies
presented by Gunningham et al., which mostly focus on interactions between businesses
and a particular local community. The Fossil Free campaign is not targeting the fossil
fuel companies themselves, but their investors, along with politicians and public figures
who would be seen to associate or do business with them. It is not particular practices or
misdeeds which are the focus of the campaign, but the entire business model of the
industry. The conditions campaigners offer for a restoration of the companies’ social
license is nothing short of a complete transformation of everything they do. Clearly this is
unrealistic, so the success of the divestment campaign rests almost entirely on external
regulation of carbon emissions rather than any voluntary actions by the companies
themselves. This shows the extent to which the moral argument of the divestment
campaign, while the central component of their messaging strategy, depends upon the
economic and political dimensions. Demonstrating that “a harm has or might well occur”
as a result of fossil fuel companies’ business practices requires credible articulation of the
economics of divestment, and effecting change along the new moral lines defined by the
campaigners requires engagement in the political process.
By defining the bounds of morality to exclude the business practices of fossil fuel
companies, divestment campaigners still need to demonstrate that some kind of moral
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transgression is taking place – one that justifies, or compels, the type of action they are
advocating. Research into the public’s attitudes towards climate change have generally
found that while people are concerned about it at an abstract level, they do not see it as
being an especially urgent issue or one that will affect them directly. Impacts are viewed
as distant in both time and space, affecting far-off locations mainly in the future
(Whitmarsh et al., 2013). Prior research into media coverage of climate change has found
that this tendency to associate the issue with distant times and places is evident in
reporting, when the impacts of climate change are mentioned at all. Often climate
impacts are elided in routine reporting and it is taken as a given that climate change is
something to be avoided without necessarily saying why (Boykoff, 2011; HowardWilliams, 2009).
This is evident in coverage of the divestment movement, with the consequences
of climate change rarely explicitly articulated, and only vaguely alluded to if they are
mentioned at all. Campaigners’ statements make vague references to devastating impacts
and impending catastrophe. When impacts are mentioned, it is most often in terms of
weather events such as droughts, floods and storms. McKibben’s (2012) Rolling Stone
piece and other op-eds deal more explicitly with the consequences of climate change.
Again, they mainly focus on weather-related phenomena, and put an emphasis on
changes that are happening and visible now as opposed to potential future impacts. The
Fossil Free website and campaign material does not put a great deal of emphasis on
climate impacts. Its fossil fuel divestment communications guide again points to extreme
weather as the major climate impact campaigners should talk about, connecting it to the
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fossil fuel industry and the moral obligations of colleges or local governments in a
“messaging triangle” (Fossil Free, 2013e). Weather is the most common impact
mentioned across media forms, as the campaign attempts to reinforce that climate change
is happening now, linking tangible phenomena their audience are able to witness (either
directly or through the media) to the threat of climate change. The threat to humans is
therefore the key point of emphasis, rather than ‘protecting nature.’ Most of the imagery
used by the campaign is of people protesting, or of either clean or dirty energy sources.
350’s style guide encourages the use of images of people in action, and cautions
campaigners to avoid “cliché environmental visuals” such as “leaves, polar bears,
overuse of the color green – 350 needs to appeal to a much broader range of people than
just traditional environmentalists” (350.org, 2014).
Presenting climate change as a moral issue is not uncommon in campaigning; in
fact, it is one of the dominant ways it is communicated to the public. Al Gore famously
stated in his documentary An Inconvenient Truth that “I don't really consider [climate
change] a political issue, I consider it to be a moral issue” (Guggenheim, 2006), a
sentiment he repeated in his acceptance speech at the 2007 Academy Awards. But, as
Pepermans and Maeseele (2014) point out, this type of framing often decouples morality
from politics, depoliticizing climate change and glossing over the structural and
institutional challenges which stand in the way of meaningful solutions. By elevating
climate change ‘above’ politics in an attempt to bridge partisan divides, campaigners too
often are reduced to advocating largely symbolic or ineffectual actions, frequently in the
form of changes to individual consumption patterns which do not offer systemic
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challenges. Indeed, the call to action at the end of An Inconvenient Truth is largely in this
vein, encouraging viewers to buy energy efficient light bulbs and drive less frequently. 3
Another problem with moralizing climate change is that because everyone contributes to
it, campaigners risk alienating their audience by casting everyone as a sinner and
contributing to the stereotype of environmentalists as humorless scolds.
The Fossil Free campaign deploys morality in a different way, linking moral
urgency to political change instead of dissociating from it and setting up the fossil fuel
industry as an external ‘enemy’ to be targeted. The fossil fuel industry’s influence on
democratic politics is more evident in the campaign as a moral transgression than any
effects of climate change itself. This approach shows the influence of the environmental
justice movement on climate change activism, as the campaign highlights the injustices
that arise out of the current system of social organization and advocates for systemic
change along more equitable lines through a redefinition of what is morally acceptable.
Rather than seeking to change individual consumption patterns or acting within the
bounds of normal political process (An Inconvenient Truth urges people to write to their
congressperson – or if that fails, run for office themselves), divestment campaigners
recognize the limits of established political institutions. Of course, such an approach is
not new, having been used in various forms by social and environmental justice
advocates for decades. It does represent a departure from the way mainstream
environmental campaigners have approached the issue, and with 350 being one of the
more visible and effective advocates for action on climate change in recent years, could
signal a broader shift in public discourse.
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Politics
The third aspect to the Fossil Free campaign is the political, involving how the
campaigns attempt to build a movement and create social change in line with their goals.
There are a number of ways in which the political is relevant to divestment. One is the act
of mobilizing a large number of people to take visible, public action on an issue of social
importance. A second is engagement with the institutions of representative democracy to
bring about legislative or policy change. And a third is the ultimate goal of the
movement, the overall vision of the type of society they are working towards and which
informs their more specific policy objectives.
As discussed above, the main intended outcome of the divestment campaign – and
indeed of all divestment campaigns – is in building a movement around a particular
cause. The acts of building a campaign, conducting petitions and protests, and engaging
the public and the media with the issue are the primary focus. From a strategic viewpoint,
the stated goal of persuading institutions to divest their fossil fuel holdings is simply a
vehicle through which the organization can achieve greater public visibility.
Campaigners’ open acknowledgement of this – their insistence that the aim of the
movement is to bankrupt fossil fuel companies politically not economically; McKibben’s
statement that “the fight is almost as important as the victory” (quoted in Kiley, 2013) –
draws attention to the wider issue of climate change as well as deflecting counterarguments that divestment will in itself not reduce carbon emissions. ‘Movementbuilding’ is at the core of 350’s mission. The first thing visible on the 350 website’s
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homepage (www.350.org) is the statement “We’re building a global climate movement”
in large letters and most of their other activities feed into this broader goal.
One of the things which has set 350 apart from other climate advocacy groups,
and which has contributed to their rapid rise to prominence, is their use of grassroots
activism on a global scale. They aim in most of their initiatives to involve individuals in
their local area, but acting in concert with others around the world. In so doing they hope
to overcome the apathy normally associated with climate change politics, that people feel
their individual actions can have any significant impact on what is a seemingly
intractable global problem. While their prior campaign events took place primarily over
short time frames, such as the global days of action which involved simultaneous protests
all over the world, the divestment campaign extends this approach to a series of
simultaneous but localized campaigns. Divestment offers a way for individuals to be
involved directly and to feel like their actions make a difference, while offering a tangible
and achievable outcome, and the chance to contribute to a coordinated global effort
against climate change. Tilly and Wood (2009) write of a possible split between “older
styles of action and organization that sustain continuous political involvement at points of
decision-making power” and “spectacular but temporary displays of connection across
the continents, largely mediated by specialist organizations and entrepreneurs” (p. 122).
Similarly, Beck (1992) posits that a characteristic of risk politics is ad-hoc and temporary
movements coming together in response to particular risks. This campaign appears to be
an effort to bridge this gap, combining displays of mass action with a longer-term
commitment to political change.
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It has long been a strategy of activist and campaign groups to use the news media
to amplify their message, and the Fossil Free campaign is no different. In the campaign
toolkit section of their website, a page entitled ‘Getting Media Attention’ stresses the
importance of media attention for putting pressure on key decision makers in college
administrations. It then reminds readers that
our larger goal is to use divestment to send shockwaves through the fossil
fuel industry and take away their social license to operate. If colleges
divest silently, without significant media coverage, our efforts won’t have
the desired effect. (Fossil Free, 2013d)
The page suggests a list of news values that campaigners should consider when trying to
get the attention of the media: “drama, conflict, strange bedfellows, new facts or
revelations, scandal, curiosity, and all the things that make for a good story.”
So in this sense the campaign is important because it draws public attention to
divestment, and hence climate change more broadly. There is much discussion in
academic and policy circles over public opinion polling on climate change, usually
related to the percentage of Americans who ‘believe’ that human actions are responsible.
This number has been found to fluctuate depending on recent events, be they weatherrelated or political, and there are large differences in responses depending on party
affiliation (Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Brulle et al., 2012). There is little in the way of
political will for major policy action on climate change, particularly at a legislative level.
As Brulle et al. (2012) found in their analysis of long-term poll trends, shifting public
opinion on climate change is mainly a function of elite cues and structural economic
factors. Their results indicate that media coverage, while important, is also mostly
dependent on the actions of politicians, and that political polarization, with contrasting
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cues coming from differing political groups, is the dominant factor in the relative lack of
public concern. The differences between the two positions are tied to wider issues of
economics and culture, and cannot be resolved through communication alone. Hence,
Brulle et al. (2012) argue, “any communications strategy that holds out the promise of
effectiveness must be linked to a broader political strategy. Political conflicts are
ultimately resolved through political mobilization and activism” (p. 185).
Potential for meaningful change thus depends on climate change being seen as a
political issue – political in the sense used by Mouffe (2005) and Pepermans and
Maeseele (2014) in that it involves agonistic debate between competing visions of social
organization. Positioning climate change only in terms of science and depoliticized
morality means that the institutional, economic and cultural factors which underlie
climate change are not subject to public debate (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). This often
results, as DeMeritt (2006) points out, in debate that is restricted to questions of science,
and those who would oppose taking action on climate change for economic reasons are
left to argue their case in scientific terms. This is not, to be clear, the fault of those
pushing for action on climate change, but just to note that any strategy to address what is
essentially a political problem needs to include political solutions.
The Fossil Free campaign, and 350 as a whole, show through their strategy that
they are well aware of the importance of politicizing climate change. This then raises the
question of what their end goals are, both in the short and long term. What is the purpose
of the movement they are building, if not to bankrupt the fossil fuel industry through
divestment, and how do they hope to achieve it? Social movements often face tensions in
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defining and articulating their goals. Especially amongst organizations which advocate
for a broad societal transformation, there is frequently a desire not to be too strongly
associated with a particular outcome or policy objective in the short term. Two recent
examples illustrate some of these trade-offs. The gay rights movement, particularly in the
US, has in recent years focused heavily on marriage equality as its primary goal. While
this has been spectacularly successful in achieving its stated aims, there have been
concerns in some quarters that placing marriage at the center of the gay rights movement
draws attention away from other forms of discrimination faced by gay and lesbian people.
And more broadly, some campaigners have argued that marriage itself is a discriminatory
institution, and that emphasizing marriage works to force homosexual relationships into a
heteronormative paradigm rather than encouraging wider social changes in thinking about
what constitutes a ‘normal’ relationship (Franke, 2006). The Occupy movement perhaps
represents the other side of this dilemma. While its protests against social and economic
inequality resonated with many people and quickly spread globally, the movement’s
emphasis on changing the global capitalist order and refusal to attach itself to any
concrete, short-term policy initiatives may have contributed to its fading from view
(Mouffe, 2013).
The general approach to campaigning taken by 350 has utilized definable, specific
goals. This is most clearly seen in the name of the organization, representing the target
concentration (in parts per million) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere which they argue
is the safe level for human society. So rather than simply raising awareness or changing
personal behavior, all of the organization’s actions are oriented ultimately towards
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reducing carbon emissions. Within this lies a set of assumptions, not always explicitly
articulated, about how society should operate. The interplay between the economic and
political arguments of the divestment campaign can illuminate how the organization is
hoping to use divestment to achieve meaningful steps towards their overall goal of
reducing the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, if not through the bankrupting of
fossil fuel companies. Action by the US government to regulate carbon emissions appears
to be the major goal, though this is not mentioned especially frequently by campaigners.
Indeed, movement-building is often positioned as an end in itself. It is stated that
the goal of removing the social license of fossil fuel companies is to reduce their
influence in politics, but the presumable reason for this – to enable Congress to pass
legislation placing limits on carbon emissions – is rarely stated outright. A campaigner
for the Washington DC divestment organization writes in the Washington Post that the
campaign is “intended to show elected officials and the financial sector that citizens want
them to make bold decisions to protect us from the economic and physical harm that
climate change promises” (Grason, 2013). Others make reference to the need to generate
“political will” for action on climate change (e.g. Daigle, 2013). The Fossil Free
website’s FAQ page states that Exxon could transition to being a renewable energy
company, but “they’ll do it because of government regulation, not because they willingly
decide to make the move ... Divestment is a clear and powerful action that helps build the
case for government action” (Fossil Free, 2013a).
Most of the references to specific governmental action or policy proposals come
from McKibben himself; mostly this is in the form of calls for putting a “price on
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carbon.” This appears in his initial Rolling Stone piece, where he writes that this should
happen “through a direct tax or other methods” and that we must “enlist the markets in
the fight against global warming” (McKibben, 2012a). He spells out the connection
between this and the divestment campaign in an interview with Responsible Investor
magazine, also posted on the Fossil Free blog, arguing that the fossil fuel industry won’t
change its practices “until we change the rules of the game and put a price on carbon and
the damage it does to the atmosphere. And we can’t do that until we’ve reduced the
power of the fossil fuel industry in Washington” (quoted in Gilbert, 2013). When asked
what Washington needs to do, he simply responds, “They need to put a price on carbon if
we’re ever going to get out of this trap we’re in.” While the Fossil Free campaign, and
350 as a whole, have a broader vision than simply passing a carbon pricing law, it is
significant that legislative action through established political processes is held up as the
best way of moving towards this vision, at least by 350’s leadership. Tilly and Wood
(2009) write that the presence of social movements in democratic societies raises the
question of whether “sovereignty and its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in
the people it claims to represent” (p. 13). Divestment is a subpolitical action, in that it is
an intervention in the economic realm outside the bounds of traditional representative
politics. However, the aim is to reduce the subpolitical power of corporations by
weakening their political influence and asserting more control through representative
democracy. And this is to be achieved through collective mobilization, rather than
viewing democracy in terms of the individual acts of voting or writing to a politician.
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It is also distinct from the ‘inside baseball’ politics of organizations such as the
Environmental Defense Fund that exert influence through lobbying, political connections
and the like. This type of institutionalized and professionalized environmental
organization has come under criticism for being too close to those in power and working
too much within the system rather than confronting systemic failings. While these
organizations have been able to achieve important policy victories, they fall short in
terms of the broader social transformation which McKibben and his ilk argue is required
to properly address the challenges of climate change. By building a popular movement,
350 is attempting to reinvigorate environmentalism with a sense of possibility, and of the
need to radically alter the business-as-usual paradigm through making political
institutions more responsive to popular demands. However, as Nisbet (2012) notes,
despite their different methods, the solutions proposed by McKibben and 350 are still
fairly narrowly focused on policy. Moreover, the failure to achieve meaningful results in
this domain has led them to “double-down in their commitment to their policy paradigm,
attributing failure to the political prowess of conservatives and industry, and to a
corresponding lack of grassroots pressure and moral outrage” (Nisbet, 2012, p. 50).
Quite what the social transformation envisaged by 350 and the Fossil Free
campaign might look like beyond the specific legislative initiatives is often left unstated
in campaign material and news coverage. McKibben certainly has ideas about it, having
articulated his vision for a post-climate change society in several of his books. In his
summary of McKibben’s body of work, Nisbet (2012, p. 50) suggests there may be a
disconnect between this vision and that of the people who make up the movement:
112

I wonder how many of the people turning out to protest the Keystone XL
pipeline, working on behalf of divestment, or following along on Twitter
and Facebook are aware of McKibben’s long standing vision of societal
change ... In this pastoral future free of consumerism or material
ambition, Americans would rarely travel, experiencing the world instead
via the Internet, grow much of their own food, power their communities
through solar and wind, and divert their wealth to developing countries.
It is not necessary, though, to accept wholesale McKibben’s vision of the future and
advocacy of small-scale, self-sufficient agrarian communities in order to be a part of the
divestment movement or any of 350’s campaigns. Given 350’s emphasis on policy
solutions, they are able to attract a diverse constituency of environmentalists and social
change advocates who can agree on the need for popular mobilization on climate without
having to commit to McKibben’s specific vision of a post-climate change society. As
Nisbet (2012) points out, since his first book The End of Nature McKibben’s writing has
argued for a “fundamental reconsideration of our worldviews, aspirations, and life goals,
a new consciousness that would dramatically re-organize society, ending our addiction to
economic growth and consumerism” (p. 3). This commitment to a reconsideration of
worldviews along sustainable lines is more important than agreement on what the end
result of this process might look like.
It is this commitment to social change which is common to almost everyone
involved in the climate activist movement, even if they may not agree with McKibben’s
overall vision or politics. This was evident at the 2013 Powershift Conference, a biennial
gathering of climate activists which drew over six thousand mostly college-aged people
from across the USA to Pittsburgh for three days of workshops, presentations and
networking. Along with an almost total focus on systemic, societal changes rather than
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individual actions or insider politics, there was a heavy emphasis on linking the climate
movement to both environmental justice and other social justice causes. A commonly
repeated message was that climate change, civil rights, workers’ rights, immigrants’
rights and related causes are all facing off against a common enemy in the economic and
political arrangements which are dominant in Western societies. Although there was a
diversity of approaches to achieving this type of change, there was a common discontent
with Western capitalism. This, obviously, is different to the CarbonTracker analysts and
others who are largely concerned about the carbon bubble in the interests of preserving
existing arrangements and worry about the destabilizing effect unburnable carbon could
have on global financial markets.
With this comes a reconsideration of social institutions to better reflect a changed
understanding of humanity’s place in the world, and a shift from a society based on the
pursuit of economic growth and the profit motive to one where human wellbeing is
paramount. Though he is one of the leading environmental writers of recent decades,
McKibben’s main subject is not nature but rather “an exploration of the meaning of being
human” (White, 2011, p. 110) and what it means to live in a world increasingly shaped
by our own actions. In the context of his advocacy, the long-term changes McKibben
advocates can be seen less as a blueprint to be followed exactly than as a signal of a
commitment to systemic change. That existing institutional arrangements are failing with
respect to the environment (and consequently human wellbeing) is a position common to
almost everyone involved in the divestment movement. While obviously there are going
to be differing viewpoints on the ultimate endpoint, this commitment to deep institutional
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change is what sets the climate activism exemplified by 350 apart from other areas of
climate change advocacy even when their immediate methods – such as legislative
change – may be the same.
While their goals for social transformation inform the activities of campaigners,
none of this is especially visible in their public advocacy or resultant media coverage.
Most news articles focus only on the immediate goals of the campaign, often related to a
specific institution and how successful the divestment actions are. Campaigners, both in
quotes provided to the media and in op-eds published in newspapers generally, as
described above, emphasize the moral dimensions of divestment. Politics, when
mentioned, is related to the need to reduce the influence of fossil fuel companies on the
political process and pass climate legislation. Feature articles such as those in the New
York Times (Gillis, 2013) go into more depth about the aims of the campaigners, but this
is still mainly limited to the political mobilization aspect of the campaign. Gillis (2013),
for instance, writes that the campaigners “may stand to win even when the colleges say
no” as a result of their forcing the issue onto the agenda of the country’s elites. The Fossil
Free website similarly concentrates almost entirely on the specifics of divestment and not
the wider aims of climate activism or any of McKibben’s political philosophy.
Nonetheless, aspects of McKibben’s outlook are evident in 350’s tactics. As
McKibben (2010) recounts in Eaarth, the idea for 350’s first day of action in 2009 came
from the notion of networked localism that he advocates. Rather than one large march on
Washington, there would instead be “distributed political action” (p. 210), hundreds of
smaller actions in cities and communities across the world, each specific to a particular
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place but connected and coordinated via the internet. Their second day of action in
October 2010 was called the ‘Global Work Party’ and involved groups of volunteers
taking specific actions in their communities, such as installing solar panels and planting
trees, again coordinated and shared online. The divestment campaign also follows this
model to an extent, with relatively autonomous local campaigns operating simultaneously
with support from 350 staffers such as McChesney. Interestingly, some of 350s
campaigns have started to move away from this pattern. The campaign against the
Keystone XL Pipeline involved several large marches on Washington, and the People’s
Climate March in New York in September 2014 was the largest climate change
demonstration in history with people traveling from all over the country – the type of
singular, grand spectacle which McKibben argues in Eaarth is outdated and unnecessary.
More broadly, the divestment campaign reflects McKibben’s politics through its
insistence on the need to rethink some of the taken-for-granted processes which shape
how our societies interact with the natural world. By challenging investment patterns,
often considered off-limits in political debates (indeed, university administrators
explicitly argue that endowments should not be subject to political considerations), the
Fossil Free campaign is making visible some of the ways in which such institutions and
processes contribute to climate change and offering a means of changing them in line
with a different set of values. Climate change, as an unintended consequence of
modernity, is a result of economic and political systems working as they should – hence
its seeming intractability or ‘wickedness,’ as eliminating the causes of climate change
means large-scale changes to the systems which produced it. Divestment is presented as a
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means by which citizens can meaningfully impact these processes, even if in a relatively
small way, through intervening in the economic system which supports the continued
extraction and burning of fossil fuels. The campaign takes the position that addressing
climate change requires transformational social change, and a reconsideration of core
social values and how these are reflected in economic and political structures.

Conclusion: Reflexivity and the political
As the idea of the Anthropocene becomes more resonant in public discourse,
tensions will arise as to the appropriate role of humans in governing planetary processes
and the means by which we should do so. As with the other two organizations in this
study, 350 seeks to reconceptualize and reconstitute environmental politics so as to more
deliberately channel environmental impacts towards beneficial ends. Where 350 differs
from the other organizations is in its strong commitment to issues of social justice and
inequality. Addressing climate change is not just about applying a narrow technical or
policy solution to a particular problem, but an opportunity to reconsider the structural
inequalities and systemic factors which are at the root of environmental risks. Systemic,
structural causes and attention to disparities in risk exposure are often not apparent in
public debates about climate change, which commonly position the problem as a threat to
all humanity, or the planet as a whole. Meanwhile, responsibility for causing climate
change is both individualized to the actions of consumers and generalized to all of human
civilization – it is at once the fault of everyone and no one. Methmann (2010) argues that
climate protection has become an empty signifier which allows governance organizations
to reframe their existing activities in terms of climate change without changing social or
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economic structures, such that they “can claim to be in favour of climate protection and
stick to business as usual at the same time” (p. 345). The approach taken by 350, by
contrast, sees climate change not as the inevitable outcome of modernity but as arising
from an economic and social system designed to benefit particular interests at the
expense of others. Their social justice-centered approach emphasizes the need to change
these structural incentives; otherwise the same inequalities will be reproduced in any
responses to climate change.4
This focus on issues of power and inequality complicates the idea of the
Anthropocene. Similar to the way that much climate discourse universalizes
responsibility for and exposure to environmental risks, thinking about the Anthropocene
simply as the ‘age of humans’ does not take into account which humans in particular are
responsible for the situation in which we find ourselves. The geophysical markers which
signal the age of humans were not laid down by humanity as a whole, but as a result of
political and economic systems which incentivize certain outcomes (principally,
exponential growth) that were put in place by hegemonic interests in specific historical
contexts. Some have argued that Anthropocene is for this reason not the best term to use
to describe our current era. Sloterdijk (2015) points out that
The collective that today is characterized with terms such as “humanity,”
and whose influence on Earth is described as “anthropogenic,” consists
mainly of agents who have, in less than one century, appropriated the
technologies developed in Europe. ... In this case one should rather speak
of a “Eurocene” or a “Technocene” initiated by Europeans. (p. 327)
Similarly, Ivakhiv (2014) outlines some of the alternatives which have been proposed,
which capture in different ways the economic, technological, political and ecological
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links embedded in our current condition. Examples include “homogenocene”,
“patriarchy”, “modernity”, and “capitalism”; though each in emphasizing certain links
and relationships inevitably downplays others. Perhaps the value of a totalizing term such
as Anthropocene (as with, say, ‘globalization’) is that it can be made to encompass all of
these, and provides a framework through which the relationship of human socioeconomic
structures to the physical environment can be discussed.
In any case, if, as Latour (2010) argues, our primary challenge is in “composing”
a future in which human impact on the non-human world is acknowledged and dealt with
forthrightly, these power dynamics need to be taken into account. The massive resistance
faced by even modest carbon reduction initiatives demonstrates the entrenched power of
corporate interests (McCright & Dunlap, 2003). And, as Methmann’s (2010) work shows,
steps to address climate change will reproduce existing power dynamics unless directly
challenged. As discussed in Chapter 2, this lack of attention to questions of power is one
of the biggest criticisms of reflexive modernization theory and the work of both Latour
and Beck. As with the Anthropocene, Beck’s concept of risk tends to universalize the
impacts of environmental problems – “poverty is hierarchic; smog is democratic” as he
put it (Beck, 1992). This macro-sociological viewpoint is not entirely incorrect. Climate
change is inescapable in a way that income inequality is not, and will certainly affect
every aspect of life if the worst effects come to pass. Nonetheless, its impacts will not be
evenly or ‘democratically’ distributed. As is frequently pointed out by campaigners,
populations who have the least responsibility for causing climate change are likely to
suffer the worst of its consequences.
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The environmental justice-infused standpoint taken by 350 insists that issues of
poverty, inequality, and racial and gender discrimination are all intertwined with
environmental issues, and that it is not possible to address one without taking account of
the others (Smith, 2014). 350 periodically issues statements expressing solidarity with
other social movements and causes such as the Occupy movement and the Arab
uprisings. An email sent to supporters after the death of unarmed black teenager Michael
Brown at the hands of police in Ferguson, Missouri stated that
We believe unequivocally that working for racial justice is a crucial part
of fighting climate change. Communities of color and poor communities
are hit first and hardest by the impacts of a climate system spiraling out of
control. ... Movements for justice in the U.S. are often fractured, and
powerful interests – like the fossil fuel industry – try their hardest to make
those divisions wider. Choosing to stand together is one of the most
important choices we can make. (May Boeve, email, 20 August 2014; see
Mock, 2014)
Climate change is conceived of as a systemic social problem, rather than a scientific or
technical issue to be resolved simply through policy instruments or the application of
technology. The ambition of 350 is to question and ultimately reconstruct the
foundational principles of social organization in late modernity, and set out a path to a
new society built on more sustainable and equitable lines.
This is, in Mouffe’s (2005) terms, a fundamentally political process, and involves
taking on the entrenched interests which work to uphold the status quo. Pepermans and
Maeseele (2014) argue that climate change discourse should be evaluated according to
whether it works to politicize or depoliticize debate. Whereas depoliticized discourse
conceals underlying values and interests, politicized discourse aims to reveal competing
sets of epistemic assumptions and relate these to alternative visions of society. The notion
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of political choice is key here; a politicized discourse emphasizes the choices and
decisions that need to be made in order to address the challenge of climate change, while
a depoliticized discourse sees climate change as a problem to be solved through the
technocratic application of scientific findings. It is important, too, that the processes of
de/politicization are dynamic and “always need to be investigated at the discursive level
instead of being associated with specific actors, discourses, practices, institutions, or
eras” (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2014, p. 228). The same individuals or organizations can
adopt different strategies in different contexts, depending on their audience and perceived
effectiveness of various rhetorical approaches.
Politicization of social movements or causes often has an uneasy relationship with
achieving meaningful change in structures and institutions. Decreus, Lievens and
Braeckman (2014), citing Mouffe’s (2013) criticism of the Occupy movement for
disengaging from institutional politics and being symbolically effective but institutionally
weak, point out that it can be hard to identify an adversary to oppose agonistically in a
depoliticized culture. Constructing the necessary we/they distinctions is especially
difficult when confronting systemic issues, such as the inequalities arising from global
financial capitalism, or climate change, as the ‘real’ sources of power and decisionmakers are often unclear. Responsibility for systemic risks is shared amongst all who
participate in the system; in depoliticized discourse ‘we’ are all responsible for causing
climate change and are equally (and individually) responsible for its resolution. Those
promoting efforts to address climate change often face criticism for their individual
contributions to the problem – Al Gore has been subject to many attacks for his own
121

carbon-intensive lifestyle, and before every UN Climate Summit there is the inevitable
commentary pointing out the emissions resulting from thousands of delegates and
campaigners flying in from all over the world. For Decreus et al. (2014), Occupy’s
construction of themselves as outside the system and their refusal to engage with
democratic institutions is a way of “making society ‘readable’ or interpretable again in
terms of we/them distinctions” (p. 147), though they concur with Mouffe that translating
this symbolic effectiveness into institutional effectiveness remains an unsolved question.
The divestment campaign represents a different approach to that of Occupy.
While addressing the issue of climate change at a systemic level and adopting a highly
politicized discourse, the campaign also shows a willingness to engage with the
democratic process. Indeed, convincing the US Congress to pass climate legislation is
one of the campaign’s major goals. The campaign is careful, however, not to position this
legislative goal as an end in itself or as the movement’s primary function. Rather,
campaigners articulate an alternative vision of society based on definable yet still fairly
broad values and principles. Their actions in the political realm are informed by this
vision. Unlike the ‘big green’ organizations which aim to achieve what change they can
within institutional boundaries, the divestment campaigners seek to use whatever political
or financial means are available to them to advance their alternate socio-environmental
paradigm. Divestment allows a push for carbon-pricing legislation to be encased within a
broader critique of political and economic structures. In a sense, the campaign seeks not
to achieve a legislative goal by working within the existing system, but instead to change
the system through campaigning for divestment with strong climate legislation being an
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outcome of this process. Divestment as a tactic has a number of advantages for this type
of campaign. It allows for the mobilization of citizens at a local level across the country,
in a way that lobbying Congress directly does not. The hundreds of separate campaigns
targeting different institutions allow for victories to be claimed and give the broader
movement a sense of momentum. And it makes visible the normally hidden or taken-forgranted relationships between societal institutions and environmental impacts, the tracing
of networks characteristic of reflexive modernization (Latour, 2003).
Although the divestment campaign does for the most part adopt a politicized
discourse, their major arguments are made in moral terms. Mouffe (2005) sees appeals to
morality as a symptom of a depoliticized culture, as the we/they opposition is constructed
in terms of good versus evil, rather than as political opponents who can engage
agonistically. The Fossil Free campaign’s moral arguments, though, are for the most part
not deployed in this way. As discussed above, the campaign does fit the notion of
politicized debate described by Pepermans and Maeseele (2014) in presenting contrasting
alternative visions for society. Opposition to action on climate change is constructed as a
symptom of a broken political system that is lacking the voice of ordinary citizens. The
actors on which the campaign is trying to exert pressure are principally university
administrators and politicians, with the aim of shifting important power relations
regarding climate change. This is to be achieved principally by reducing the influence of
fossil fuel companies in the political process and excluding them from positions of
influence in societal institutions and policymaking.
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There are, as Mouffe (2005) notes, always parties and viewpoints that are
excluded from agonistic debate, but she argues that this process of exclusion should be
envisaged in political, rather than moral, terms: “some demands are excluded, not
because they are declared to be ‘evil’, but because they challenge the institutions
constitutive of the democratic political association” (p. 122). This is essentially the
objection that the campaign has to fossil fuel companies, that through their
disproportionate influence on the political system they are undermining democracy and
self-determination. By removing the legitimacy of fossil fuel companies to act in a
political capacity, the campaigners are, in their view, working in the interests of
democratic ideals. Mouffe (2005) continues that the “drawing of a frontier between the
legitimate and the illegitimate is always a political decision, and that it should always
therefore remain open to contestation” (p. 122). Fossil Free, and 350’s larger campaign
efforts, are attempts to redraw the boundaries of what is acceptable in politics, excluding
corporate interests from the process, including a popular voice and taking account of
environmental externalities which are normally ignored.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Mouffe (2005, 2013) is very critical of the reflexive
modernization approach advocated by Beck, Giddens and, to a lesser extent, Latour. Her
criticism is based on their advocacy for a post-political consensus-driven approach and
the lack of attention to questions of power and inequality. While this critique is valid (and
necessary), the reflexive modernization approach is nonetheless valuable, particularly
when it comes to environmental politics. A central tenet of reflexive modernization is the
challenge to the legitimacy of institutions brought about by the crises for which they
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themselves are responsible. As McCright and Dunlap (2010) point out, social movements
are a prominent agent of reflexivity as they “help raise public consciousness of
unintended and unanticipated effects of the industrial capitalist social order, while
providing a vision of the social transformations needed to address them” (p. 104). This
social transformation, for the reflexive modernization theorists, is not just a shift in the
hegemonic terrain of politics, but a more fundamental reinvention of social organization
– a “new modernity,” as Beck (1992) would have it. With this comes the formation, or at
least the recognition, of new political configurations where the non-human world
becomes an essential and unavoidable actor in human affairs.
As both Latour (2003) and Beck, Bonss and Lau (2003) argue in their outlines of
reflexive modernization, boundary-making is a key aspect of the shift from simple
modernization. Specifically, the labor of boundary-making between nature and society
becomes more visible, and while the artificiality of boundary-making is recognized such
boundaries are nonetheless seen as necessary and are institutionalized. In this context, the
divestment campaign’s actions are more than simply redrawing the line around what is
politically acceptable. The associations between financial processes and environmental
impacts have always existed but, as Latour (2003) points out, the ‘constitution’ of
industrial modernity meant that they were usually hidden. The campaign seeks to
incorporate new entities into the political process and create new links and alliances
between various actors, making explicit the connections between climate change and the
economic practices of institutions people interact with on a daily basis. This echoes
Latour’s (2003) contention that risks are best conceptualized as networks. Social
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movements become important in highlighting particular connections and thus attempting
to not simply erase the nature/society distinction but to reassemble elements in new ways
in order to create a different politics.
The importance of social movements is recognized by Beck (1992; 2009),
although he conceptualizes this in terms of ‘risk publics,’ seemingly ad-hoc groupings
which coalesce around particular risks before dissipating. This is often how
environmental activism has functioned, particularly in response to more localized threats,
with more lasting commitments to a particular identity-group or political affiliation not as
evident. The divestment campaign and the climate activist movement more generally
show evidence of this tendency, using their wide reach through digital media to mobilize
large numbers of people for particular events. But underlying this is a deeper affiliation to
social transformation – or at least this is the hope and intention of movement leaders.
Through their emphasis on social and environmental justice, and exhortations that
the climate movement is part of the same movement as those addressing race, class and
gender inequalities, leaders aim to build broad coalition that can mobilize around various
issues but is united in pushing for a fairer, more just and more democratic society.
Importantly, it is a movement based on confronting power and bringing a politicized
discourse to public debate on climate change. While most approaches to tackling climate
change have focused on working through the political system, divestment attempts to
bring democratic accountability to a domain from where it is normally absent. Citizen
power is seen as a means to disrupt the activities of fossil fuel companies, trying to give
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citizens some measure of control over processes which affect the entire planet but from
which environmental concerns are systematically excluded.

1

Maxwell and Miller (2012) use the figure of the accountant as the basis for an ideal
green citizen, being as they are privy to the environmental costs of production.
2

This aligns with Dewey’s (1927) conception of the public as “all those who are affected
by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary
to have those consequences systematically cared for” (p. 16).
3

It may seem odd to use Al Gore as an example of depoliticization – as a former
Democratic politician he is a deeply polarizing political figure, and his position as the
most high-profile public figure associated with climate change was criticized by some
advocates for deepening rather than bridging partisan divides on the issue (e.g. Nordhaus
and Shellenberger, 2014b). And as Pepermans and Maeseele (2014) make clear, in other
venues he has called for more expressly political action on climate.
4

The charge of using climate change as an empty signifier to advance a pre-existing
agenda is also deployed by conservatives against climate activists. They see climate
change simply as a smokescreen to radically transform society along leftist lines. The
climate activists, of course, do not deny the second part of this and see it as central to
their mission, but their lessened focus on the impacts of climate change and explicit
political agenda leaves them open to this critique. Nisbet (2014b) argues that this may
harm efforts to address climate change as it only deepens polarization on the issue.
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Chapter 5 – Ecomodernism: The Breakthrough Institute’s theology
for the Anthropocene

Introduction
Many different factors have been blamed for the inadequacy of societal responses
to climate change: fossil fuel companies and corporate interests delaying action to protect
their bottom lines; a political system ill-equipped to handle a problem of this magnitude
and complexity; the human mind’s difficulty in comprehending a problem which is
largely invisible in everyday life, and where the worst effects seem as if they’ll befall
somebody else at some other time. Advocacy groups have been working to overcome
such challenges for decades, and yet progress often appears frustratingly slow. Perhaps
some of the blame should lie with environmental advocacy groups themselves: could they
have got it massively wrong in their efforts to inform and persuade the public of the
dangers of climate change? Such was the assertion of Michael Shellenberger and Ted
Nordhaus in their widely-distributed and controversial 2004 report The Death of
Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a Post-Environmental World. Internal
self-critique is not new to environmentalism, with various factions within the movement
competing for ascendency and periodic broader challenges, such as from the
environmental justice movement. By declaring environmentalism dead, Shellenberger
and Nordhaus argued for a new way of conceptualizing the relationship between humans
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and their environment, one which took into account the centrality of risks to social
organization and the outsized impact of humans on the planetary ecosystem.
This chapter examines the publication of The Death of Environmentalism and the
reactions to it both inside and outside the environmental community, and what the
varying responses signal about how environmental politics is being reconceptualized to
address the threat of climate change. I then track the subsequent work of Shellenberger
and Nordhaus and their think-tank The Breakthrough Institute in their attempts to create a
new politics for the Anthropocene. Their efforts culminated in the emergence of
‘ecomodernism,’ a worldview which embraces humanity’s role in shaping the planet and
enthusiastically embraces technology, innovation and modernization as the path to
environmental salvation.
Table 3: List of primary sources for chapter 5
Source Type

Details

Number

Book

Break Through

News sources

Newspaper reports

7

Newspaper op-eds

12

Magazine reports

8

Magazine op-eds

11

Grist forum responses

18

Total

56

BTI publications

Death of Environmentalism
An Ecomodernist Manifesto
Breakthrough Journal articles
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36

The Death of Environmentalism
The US environmental movement in the early 2000s was not in a good place.
Though public support for environmentalism remained high at an abstract level, concrete
progress on pressing environmental issues was hard to come by. The Kyoto Protocol (an
international effort to reduce carbon emissions) had been abandoned by the US,
Congressional efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions through cap-and-trade had
foundered, and a Republican-controlled Presidency and Congress were busy enacting
anti-environmental legislation including a bill to allow oil drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge. It was in this context that Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004) report
The Death of Environmentalism emerged. Shellenberger and Nordhaus had worked as
strategists and consultants for a variety of progressive and environmental organizations,
conducting policy and public opinion research. Shellenberger, who holds a masters
degree in Cultural Anthropology, had founded Communication Works, a public relations
firm dedicated to progressive causes; he had also been involved in several labor and
business-ethics initiatives, as well as a campaign to put Martin Luther King on the US
twenty-dollar bill. Nordhaus was, at the time, a vice-president of American public
opinion research firm Evans/McDonough where he specialized in environmental, land
use and transportation issues (ibid; Polonsky, 2005).
The report The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a PostEnvironmental World (henceforth DoE) was released in October 2004. It was initially
presented to the 2004 meeting of the Environmental Grantmakers Association, an
umbrella group which brings together philanthropic foundations with an interest in
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environmental causes. In writing the report, Shellenberger and Nordhaus interviewed 25
people whom they identified as leaders in mainstream American environmental
organizations about their perspectives on the state of environmentalism, where they
thought the movement was headed, and how best to address challenges such as climate
change. The report articulates what Shellenberger and Nordhaus see as the major
problems with environmentalism and, while stopping short of concrete recommendations,
outlines a radically different approach to campaigning which they say is necessary to
match the scale and complexity of the problems faced by society. The report was subject
to much criticism and dissection within the environmental community; what follows is a
brief recapitulation of the key arguments in the DoE followed by an account of the
broader debate.
The major thesis of DoE is that modern environmentalism, despite its past
achievements, is “no longer capable of dealing with the world’s most serious ecological
crisis,” namely: climate change (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004, p. 6). Their focus is
exclusively on American environmental organizations, and in particular (though they do
not say this explicitly) the large, ‘mainstream,’ policy-oriented groups. They do not
concern themselves with activism, community-based groups or environmental justice –
though their later work also harshly criticizes this branch of environmentalism, as will be
discussed below. Arguing that American environmental leaders focus too much on policy
“without giving much thought to the politics that made the policies possible” (p. 7;
emphasis in original), DoE excoriates the “policy literalism” that characterizes the
mainstream approach to dealing with environmental challenges. While this method may
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have been successful in the environmental battles of the 1970s – when almost all of the
federal environmental legislation still in use today was enacted – they contend that a new
way of thinking is now needed in order to create a movement capable of enacting the
massive societal transformation necessary to properly address climate change.
The environmental movement of the 1970s, Shellenberger and Nordhaus claim,
was based on a paradigm which viewed the environment as something which needed to
be defended and protected. Deconstructing the category of ‘the environment,’ they
question the assumptions they claim are shared by environmental groups that
a) the environment is a separate ‘thing’ and b) human beings are separate
from and superior to the ‘natural world’... If one [instead] understands the
notion of the “environment” to include humans, then the way the
environmental community designates certain problems as environmental
and others as not is completely arbitrary. (p. 12)
The authors go on to complain that defining environmentalism in this way leads
advocates to focus on narrow, technical solutions to be enacted through enlightened
policy-making, ideally with bi-partisan support. Public support is built through messaging
and framing strategies targeted at particular constituencies. While large numbers of
Americans express support for environmental legislation, this support is shallow and
fleeting, and for the most part does not affect how people vote and does not rank high in
perceptions of importance amongst public issues. Environmentalism is reduced to just
one special interest amongst many, competing for attention and political support against
other causes and unable to overcome industry and conservative opposition through its
uninspiring technocratic policies.
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After providing examples of environmental policy defeats on climate legislation
and vehicle fuel efficiency standards, DoE concludes the failure of environmental leaders
to take politics into account when devising solutions is holding the movement back.
Environmental groups consistently misunderstand the nature of their opposition, who will
not be won over by policy proposals or appeals to rational self-interest.
Environmentalists, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004) argue, “are in a culture war
whether we like it or not” (p. 10), a battle over the core ideas and values which define the
direction of society. What is instead needed is a renewed focus on politics over policy, a
set of values through which advocates can articulate an inclusive and hopeful vision of
the future. Any specific proposals should be located within this set of values and “must
be evaluated not only for whether they will get us the environmental protections we need
but also whether they will define the debate, divide our opponents and build our political
power over time” (p. 27). A key element of this is uniting the various factions and interest
groups of the political left towards, having them all work together for a common purpose,
as well as recognizing the linkages between the environmental, labor, civil rights and
other movements rather than competing with them for attention and resources. The aim is
to get back on the offensive and build a “true, values-based progressive majority in the
United States” (p. 27) rather than responding in a defensive and piecemeal way to
individual environmental challenges.
One of the authors’ key arguments is that focusing too much on specific
environmental problems in isolation allows the opposition to elevate the frame that
environmental policy will result in economic harm, whereas talking about the benefits
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and opportunities creates a sense of purpose and meaning. As an example they refer
extensively to the Apollo Alliance, a coalition of business, labor and environmental
organizations which advocated for an Apollo Program-scale effort to transform the
country’s energy system. As well as an array of policy proposals, the Apollo Alliance
was intended to unite various interest groups around a shared set of values and a clear
vision for how society should be organized. This shared vision and sense of purpose are
vital, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004) argue, and environmentalists would be wise
“to tap into the creative worlds of myth-making, even religion, not to better sell narrow
and technical policy proposals but rather to figure out who we are and who we need to
be” (p. 34).

Reactions to The Death of Environmentalism
The report attracted a lot of attention, and no little controversy, both in the
environmental movement and in broader progressive circles upon its publication.
Although released in October 2004, most of the reaction and commentary came in the
wake of the November 2004 US elections. With the Republican Party occupying the
presidency and increasing their majority in both houses of Congress, there was much
soul-searching on the left as to how to counter a conservative movement that was very
much in the ascendance. Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ vision for a reinvigorated
progressive politics played into this context, and the report was widely discussed by
progressives outside of the environmental movement. Nonetheless, there was much
discussion amongst environmentalists, who had failed to see any political progress
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despite public opinion seemingly being in their favor, as to whether Shellenberger and
Nordhaus had identified the right causes and were proposing the right solutions.
It took several months for the report to enter the broader political sphere. A search
of the Lexis-Nexis database for the phrase “death of environmentalism”, or references to
Shellenberger and Nordhaus, returned 38 relevant newspaper and magazine articles (20
from newspapers and 18 from magazines and trade publications) from the time of the
report’s release in October 2004 until the end of 2006 when coverage of it largely ceased.
There were no news articles referring to DoE from 2004, and it was not until February
2005 that news organizations began making reference to it. Environmental news website
Grist1 was a major forum for discussion of DoE, referred to by several of the newspaper
articles addressing the report (e.g. Barringer, 2005; van Sickler, 2005; Pedersen, 2005).
The report had been much-discussed within environmental organizations and networks in
the months after its publication (Grist, 2005a) but most of this discussion was not public.
In an editorial, Grist’s staff explained their rationale for their attention to DoE and the
concerns it raised:
It’s not enough for the leaders of the environmental movement to discuss
these issues in closed-door meetings and the privacy of their offices, or
via email and listservs. The debate over environmentalism’s current
health and future prospects deserves a wide airing, open to voices rarely
heard in the boardrooms of big green organizations. (Grist, 2005a)
Grist republished DoE in January 2005 and followed this with responses from a range of
voices in the environmental community between January and May 2005. Eighteen of
these responses are accessible and were included in this analysis (see Table 3).
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Rejection of the DoE thesis
Some reactions to DoE refute Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ entire argument,
making the case that there is little wrong with environmentalism and that any issues are
relatively minor and certainly do not necessitate its death. These are mostly seen in the
responses in the Grist forum, which featured perspectives from within the environmental
movement, whereas media coverage tended to be either news articles reporting on the
controversy or opinion pieces generally in favor of the position of DoE. Sierra Club
Executive Director Carl Pope, who was interviewed for DoE and quoted approvingly in
the report, wrote a scathing six-and-a-half-thousand word response, published by Grist in
January 2005. He takes particular issue with DoE’s claim that environmentalism is no
longer capable of dealing with climate change, arguing that “by mingling the issue of the
need for deeper and more effective global warming strategies with an ill-thought out
assault on environmentalism, Shellenberger and Nordhaus are likely to create
defensiveness, not receptivity; resistance, not movement; backlash, not progress” (Pope,
2005a). This backlash was evident in several of the other pieces posted on Grist.
Martin Kaplan, an attorney and advisor to environmental foundations, writes that
Shellenberger and Nordhaus “are arrogant, self-indulgent, and wrong in blaming
perceived failure on those who have sought change, rather than on those who have
opposed it” (Kaplan, 2005). He does not acknowledge any lack of progress on climate
change, and views any questioning of environmentalists’ tactics as a distraction from
confronting anti-environmental forces. Most other responses are less directly
oppositional, recognizing the need for debate while still rejecting key elements of
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Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ arguments. As part of a series of responses from
mainstream environmental organizations published by Grist, National Environmental
Trust president Phil Clapp disputes the claim that mainstream environmentalism has
failed in dealing effectively with climate change. He argues that climate change does not,
as Shellenberger and Nordhaus claim, represent a paradigm shift, but is “the same
dynamic that we had on acid rain protections in the 1980s” (Clapp, 2005) and that it
simply needs to work its way through the policy process.
The environmental movement’s ideological positioning
Of environmental leaders who engage with the report, there are two main (and
mostly mutually exclusive) criticisms: the first that environmental organizations are
already forming alliances with relevant progressive groups, the second that they should
not align themselves solely with liberals and should reach out to conservatives. Several
environmental leaders make the point that much of what DoE proposes is already
underway, particularly in terms of building connections with other sections of the
progressive community. Dan Carol, a board member of the Apollo Alliance (which as
noted was referenced extensively in DoE as an exemplar of a potential way forward)
distances the Alliance from Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ approach.2 He points out that
there is much more going on at a local level than DoE recognizes, and argues that the
“‘debate’ really comes down to a difference in philosophy about how to catalyze change:
Do you catalyze change by creating destruction, or by showing the way?” (Carol, 2005).
Carol echoes the concerns raised by Pope that the good ideas in DoE will be drowned out
by overheated reactions to its confrontational tone, arguing that “you can’t be both a
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provocateur and a movement builder” (Carol, 2005). Greenpeace USA executive director
John Passacantando, quoted in a New York Times feature about DoE, takes a similar line,
noting that Shellenberger and Nordhaus have “fascinating data” but “they put it in this
over-the-top language and did it in this in-your-face way” (in Barringer, 2005).
The contention that environmentalism needs to align itself entirely with
progressivism or liberal causes to have any meaningful impact is one of the main points
of disagreement fomented by DoE’s publication. William Peterson, a columnist for the
Weekly Standard magazine, argues that environmentalism has been unnecessarily taken
over by left-wing activists, and that “the actual needs of environmental protection come
second to that agenda” (Pedersen, 2005). A key conclusion of DoE is that
environmentalists need to become more expressly political and should join with other
progressive causes to advance a unified, compelling vision for social transformation.
Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005) reinforce this in an essay in The American Prospect,
a liberal magazine, arguing that this environmental vision needs to be injected into
contested political space if it is to have any impact – otherwise, it risks becoming
an idea that everyone is for but nobody understands. The notion that
social-change omelettes can be made without breaking political eggs is a
fantasy that needs to die along with the notion that dealing with global
warming could ever be ‘above politics.’
Several representatives of mainstream environmental groups and funding
organizations make the case that the environmental movement is better served by
reaching across traditional political divides and engaging with conservatives on issues of
mutual agreement. In a dialog published on Grist between four representatives of
environmental foundations – the audience at which DoE was originally targeted – two of
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them reject the idea that environmentalists should articulate a set of values, and should
instead continue to build alliances between ideologically disparate stakeholders (Grist,
2005b). Hooper Brooks of the Surdna Foundation argues that environmentalism is more
diverse and expansive than DoE recognizes, and “often doesn’t go by the name
environment — rather, community vitality, economic development and competitiveness,
equity and fairness” (in Grist, 2005b). While similar to Shellenberger and Nordhaus’
point that what is considered to be ‘environmental’ needs to be rethought, Brooks takes
the position that environmental values need to be inserted into multiple diverse contexts
rather than only being associated with progressivism. Rhea Suh of the Hewlett
Foundation concurs, noting their success in “organizing ranchers, hunters and anglers,
Native Americans, and business leaders to speak for things like responsible energy
development, accountable land management, even wilderness” (in Grist, 2005b). While
not endorsing DoE’s specific viewpoint, Town Creek Foundation director Stuart Clarke is
in some ways critically aligned when he warns against an “ideologically transcendent
environmentalism,” arguing that becoming increasingly inclusive may mean becoming
politically ineffective if environmentalists do not take a stand on important ideological
battles. Suh counters that “we shouldn’t pass up the areas where there may be
opportunities out of fear that we are losing touch with our ideological underpinnings” (in
Grist, 2005b).
Other articles which include arguments along similar lines, particularly those in
newspapers, do not engage as deeply with the issue. Nonetheless, disputes over the
political positioning of environmentalism point to irreconcilable differences in opinion
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over what it means to advocate on behalf of the environment. These tensions of course
did not emerge with DoE, having been a feature of environmentalism since its emergence
in the 1960s. However, its publication and the subsequent discussion marks a key
moment in which they were articulated and renegotiated publicly at a time of uncertainty
for many within the movement. As Clarke of the Town Creek Foundation notes, “aside
from the sensationalism of its ‘slaying the fathers’ rhetoric, much of the essay’s traction
comes from the fact that it was dropped into a discursive vacuum” (in Grist, 2005b). This
is noted by Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004) in DoE, who write that environmentalism
has a “lack of feedback mechanisms” (p. 12) which results in the conceptual foundations
of the movement not being subject to scrutiny from within.
Three paradigms of environmentalism
There are a wide variety of issues, organizations and activities that are covered by
the term ‘environmentalism.’ This diversity and inclusiveness have been among the
strengths of the movement, but also contributes to its lack of a cohesive direction and
strategy. One of the key tensions within this is among three different ideas or paradigms
of environmentalism, each with their own discourses and assumptions about human
nature-relations. One, most closely associated with the conservation movement, is that
environmentalism is about protecting nature; that wild spaces free from human
encroachment need to be preserved. The second, emerging mainly in the 1960s, is that
environmentalism means reducing the harmful impact of human activities on the physical
environment; addressing direct human impacts on the physical environment such as
pollution. These are broad characterizations, and there are overlaps between them and a
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multitude of different ways in which they are put into practice. As Shellenberger and
Nordhaus (2005) amongst many others have demonstrated, these categorizations are
easily deconstructed and break down under close scrutiny. Still, these ideas – the
conservation and pollution paradigms – have informed environmentalism since the
1960s, and are often combined in public discourse surrounding particular environmental
issues. In the case of climate change, an issue caused by human society and with huge
potential human impacts is often presented in terms of its effects on nature. Polar bears,
for instance, became an iconic symbol of the problem, and communication addressing the
need for climate actions often justifies it in terms of the need to ‘protect the planet’ or
‘save the earth.’ The global, existential risks generated by modern societies necessitate a
third paradigm, which deals with the unintended consequences or negative externalities
of industrial societies and involves systemic issues, like climate change, that cannot be
successfully addressed after the fact but instead must be prevented via active change in
industrial and social practices.
The idea of protecting wild places is less inherently political than addressing
risks, in the sense that it does not call into question the legitimacy of social institutions.
For this reason debates over the political positioning of environmentalism in the wake of
DoE – whether to align with progressive causes, or to engage across the political
spectrum – breaks down along these lines. The majority of those advocating for an
environmentalism which is not tied to a wider political position do so using language
which speaks more to a discourse of protecting nature. A Philadelphia Enquirer feature
on how environmentalism is uniting left and right states that “conservatives such as pro141

gun hunters and antiabortion evangelicals are making common cause with pro-abortionrights, gun-control liberals on land conservation, pollution, and endangered-species
protection” (Nussbaum, 2005). League of Conservation Voters president Deb Callaghan
is quoted as saying these alliances amount to a “rebirth of environmentalism” as opposed
to a death, though all of the examples cited in the piece related to land preservation, water
quality and locality-specific issues. There is a brief reference to support for renewable
energy in otherwise conservative states, but climate change is not directly mentioned.
Similarly, Environmental Defense Fund president Fred Krupp is quoted in a San Jose
Mercury News feature saying that environmentalists need to engage with “hunters,
fishermen, ranchers” who could be allies. This is followed by a quote from Montana
governor Brian Schweitzer stating that the face of environmentalism should look “more
like a rancher than a stockbroker ... more like a Montana family, less like a commune
from San Francisco” (Rogers, 2005).
The question of whether environmental groups should advocate from a particular
political position arises from disagreements, or perhaps confusion, over the goals and
purpose of environmentalism. Shellenberger and Nordhaus do not argue in DoE that
environmentalists should align with other progressive groups simply because
environmentalism is a left-wing cause, but rather that for environmentalism to succeed it
need to articulate a clear set of values. This is necessary in order to gain political capital
and political success at a societal level, rather than at the level of localized environmental
problems or specific issues. As the DoE authors argue in a response to the controversy in
The American Prospect, the major problem with environmentalism is conceptual rather
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than strategic: “the fact that every two years a moribund environmentalism marries itself
to a moribund liberalism in an effort to elect Democratic candidates is part of the
problem” (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2005). Seen in this light, debates over which
particular groups environmentalists should deal with are missing the point, which is that
the “way we [as environmentalists] conceptualized the problem analytically was getting
in the way of what we needed to do politically.”
Critics of DoE from mainstream environmental groups by and large do not engage
with broader questions over what environmentalism is and what it should be, focusing
instead on framing and modes of action. Much of this is oriented towards increasing
identification with environmental groups or participation in campaigns. Building
alliances with Republicans and pig-hunters is, from this perspective, worthwhile, as it
widens the range of domains in which ‘the environment’ becomes socially relevant. And
such an approach can be and often is successful in addressing environmental problems,
particularly at a local level. Issues of global risk such as climate change are, however,
categorically different, and addressing them means confronting issues of power,
inequality and distribution of resources – for which a depoliticized consensus-building
approach is inadequate to bridge intractable ideological divides. Most of the responses
from mainstream groups do not address this conceptual level. ‘Environmental issues’ are
for the most part implicitly defined as those with which environmental organizations are
currently concerned. In calling for the death of environmentalism, the Shellenberger and
Nordhaus do not really mean to kill it as much as to reconceptualize it as both a
movement and a set of strategies, to place boundaries around it that make clear that it is
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more about deeper human-nature relationships than about waste-cleanup triage or
protection of some rare species of owl.
Their point is that traditional environmentalists do not adequately deal with
underlying structural issues, i.e. what is causing environmental problems. There is
nothing especially politically contentious about this claim, as it speaks mostly to a split in
what environmentalism means within the competing and overlapping paradigms of risk,
pollution and conservation. Conservation-oriented groups, for instance, promote an
apolitical vision that is seen in articles which advocate engaging with conservatives to
protect the natural world. This gesture towards negotiation reveals a tension in what it
means to advocate for ‘environmental’ issues – a key part of DoE that is not really
engaged with by respondents except in a dismissive way, even as they demonstrate
through other writing that cooperative negotiation across ideological lines can be a major
factor in successful campaigns. This tension is often implicit, rather than directly stated,
and leads to people of similar intentions talking past each other unproductively.

Environmentalism without environmentalists
While most mainstream environmental groups expressed skepticism if not
outright hostility towards DoE, there was some significant support for its conclusions
from those less closely affiliated with the environmental movement. Some of this is from
conservative organizations or publications who for the most part use the report’s
publication as an excuse to wheel out familiar stereotypes about environmentalists while
not substantively engaging with its arguments. Two op-eds in the conservative magazine
The American Spectator both quote Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ line that
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“environmentalism is just another special interest” in their attacks on environmental
groups and climate science. David Hogberg quotes DoE after mocking a celebritystudded Earth Day event promoting sustainable living. Arguing that “only the mega-rich,
like movie stars, can afford such a lifestyle,” he sarcastically applauds the inclusion of
“noted economist, pro-skateboarder and X-Games gold medalist” Danny Way and
Anthony Kiedis, the “highly-respected climatologist and lead singer for the rock band
Red Hot Chili Peppers” (Hogberg, 2005). In the subsequent issue, a lengthy piece
claiming to debunk climate change science argues that “environmentalism is now a $1.5
billion industry” which needs to promote bogus claims to make money – and then claims,
referring to Shellenberger and Nordhaus, that “[s]ome environmentalists have begun to
echo the complaint that they are a special interest” (Bethell, 2005). Lawrence Solomon,
writing in Canada’s Financial Post, also quotes the “special interest” line before
lamenting that today’s environmentalists are “ideologues who care more about socialism
and political correctness” than solving problems (Solomon, 2005). In each case
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ credentials as environmentalists are invoked to undermine
environmentalism as a whole by showing turmoil within the movement and portraying
environmentalists as self-interested and elitist, and then using this to advance the ideas of
environmental-science skeptics.
Viewpoints which are so openly hostile to environmentalism are relatively rare in
coverage of DoE and are found mainly in conservative publications. More common are
those which express support for the general principles of environmental protection while
distancing themselves from environmentalists, and supporting the calls in DoE for a new
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approach. Staking out a middle ground between environmental groups and their
adversaries, and positioning both sides as extremists, allows Shellenberger and Nordhaus
(and their allies) to appear as the sensible, rational alternative – a strategy which has
served them well since as I will subsequently show. The president of the Trust for Public
Land, Will Rogers, notes in a San Jose Mercury News feature that “the term
‘environmentalist’ has a lot of baggage” (Rogers, 2005) and the reactions to DoE clearly
show there is a constituency for an ‘environmentalism without environmentalists’. Many
of the same stereotypes about environmentalists as deployed by conservative
commentators are used here, although often with a self-reflexive awareness that they are
stereotypes. The Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Jane Eisner (2005) writes that
“According to stereotype, environmentalists are socialistic, pantheistic tree-huggers”; an
Associated Press feature about DoE opens by stating that “large numbers of Americans
seem to dismiss them [environmentalists] as tree-hugging extremists” (Chea, 2005);
Nicholas Kristof (2005) in his New York Times column explains that DoE is “provoking a
civil war among tree-huggers.”
Like the conservative arguments, however, these perspectives do not engage
deeply with Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ specific proposals beyond their attacks on the
environmental movement. For the most part they enthusiastically quote the criticisms of
environmental organizations in DoE but offer little commentary regarding the remainder
of the essay. This is accompanied by a call for a more rational environmentalism which
can appeal to people across political ideologies – which is largely out of step with DoE’s
call for environmentalists to form part of a muscular, values-based progressive coalition.
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Kristof’s column, appearing in March 2005, was the first op-ed in a major newspaper to
address DoE (the New York Times had published a feature story on the controversy the
previous month) and is cited in several of the other responses. He writes that
environmentalists are “the left’s equivalents of the neocons: brimming with moral clarity
and ideological zeal, but empty of nuance” and that “reasonable environmentalists –
without alarmism or exaggerations – are urgently needed” (Kristof, 2005). He allows that
there are “many sensible environmentalists, of course, but overzealous ones have tarred
the entire field.” Kristof does not elaborate on what this reasonable and sensible
environmentalism should look like, but his main preoccupation is the way environmental
advocates talk about issues – in his view being too confrontational and alarmist – rather
than their political orientation or particular point(s) of advocacy. There is a similar
dynamic in Eisner’s column, which appeared the following week. She writes that
“Shellenberger and Nordhaus get it. They understand that effective environmentalism
requires vision and values, not alarmism and sentimentalist nature-love” (Eisner, 2005).
While echoing DoE in calling for a values-based movement, much of the column is about
potential alliances between environmentalists and conservative Christians which conflicts
with the DoE authors’ advocacy for a strong coalition of the left.
Whether intentionally or not, Shellenberger and Nordhaus found an audience who
wanted to hear that action could be taken on climate change without the association with
left-wing politics or radical activism. To wit, DoE appears to have gained traction within
the business community during 2005. There is some published evidence of it being
frequently emailed and discussed, though there are fewer traces of its impact in public
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discourse. For instance, a December 2005 editorial in trade magazine Waste News states
that “an automotive company executive recommended this article to others and me
months ago” and recommends DoE as “the perfect Christmas gift for that
environmentalist in your life” (Lafferty, 2005). Lafferty enthusiastically summarizes
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ criticisms of the environmental movement – “too narrow,
wrong-headed and out of touch with the mainstream” but reduces the remainder of their
proposals to a “simple shift in marketing and politics.” These remarks show not only how
environmentalism is often perceived by those without the movement, but also how the
DoE, and the authors’ status as environmentalists, gives those same people a focal point
to latch onto even if they don’t agree (or engage in any substantive way) with the nuances
of Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ argument.
The Environmental Justice movement on environmentalism’s death
The absence of an environmental justice perspective is one of the major
differences between the coverage of The Death of Environmentalism in news media and
that on Grist. The concerns and viewpoints of poor and marginalized communities and
people of color are excluded from almost all media coverage and commentary – as they
are in DoE itself. The only mentions of environmental justice are in the special issue of
American Prospect, which contains reflective and analytical pieces more along the lines
of those found on Grist than the other media coverage. An article in the Rhode Island
newspaper Providence Journal about a speech made by the Sierra Club’s Carl Pope
reports that he acknowledged that “demographic groups that are underrepresented in the
[Sierra] club may have the most at stake in environmental decline – for example, he said,
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the poor tend to live in the most polluted neighborhoods” (Gudrais, 2006). Though a
central concern of environmental justice, Pope’s remarks were about the Sierra Club’s
failings in this area and not the work which is being done by environmental justice
advocates.
On Grist, by contrast, environmental justice was a major theme of the
contributions. Seven of the eighteen articles written in response to DoE are written by
environmental justice advocates or take as their primary focus the relationship of DoE to
the environmental justice movement. Most of the other articles at least mention
environmental justice or related concerns. It was Grist’s stated aim to broaden the debate
over the future of environmentalism, and diversity is listed prominently in the site’s
editorial outlining the key issues they hoped to address in their forum on DoE:
At a time when the nation’s ethnic and gender balance of power is
shifting, the environmental establishment remains composed largely of
middle- and upper-class white dudes, and focused mainly on issues they
deem important. An environmental agenda set by a more diverse
constituency might give greater voice to class and race issues, urban
issues, and regional and local issues. (Grist, 2005a)
The environmental justice-focused responses critique both DoE and mainstream
environmentalism for their exclusion of marginalized voices. The pieces vary in the
extent to which they target each, with some taking aim at Shellenberger and Nordhaus for
failing to incorporate these perspectives in their remaking of environmentalism, and
others celebrating the death of a movement which has failed them.
Criticisms of DoE for its narrow scope were common and present in almost all of
the environmental justice-themed articles. This is pithily summarized by two activists
149

who note that while Shellenberger and Nordhaus “managed to piss off a lot of
mainstream environmentalists by declaring their irrelevance, [they] pissed off a bunch of
other groups for not even acknowledging their existence” (Chang & Kano, 2005).
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ justification for their analytical focus on large, well-funded
national environmental organizations was that these groups attract almost all of the
funding directed to environmental causes and have the biggest impact on shaping
environmental priorities (and ultimately policy). Nonetheless, several authors state that
by ignoring large parts of environmentalism, the conclusions and recommendations
reached by DoE would necessarily be inadequate. Environmental justice advocate
Ludovic Blain argues that for this reason DoE is “at very best, incomplete,” and the fact
that the report “only focused on white, American male-led environmentalism meant that
the fatal flaws of that part of the environmental movement infected the critique itself”
(Blain, 2005). Similarly, environmental health campaigner Swati Prakash expresses
skepticism as to whether Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ vision, which “operates on a
national level and seems dominated by white men who already enjoy leadership
positions, is sufficiently different from the old guard to avoid the many other pitfalls of
old-school environmentalism” (in Grist, 2005c). That this narrow cultural positioning
was also true of many of those reacting to DoE did not go unnoticed. Torri Estrada,
another environmental justice campaigner, notes that while DoE “critiques the narrow
frame of environmentalism ... the paper and ensuing debate suffer from a lack of diverse
voices in this ostensible autopsy of the environmental movement” (in Grist, 2005c).
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Despite the lack of recognition of environmental justice in DoE, the positions
expressed in the report have much in common with the founding principles of the
environmental justice movement. This is also noted by several of the responses on Grist,
with Prakash writing that “for many frontline environmental-justice activists and
organizers, these insights are neither new nor particularly profound” (in Grist, 2005c) and
Chang and Kano (2005) similarly stating that “for communities of color and the
environmental-justice movement, the critique Shellenberger offers of the mainstream
national environmental movement is nothing new.” Both Prakash and Blain (2005) point
out that the major critiques of environmentalism in DoE echo the widely-disseminated
letters sent by environmental justice activists to mainstream environmental groups since
1990, and the 17 Principles of Environmental Justice which emerged from the National
People of Color Environmental Summit in 1991. Both the letters and the principles
contributed to the emergence of a movement for environmental justice, and place a heavy
emphasis on the linkages between the environment and human wellbeing (Pezzullo &
Sandler, 2007). While DoE does not specifically foreground issues of race and class, its
expansive definition of environmentalism and insistence that environmental concerns are
fundamentally linked to economic and labor issues as well as general social wellbeing
have clear parallels to environmental justice. As Blain writes,
Clearly, we all agree that there should be a broader movement. And we
did not, as Nordhaus and Shellenberger write, have to go to the
conservatives to learn it. We already have a movement positioned to build
a multiracial progressive agenda that democratically represents the
environmental interests of communities. (Blain, 2005)
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Ted Nordhaus, in an interview with a Grist reporter, justifies the focus on mainstream
environmental groups and large funding agencies because they are the ones “deciding
how to spend tens of millions of dollars annually. ... They are deciding where this
movement is going, where the resources are going” (in Little, 2005a). Given
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ later antipathy towards the environmental justice movement
(discussed further below), distancing themselves from the more ‘radical’ elements of
environmental activism is likely also a strategic choice to appeal to a more centrist
audience.
Nonetheless, because of this similarity in the critique made by Shellenberger and
Nordhaus to the principles of the environmental justice movement, several authors
express support for DoE’s aims of remaking the environmental movement and aligning
with a broader progressive vision. While the blindspots of DoE are criticized, the
opportunity for debating the future of environmentalism is roundly supported, with little
of the defensiveness of mainstream organizations. Chang and Kano, reporting from an
environmental justice conference, find that in contrast to the uproar DoE caused in
mainstream environmental circles “there was little argument about the shortcomings of
the national environmental establishment and the weak state of the movement” (Chang
and Kano, 2005). Orson Aguilar, director of social justice organization The Greenlining
Institute, writes of his frustration with the Sierra Club and other mainstream
environmental groups for prioritizing the protection of nature at the expense of promoting
economic opportunity for low-income communities. He concludes that while
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there are many who feel sadness and anger that environmentalism is
dead, I am optimistic that in dying, environmentalism might give birth to
a new politics that offers a better future to both my community and the
planet. (Aguilar, 2005)
There is particular support for the idea that environmentalism writ broad should
place more emphasis on the connections between environmental protection and social
wellbeing. Several writers argue that this orientation is better suited for addressing
climate change. For Thompson Smith, director of a Native American environmental
organization, the “project of building a more sustainable society is ultimately inseparable
from the project of building a more just society” (in Grist, 2005c). He adds that
This is arguably less true in dealing with the narrower issues that the ‘big
greens’ have traditionally addressed: regulation of pollution, preservation
of land, etc. It is perhaps more true when we are dealing with the bigger
issues that now threaten the entire globe, such as global warming.
From this point of view, the environmental justice movement is better suited to dealing
with climate change than mainstream environmentalism. In a report entitled The Soul of
Environmentalism (Gelobter et al., 2005), released by liberal think-tank Redefining
Progress and republished on Grist, the authors emphasize the environmental movement’s
emergence from the civil rights activism of the 1960s. Environmentalism, by this reading,
was a radical and innovative departure from the conservation movement
that preceded it. And in almost every way, the politics and innovations of
the early environmental movement derived directly from the same era’s
fight for black power and racial justice. (Gelobter et al., 2005, p. 10)
The environmentalism as practiced by large organizations is therefore a departure from
the

movement’s

original

purpose.

Integrating

the

social

into

mainstream

environmentalism, and in particular issues of race and class, is to reconnect the
movement with its ‘soul,’ which is “tied deeply to human rights and social justice, and
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this tie has been nurtured by the Environmental Justice and Sustainability movements for
the past 20 years” (p. 6). Indeed, the early environmental movement of the 1960s drew
heavily on civil-rights and student activist movements, and concerns about social justice
and human wellbeing were at the forefront of environmentalism into the 1970s (Rome,
2013).
The vision of environmentalism presented by the environmental justice advocates
is almost wholly anthropocentric; one in which the human and natural worlds are
inextricably linked and where improving human wellbeing is the central concern. This
aligns closely with Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ position that the distinctions
environmentalists make between what counts as an ‘environmental’ problem and what
does not are largely arbitrary, and supports the criticism that mainstream environmental
groups prioritize preserving nature at the expense of local communities. Aguilar (2005)
writes that from his community’s perspective environmentalists seemed to care more
“about preserving places most of us will never see” and “do not talk about the importance
of a living wage or affordable housing because, we are told, these are not environmental
problems.” Prakash likewise agrees with DoE in that one of the environmental
movement’s major weaknesses has been “allowing environmentalism to be framed as
somehow about preserving the rights of nonhuman elements of our world (like ‘climate’)
at the expense of people’s basic needs” (in Grist, 2005c). Along with being
anthropocentric, this commitment to human wellbeing and social concerns is also
unavoidably political. The Soul of Environmentalism writes about finding common cause
been environmentalism and anti-war advocacy, gay marriage, and anti-capitalism, and the
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promotion of communitarian values over individualist (Gelobter et al., 2005). This is
manifestly different from the nature- or pollution-focused environmentalism which might
be amenable to conservatives, and reflects a shift towards reconsidering the relationship
between humans and nature and defining the values upon which the new world of the
Anthropocene will be built.
The Death of Environmentalism and the birth of climate activism
Shellenberger and Nordhaus were not the only ones dissatisfied with the state of
the environmental movement in the mid-2000s. Bill McKibben, at the time still known
only as a writer rather than an activist, was also searching for new approaches to
confronting climate change. McKibben is quoted in news stories and wrote several opeds related to DoE. Although he does not for the most part directly engage with
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ arguments, his contributions show both the commonalities
and points of divergence between what would later emerge as the climate-activist and
ecomodernist discourses.
As a scholar-in-residence at Middlebury College, McKibben had taught a seminar
entitled ‘Building the New Climate Movement,’ which culminated in a conference in late
January 2005. Called “What Works: New Strategies for a Melting Planet”, the conference
brought together scholars, activists and advocates – including Shellenberger and
Nordhaus – to discuss ideas for rethinking the politics of climate change. McKibben
(2005a) wrote daily summaries of the conference for Grist, and the event served as a
news hook for the first stories about the DoE controversy for the New York Times
(Barringer, 2005) and the Associated Press (Rathke, 2005). Like Shellenberger and
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Nordhaus, McKibben talks frankly about the lack of success on the part of the
environmental movement in addressing climate change. In his dispatch for Grist, he
writes that the “U.S. has wasted the 15 years since climate change emerged as a real
problem. Its environmentalists have failed to make measurable progress on the greatest
environmental challenge anyone’s ever faced” (McKibben, 2005a). Rathke’s (2005)
report also quotes both McKibben and Shellenberger stating that environmentalists had
“failed” to achieve anything meaningful, and both are presented as being on the same
side of the issue.
The presentation given by Shellenberger and Nordhaus at the conference outlined
more of their public opinion research on American values, making a case that the country
had become increasingly conservative and that progressives need to embrace core values
which would appeal to the majority of the public. According to McKibben’s (2005a)
summary of the proceedings, the “bad boys of American environmentalism” largely
succeeded in winning over an initially skeptical audience:
they’d pissed off a good many in the crowd with their paper’s no-holdsbarred attack on the big enviro groups. But when they plugged in their
PowerPoint, they had the goods. ... one could sense the audience, almost
against its will, agreeing.
The idea that the assumptions and practices of environmentalism are outmoded and that
an alternative vision needs to be created is based on the premise that climate change
represents a different type of challenge than previous environmental issues. This
willingness to upend the traditions of the environmental movement and build a
replacement based on a positive vision was important both to McKibben and his
emerging circle of climate activists involved in the climate-change activist organization
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350 (which several members of McKibben’s Middlebury seminar went on to co-found),
and Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ own Breakthrough Institute.
The differences in the positive vision to which the new climate movement must
aspire were already in evidence, however. McKibben (2005b), writing in the
Philadelphia Inquirer in August 2005, describes the split between “a robust
environmental movement taking on the relatively simple problems of old-fashioned
pollution and a weak one getting nowhere on preventing the collapse of the planet’s
stable climate.” He notes that the new movement must tackle fundamental questions of
politics, economics, and “what makes for a secure, satisfying individual life,” concluding
that “[i]f it has success, it won't be environmentalism any more. It will be something
much more important.” This last quote is cited approvingly by Shellenberger and
Nordhaus (2005) in their article in The American Prospect. They put it in terms of an
“aspirational politics,” as opposed to one that “[tells] Americans what they can’t have and
can’t be without ever telling people what they can have and can be” (Shellenberger and
Nordhaus, 2005). For McKibben, however, the new movement will be a “force that dares
to actually say out loud that ‘more’ is no longer making us happier, that the need for
security and for connection is now more important” (McKibben, 2005c). While similar in
their desire for a new type of movement based around strong values and a positive
message, Shellenberger and Nordhaus differ in their rejection of any constraints on
wellbeing or quality of life, and their embrace of human potential and technology to
achieve this.
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The publication of DoE and the surrounding controversy marked a significant
moment for environmental discourse in the US. Whether intentionally or not, the report
tapped into a widespread sense of unease within environmentalism and liberal politics
more broadly, exacerbated by the political landscape of the time with conservatives in the
ascendency. As Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005) commented a year after DoE’s
publication: “We expected controversy. What we didn’t expect was that the essay would
become a projection screen for the hopes and fears of the broader progressive
movement.” While mainstream environmental groups were understandably defensive
about the attacks on their strategy, the widespread discussion and qualified support from
activists and environmental justice advocates shows the level of dissatisfaction with the
direction of the movement. While environmentalism’s ‘death’ was (willfully) overstated,
the reactions its preemptive eulogy stirred up indicated that Shellenberger and Nordhaus’
call for a new environmental paradigm were warranted. They would attempt to advance
this cause over the subsequent years.

Break Through and the creation of a new politics
‘The Death of Environmentalism’ deliberately did not propose any firm plan as to
how the vision of a progressive, values-based movement might be achieved. This
attracted some criticism from the report’s interlocutors, though in an interview with Grist,
Nordhaus states that they resisted suggestions to “provide specific prescriptions because
we wanted to begin a discussion and dialogue, not suggest we had all the answers” (in
Little, 2005a). In 2005 Nordhaus and Shellenberger were already working on a book,
provisionally titled The Death of Environmentalism and the Birth of a New Aspirational
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Politics. It was eventually published in 2007 under the title Break Through: From the
Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility (Nordhaus & Shellenberger,
2007), though the paperback edition was subtitled Why We Can't Leave Saving the Planet
to Environmentalists. The shifting titles provide a clue to the major aims of the book: to
expand on DoE and give greater depth to the idea of a post-environmental politics, and
for Nordhaus and Shellenberger to further distance themselves from environmentalists
and the environmental movement. The book is in two parts. The first, ‘The Politics of
Limits,’ further critiques the failings of environmentalism and extends this critique to the
environmental justice movement. The second, ‘The Politics of Possibility,’ outlines a
vision for a more expansive progressive politics based on unleashing rather than limiting
human potential and embracing humanity’s role as the dominant force on the planet.
Having ignored the environmental justice movement in DoE, Nordhaus and
Shellenberger devote a chapter to it in Break Through, and they are no kinder to it than
they were to mainstream environmentalism. Far from acknowledging any conceptual or
philosophical similarities as expressed by some of the respondents on Grist, Nordhaus
and Shellenberger deride environmental justice as “interests within interests” (Nordhaus
& Shellenberger, 2007, p. 66). They argue that environmental justice as practiced “has
won no significant new environmental laws or any major civil rights legal challenges” (p
68) and focuses too narrowly on issues of toxic waste and air pollution which are not a
high priority for, nor a unique threat to, the wellbeing of people of color. Further,
Nordhaus and Shellenberger claim that environmental justice has made environmentalism
smaller, not larger, due to the racially-focused and complaint-based strategies which they
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say typify the movement. They cite a lack of evidence of “intentional discrimination”
against poor or minority communities and a simplistic understanding of the “large,
complex, and deeply rooted social and ecological problems” (p. 68) which lead to social
inequality. These deeply rooted social problems are not seen by advocates as
‘environmental’ and are therefore ignored – the same critique DoE leveled against
mainstream environmentalists.
As discussed above, many of the environmental justice activists who responded to
DoE do put economic issues at the center of their approach and emphasize the
connections between poverty, health, and the environment. Nordhaus and Shellenberger
(2007) briefly acknowledge this at the end of their chapter, noting that there are signs of a
more expansive environmental justice movement evolving where groups “that were once
focused strictly on air pollution are today advocating jobs, health care, and the kinds of
urban development that lead to livable communities” (p. 88). However, the generally
negative attitude towards environmental justice aligns with their strategy of positioning
themselves as the rational, moderate alternative to radical agitators. The improvements in
air and water quality in poor neighborhoods are, they argue, largely thanks to 1970s
legislation such as the Clean Air Act which was “passed with the intention of protecting
all Americans” rather than to serve the “race-based strategies” of environmental justice
campaigners (p. 83; emphasis in original). While Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s position
does emphasize the importance of political contestation in achieving progress on climate
change, their aversion to interest group campaigning leads them to reject any strategies
which highlight social inequalities. The outcome of this is a discourse which often does
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not examine power structures or the vested interests which seek to maintain the status
quo.
The book also continues the critique of mainstream environmental organizations,
and with it begins to build the case for a post-environmental politics based on the
embrace of human ingenuity and technology to purposefully shape the planet for the
better. Environmentalism is constructed as dismal and negative, obsessed with ‘fall’
narratives in which humankind’s sins against nature must be punished and in which
“environmental virtue [is] equated with a kind of self-denial” (Nordhaus &
Shellenberger, 2007, p. 124). Drawing on Thomas Kuhn, they argue that the reigning
environmental paradigm based on limits and sacrifice must be rejected:
overcoming global warming demands something qualitatively different
from limiting our contamination of nature. It demands unleashing human
power, creating a new economy, and remaking nature as we prepare for
the future. (p. 113)
Though they do not employ the word ‘Anthropocene,’ which was not in common usage
at the time, Nordhaus and Shellenberger embrace the notion that humans are the
dominant force on the planet and that politics should be reconfigured based on this
reality. They write that the “issue is not whether humans should control nature, for that is
inevitable, but rather how humans should control natures – nonhuman and human” (p.
135; emphasis in original) and conclude that “whether we like it or not, humans have
become the meaning of the earth” (p. 272). This is the foundation of Nordhaus and
Shellenberger’s theory of ecomodernism, which they have continued to develop through
the work of The Breakthrough Institute in the years since 2007.
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The conceptual roots of ecological modernization
The Breakthrough Institute under the leadership of Shellenberger and Nordhaus
continued to develop a vision for a post-environmental politics. Along with a loosely
affiliated network of scholars, thinkers and journalists, the Breakthrough Institute
(henceforth: BTI) publishes a mixture of wonkish policy analysis and more conceptual
political theory. Supporters of this perspective have come to increasingly adopt the label
‘ecological modernization’ and later ‘ecomodernism’ to define their outlook. This
culminated in April 2015 in the release of An Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et
al., 2015), a statement of principles put forward by eighteen authors (twelve of whom,
including Shellenberger and Nordhaus, have ties to the BTI) to “affirm and to clarify our
views and to describe our vision for putting humankind’s extraordinary powers in the
service of creating a good Anthropocene” (p. 7). The concept of ecological modernization
dates back at least to the 1980s (Dryzek, 2005; Christoff, 1996), and heavily informs the
BTI’s ecomodernism. One of the central unresolved tensions of the earlier ecological
modernization, whether to address environmental challenges through minimallydisruptive technocratic processes or more radical social upheaval, is also present in the
BTI’s work. The following sections examine the conceptual roots of ecological
modernization, how these lead into the development and key proposals of ecomodernism,
and how the tensions inherent in turning the tools of modernity against modernity’s
consequences manifest in the BTI’s public advocacy. I will use the term ‘ecological
modernization’ to refer to the earlier/more general discourse, and ‘ecomodernism’ to
refer to the position adopted by Shellenberger and Nordhaus and their allies.
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The term ‘ecological modernization’ is not used by Nordhaus and Shellenberger
in Break Through, though the argument they lay out speaks clearly to a commitment to
embracing rather than rejecting modernity. Their ‘politics of possibility’ is based on the
idea of “overcoming,” a term which is used frequently in the book. This notion rejects
what they see as the traditional environmentalist idea that humans should retreat in the
face of the ecological crises they have caused in deference to some ideal of a pristine,
pre-modern nature. Rather than retreating, humanity should advance, celebrating the
good that has come from modernization rather than lamenting its problems. The same
commitments to ingenuity and technology that built the modern world will in turn be
used to solve the problems they create. The book concludes with the sentiment that
In overcoming oppression and deprivation – predators, hunger, disease –
we have given birth to a new world. It is a world at once beautiful and
terrible. And this world, too, we shall overcome. (Nordhaus &
Shellenberger, 2007, p. 273).
While technological development is central to their aims, this is in essence a political
project, aimed at remaking the institutions of modernity through emphasizing a different
set of values.
This is consistent with the earlier discourse of ecological modernization. For
Dryzek (2005), ecological modernization is “a restructuring of the capitalist political
economy along more environmentally sound lines” (p. 167), in such a way that decouples
economic growth from environmental harm. Hajer (1995) distinguishes it from earlier
forms of institutionalized environmental politics which were principally legislative ways
of controlling the emission of substances into the environment. Pollution, under this type
of regulatory regime, “was not generally recognized as a structural problem” and could
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be “contained using ad hoc, and ex post remedial measures” (p. 25). By contrast,
ecological modernization does see environmental problems as structural, but “assumes
that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care for the
environment” (p. 25). For Hajer, whose case studies mainly involve European countries
and international institutions, the ecological modernization paradigm replaced the older
pollution regulation framework during the 1980s. This is very different to the situation in
the United States, where the majority of environmental regulation – including on climate
change – is to this day carried out within the framework of 1970s-era legislation such as
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.
Indeed, Dryzek (1995) points out that the countries where ecological modernization had
taken hold – he lists Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as
exemplars – all have corporatist political-economic systems where decision-making is a
consensual, co-operative process between government, industry, labor, and civil society.
This is in contrast to the more adversarial policy-making system of the US.
The proposals put forward by Shellenberger and Nordhaus in DoE and Break
Through presented a strong challenge to American environmentalism, still focused on the
pollution paradigm, while much of their approach would not have been unfamiliar to
European environmentalists. Their rejection of the pollution paradigm accords with
ecological modernization’s commitment to “holistic analysis of economic and
environmental processes rather than piecemeal focus on particular environmental abuses”
(Dryzek, 2005, p. 169). The Apollo Alliance and other calls for partnerships between
government, industry and labor are also characteristic of ecological modernization
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discourse, as is the insistence that environmentalists adopt a more moderate and less
radical position in order to be included in decision-making processes. (Dryzek notes that
with the exception of Germany, none of the six exemplar countries have strong radical
environmental movements.)
The seemingly moderate stance of ecological modernization leads to one of the
central tensions within the discourse. While outwardly compatible with the institutions of
capitalism and existing political-economic structures, ecological modernization contains
the potential for a more radical transformation. Realigning political institutions along
more ecological lines can open the door to deeper, more systemic changes once the
limitations of capitalism vis-a-vis the environment are acknowledged. The discourse is
deployed in different ways. In his summary and review of literature up to the mid-1990s,
Christoff (1996) makes a distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of ecological
modernization. Strong ecological modernization stresses “the transformative impact of
environmental awareness on civil society and the public sphere, and on the institutions
and practices of government and industry” (p. 488) and “points to the potential for
developing a range of alternative ecological modernities” (p. 496). The weak version is
primarily technocratic, “a rhetorical device seeking to manage radical dissent and secure
the legitimacy of existing policy while delivering limited, economically acceptable
environmental improvements” (p. 488). Important here is the degree of reflexivity present
in the discourse; the tension is whether the institutions of modernity are uncritically
deployed in solving environmental problems, or whether such institutions are themselves
transformed as their role in creating ecological crises is recognized.
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The

various

theoretical

conceptualizations

of

reflexive

(ecological)

modernization developed by Hajer (1995), Beck (1992; Beck et al., 2003), Giddens
(1994), Latour (2003) and others, while differing in certain details, have in common the
notion of increased public participation in decision-making regarding risks. The experts,
elites and governments are no longer to be trusted, as processes governing the direction
of modernization are opened up to citizens. This is at odds with the weaker, more
technocratic version of ecological modernization, more commonly deployed in policymaking, where technological development and rational, science-based decision-making
are the primary paradigms. Buttel (2000) argues that, while similar, Beck’s notion of
reflexive modernization cannot serve as a theoretical basis for ecological modernization.
This is primarily due to Beck’s emphasis on subpolitics and social movements in
restructuring the state, while ecological modernization (as Buttel conceptualizes it)
stresses that environmental gains “can be achieved without radical structural changes in
state and civil society” (Buttel, 2000, p. 62). As a think-tank bridging the academic and
policy spheres, the BTI draws from many of the aforementioned scholars, but also has to
appeal to the technocrats and walk a fine line as it addresses key tensions in how radical
it appears, and role of public opinion in their efforts to influence decision makers.
One feature

which

distinguishes ecological

modernization from

other

environmental discourses is its positivity. Buttel (2000) argues that “ecological
modernization has become attractive as a concept because it provides alternatives to the
pessimistic connotations” of other forms of environmentalism (p. 63). Rather than
emphasizing the destruction of the natural world or impending catastrophes for human
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society, ecological modernization focuses on solutions and the capacity of societies to
overcome any of the problems they have created. Instead of turning away from modernity
or decrying the impact that it has had on the world, there is a “renewed belief in the
possibility of mastery and control, drawing on modernist policy instruments such as
expert systems and science” (Hajer, 1995, p. 33). As discussed above, this positive focus
aligns closely with the perspective of Shellenberger and Nordhaus, who defined
themselves in opposition to what they saw as the pessimism endemic to
environmentalism. Their argument that the “solution to the unintended consequences of
modernity is, and has always been, more modernity” (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2012)
echoes Buttel’s (2000) summary of ecological modernization’s worldview in that “the
problems caused by modernization, industrialization, and science can only be solved
through more modernization, industrialization, and science” (p. 62). The optimism of
ecological modernization also functions, as Dryzek (2005) notes, as a “discourse of
reassurance” in which “no tough choices need to be made between the present and the
long-term future” (p. 172). Particularly in its weaker forms, this can simply serve to
justify the status quo and existing institutional arrangements. The challenge for those who
agree with Shellenberger and Nordhaus is to make certain that this impulse towards
reassurance does not lead to apathy of action but rather is channeled into a positive
confidence that change is not only possible but achievable.
Faith in modernity
Shellenberger and Nordhaus, along with others associated with the BTI, further
developed and articulated their vision of ecomodernism, principally through publications
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on the BTI website along with occasional features and op-eds elsewhere. The BTI
website publishes a variety of technical and policy analyses on topics such as renewable
energy, urban development, agriculture and transportation, along with broader articles on
humans’ relationship to nature. Though there are sometimes dialogues and disagreements
between authors, almost all pieces accord with the general ecomodernist position of
increasing technological development, energy use and economic growth. This section
analyzes publications on the BTI website, focusing on those which are more conceptual
and outline a view of human-nature relationships. Dryzek (2005) identifies the key
implicit metaphor of the earlier ecological modernization discourse as that of a ‘tidy
household,’ efficiently maximizing wellbeing while minimizing waste. The metaphors
and rhetorical devices deployed by the BTI are quite different, however. Three important
metaphors which appear in much of the BTI’s output are the ideas of modernization as
religion, as evolution, and as creative destruction.
As a think-tank, the BTI is concerned primarily with disseminating ideas, and
their political proposals are for the most part at the level of defining a worldview or
orientation towards modernity. In Break Through, Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007)
criticize environmentalists for “treating nature and science too much like a religion”
while “environmentalism doesn’t work enough like a church” (p. 201, emphasis in
original). Comparing weakly-held environmental views to evangelical Christianity, they
argue that environmentalism needs to speak to what makes people happy and fulfilled in
order to create “a politics powerful enough to transform the global energy economy” (p.
205). The work of Shellenberger and Nordhaus, and the BTI more generally, has moved
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away from questions of individual psychology and movement-building since the
publication of Break Through and more towards broader institutional and policy matters.
As discussed above, technology and development always played an important role
in Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ proposals, and they make this explicit in a 2012 essay
entitled ‘Evolve: The Case for Modernization as the Road to Salvation.’ The piece
continues the critique of environmentalism as a religion, in their view a hypocritical
‘ecotheology’ which claims to reject modernity while benefiting from modern comforts.
Typical of BTI’s output, developed-world environmentalists are the primary target. In
contrast to environmentalists who position themselves as fighting against entrenched
power structures, in Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2012) telling it is environmentalists
themselves who are the “ruling elites [who] espouse beliefs radically at odds with their
own behaviors.” Ecotheology, “like all dominant religious narratives, serves the
dominant forms of social and economic organization in which it is embedded.”
Environmentalists “[preach] antimodernity while living as moderns” and prescribe how
poorer countries should develop while not holding themselves to the same standard.3
In contrast, Shellenberger and Nordhaus offer a different vision, based on a faith
in human ingenuity and technology and an embrace of the endless cycles of creation and
destruction which accompany the processes of modernization. They continue to position
themselves in opposition to ecotheology, the traditional world view of environmentalism,
nevertheless they intentionally put their alternative argument in religious terms:
Putting faith in modernization will require a new secular theology
consistent with the reality of human creation and life on Earth ... It will
require replacing the antiquated notion that human development is
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antithetical to the preservation of nature with the view that modernization
is the key to saving it. Let's call this ‘modernization theology.’ ... Where
the ecological elites see the powers of humankind as the enemy of
Creation, the modernists acknowledge them as central to its salvation.
(Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2012)
Acknowledging that environmental risks are caused by humans and their technologies,
they insist that the only option is to keep moving forward. We should accept as a matter
of faith the processes of endless change that come with modernization, taking the good
with the bad, knowing (or believing) that the positive unintended consequences will
outweigh the negative. In contrast to the environmentalism-as-church proposal from
Break Through, the modernization theology presented here is mostly at a conceptual
level, a worldview or ideology rather than a means of engaging people’s dreams and
desires. After setting up a conflict between ecological elites and developing-world poor,
modernization theology speaks to a universal “we” – the ecological problems we cause
can continually be fixed by the technologies we create. While environmentalists are
criticized for their individual attitudes and behaviors, individual humans are absent from
the solutions proposed by Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2012) with technology presented
as the savior of the environment.
The BTI’s ecomodernism places a heavy emphasis on technology and
technological development. Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2012) point out that
technological development has always been central to human civilization, and that while
some object that technology brings with it unintended consequences, “life on Earth has
always been a story of unintended consequences.” The new problems caused by
technology, they write,
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will largely be better than the old ones, in the way that obesity is a better
problem than hunger, and living in a hotter world is a better problem than
living in one without electricity.
This version of ecomodernism is not entirely technocratic. The heavy focus on
technology is driven by the conviction, informed by values of care and compassion, that
humans must continue to engineer the Earth in order to improve the quality of human
existence. So while in favor of technology, the worldview of the BTI’s ecomodernism
does not see scientific rationality as a guiding principle but separates technology from
science. To break the political impasse in climate politics the solution is “not more
climate science but rather a different set of remedies” (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2011),
in the form of intensive technological development guided by strong values. An article by
Science Studies scholar and BTI fellow Daniel Sarewitz (2012) makes the claim that the
increasing emphasis by liberals on scientific rationality in political decision-making is
“displacing the politics of liberal values” and has “alienated [liberals] from one of the
most powerful tools for creating a more equitable society: technology.” The focus on
risks caused by technology and diagnosed by sciences has, Sarewitz argues, led to “a
reverence for science that increasingly, and with ever-greater precision, documents the
problems associated with a technology-dependent society” while ignoring the immense
social benefits technological advances can bring. The process of technological
development is not, in this view, value-neutral or outside of politics. Nordhaus and
Shellenberger (2012) critique environmentalists for ignoring politics, imagining “carbon
pricing to be the pure policy expression of unadulterated science.” Scientific rationality
must “incorporate, rather than dismiss, other ways of knowing.” While acknowledging
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the role of culture and politics in the social outcomes of technology, Nordhaus and
Shellenberger caution that this should not lead to a rejection of the process of
technological development which, they claim, has been integral to humans’ evolution as a
species.
It is this process of technological advancement writ broad, rather than any specific
implementation, which the ecomodernists place above politics. Though fundamental to
modernization, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2012) situate technology as a more primal
force in human evolution, writing that our “technologies have not only been created by
us, but have also helped create us” and have also created the environment in which we
live. Their argument is that this process needs to continue, that humans must continue
remaking the earth with our tools and remake our societies and ourselves in the process.
Awareness of humanity’s impacts should not put a halt to our transformation of the
planet, they argue; rather we must act with greater purpose and take responsibility for any
consequences. Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2012) deployment of evolution is used in
both technological and biological senses, with the two merging as we develop
technologies which shape the not only environments in which species – including humans
– evolve, but also “creat[e] new habitats and new organisms, perhaps from the DNA of
previously extinct ones.” They draw in support of their argument on the work of Bruno
Latour, who served as a fellow of the BTI in 2011 and had previously expressed his
support of Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ mission (Latour, 2008). In an essay for the
Breakthrough Journal, Latour (2012) writes that recognizing the consequences of
modernization should not mean abandoning modernization, but reflexively integrating the
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consequences into our politics. Drawing on his previous work (Latour, 1993), Latour
(2012) argues that the mistake of industrial modernity was imagining that technological
mastery over nature meant emancipation from it, when in fact it means further
attachment:
The goal of political ecology must not be to stop innovating, inventing,
creating, and intervening. The real goal must be to have the same type of
patience and commitment to our creations as God the Creator, Himself.
And the comparison is not blasphemous: we have taken the whole of
Creation on our shoulders and have become coextensive with the Earth.
While the default mode of industrial modernity was to deploy technology without regard
for its consequences on the world, this new approach would see the same spirit of
innovation, but with unexpected consequences “attached to their initiators and ...
followed through all the way.”
The commitment to continuing cycles of innovation and transformation and
acceptance of any consequences as simply another challenge to be overcome speaks
primarily to a macro view of social change, concerned with the aggregate good of
humanity rather than local circumstances or manifestations of power. While
acknowledging that the processes of technological innovation can have locally
deleterious effects, the primary political task is to manage this constant sequence of
upheavals. This is made explicit in a 2014 essay in the Breakthrough Journal (Nordhaus,
Shellenberger & Caine, 2014) which deploys the economic concept of “creative
destruction” as a model for life in the anthropocene. Developed by economist Joseph
Schumpeter in the mid-20th century and popularized in the technology-driven economic
boom of the 1990s, creative destruction refers to the cycles of innovation and
173

transformation which characterize capitalist economic systems. Rejecting the
environmentalist idea of living in harmony with nature, Nordhaus et al. (2014) argue that
“our powers of creative destruction must be embraced and guided, not denied or
repressed. The challenge we face, in the ecomodernist view, is to become ever-wiser
stewards of technological innovation, human development, and nature protection.”

The emerging ecomodernist identity
The use of economic terms such as “creative destruction” also serves the BTI’s
strategic goals of reaching an audience who may be concerned about environmental
issues while wary of being associated with environmentalism. As with the strategy in The
Death of Environmentalism of drawing on the success of the conservative movement
rather than similarly applicable lessons from environmental justice, the BTI’s use of
economic and technological discourses positions them as a pragmatic, centrist alternative
to “the dark, zero-sum Malthusian visions and the idealized and nostalgic fantasies for a
simpler, more bucolic past in which humans lived in harmony with Nature” (Nordhaus &
Shellenberger, 2011) which they argue characterize mainstream environmentalism. This
rejection of the idea of living in harmony with nature is bound up in the emergence of the
ecomodernist identity. In an essay entitled ‘The Education of an Ecomodernist’ in a
creative destruction-themed issue of the Breakthrough Journal, geographer Martin Lewis
(2014) writes of his disillusionment with “Arcadian” environmentalism that rejects
modernity and technology. Lewis makes the case that pre-modern and indigenous
cultures did and do not live in harmony with nature and have a much greater per-capita
impact on the physical environment than do industrialized societies, with much lower
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living standards. The “pragmatic, non-ideological” ecomodernist approach is contrasted
to the BTI’s familiar construction of environmentalism as composed of radical, out-oftouch hippies or hypocritical affluent liberals whose environmental identities “represent a
cultural attitude more than a serious political or economic agenda.”
Much of the BTI’s public communication, for instance in newspaper op-eds,
between 2011 and 2014 focused on attacking mainstream environmental organizations or
ideas. The conceptual framework of ecomodernism developed in Break Through and the
Breakthrough Journal essays certainly informs their efforts, but the primary focus is on
debunking environmentalist orthodoxy while still calling for action on environmental
issues. Op-eds by Shellenberger and Nordhaus attacked environmentalists’ strategies of
linking natural disasters to climate change and the political effectiveness of Al Gore’s
climate activism (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2014) and the idea that energy efficiency
could reduce carbon emissions (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2014). Many of the articles
published on the Institute’s website also follow this pattern, with headlines arguing
against environmentalist sacred cows such as renewable energy (“When Renewables
Destroy Nature”), city living (“The Green Urbanization Myth”) and Arctic ice melt
(“How Environmentalists and Skeptics Misrepresent the Science on Polar Bears”); and in
favor of nuclear energy (“Nuclear is Cheaper than Solar Thermal”), factory farming (“Is
Feedlot Beef Better for the Environment?”) and genetically modified food (“Love Your
Frankenfoods”). All of these are informed by careful research and analysis, and in many
cases the articles are not as sensationalist as the headlines would suggest. The choice to
present a contrary position to commonly-held environmentalist views is clearly deliberate
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and works to solidify the BTI and its followers as an alternative to environmentalism
rather than merely a disputatious offshoot.
This work of building a distinct identity, which would culminate in the adoption
of ecomodernism and release of the ‘Ecomodernist Manifesto’, intensified in 2012 and
2013. Several articles in environment-focused publications picked up on the growing
movement and its increasing ideological coherence. Science journalist Keith Kloor, in a
December 2012 feature for Slate, traces the origins of what he calls “modernist greens” to
the Death of Environmentalism and the ensuing debates (Kloor, 2012). The article sets up
a contrast between the pragmatic, optimistic modernists and “traditionalist” greens who
still adhere to a nature-centric framework and apocalyptic catastrophizing. Kloor
implicates the scientific community in this latter worldview, writing that environmental
scientists
hold glitzy, international symposiums that put humanity on a mock trial
for the global imprint of its civilization. The common thread: The
Anthropocene is an unmitigated disaster. Humans are planet wreckers.
Time is running out for us. (Kloor, 2012; emphasis in original)
British environmental journalist Fred Pearce, in a feature article for Yale Environment
360 magazine which was republished on the BTI website, also charts the rise of
“environmental modernism” (Pearce, 2013). Pearce emphasizes that the modernists
“want to cut the links between mankind and nature” through the use of technology so as
to spare nature from human impacts. Complicating the clean dichotomy drawn by Kloor
(and

the

ecomodernists

themselves)

between

modernist

and

traditionalist

environmentalists, Pearce notes that “some degree of environmental modernism is part of
the worldview of all but the most fundamentalist greens.” In so doing, Pearce points out
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the value of the ecomodernist discourse to environmentalism more broadly, through
“raising questions about why mainstream environmentalists buy into some aspects of
modernism and some technologies, while resisting others.” Shellenberger and Nordhaus
do claim to value rational and constructive debate, and there is some evidence that they
uphold this. But, particularly in the case of the BTI, this conflicts with the institutional
imperatives of standing out in a crowded ideas marketplace, and through focusing their
attacks on strawman environmental traditionalists they miss opportunities to build a
constructive dialogue amongst erstwhile allies.
The release of the Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015) in April
of 2015 attempted to codify the ecomodernist worldview and define ecomodernism as a
discursive worldview in its own right. As explained in the 2015 issue of the
Breakthrough Journal which followed the release of the manifesto, it was intended to
change the focus “from what environmentalism is not and cannot be, to what
ecomodernism is and should become” (Nordhaus, Shellenberger & Mukuno, 2015). The
manifesto and related publications – the Breakthrough Journal issue and op-eds
published by Shellenberger and Nordhaus along with other proponents of ecomodernism
– reflect several shifts in emphasis from their earlier output. The manifesto opens by
affirming the notion that the Anthropocene requires conscious application of human
capabilities to shape the planet for the better, before immediately taking what appears to
be a sharp departure from their earlier position regarding humanity’s relationship with
nature:
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A good Anthropocene demands that humans use their growing social,
economic, and technological powers to make life better for people,
stabilize the climate, and protect the natural world. In this, we affirm one
long-standing environmental ideal, that humanity must shrink its impacts
on the environment to make more room for nature, while we reject
another, that human societies must harmonize with nature to avoid
economic and ecological collapse. (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 6)
Central to the manifesto is the idea of “decoupling” human development from
environmental impacts. This essentially means harnessing technology to use natural
resources more intensively and efficiently, such that a greater area of land can be freed
from direct human impact.
As discussed above, much of the BTI’s theorizing on the relationship between
humans and nature had emphasized the arbitrariness of the human-nature dichotomy and
the social construction of ‘the environment.’ The Ecomodernist Manifesto follows on
from this, but places a greater rhetorical emphasis on nature and the importance of
reducing humanity’s physical footprint in order to create spaces untouched by humans.
Placing decoupling as the core logic of ecomodernism means that environmental
protection and the need to “re-wild and re-green the Earth” (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p.
15) take an equal place alongside the BTI’s usual agenda of enhancing human wellbeing
through technology. While the manifesto acknowledges anthropocentric control of the
environment and that “the Earth is remade by human hands” (p. 6), the path to a good
Anthropocene depends on “reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere” (p.
17). Further than this, though, the manifesto argues that the “case for a more active,
conscious, and accelerated decoupling to spare nature draws more on spiritual or
aesthetic than on material or utilitarian arguments” (p. 25). Ecomodernism does not deny
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humanity’s attachment to nature, but takes the position that the best path through the
Anthropocene involves minimizing these attachments to the extent possible. The
imperative for decoupling thus is presented not as a necessity based on science – or
economics – but rather a choice based on values.
The philosophical underpinnings of the manifesto are further developed by
environmental philosopher Mark Sagoff, one of the manifesto’s authors, in an article for
The Breakthrough Journal entitled ‘A Theology for Ecomodernism: What is the Nature
We Seek to Save?’ (Sagoff, 2015). Sagoff positions ecomodernism as distinct from both
the ‘conservationist’ approach of only valuing nature that is untouched by humanity, and
the ‘ecosystem services’ approach of only valuing nature based on its monetary value for
humanity. The ecomodernist approach, for Sagoff, is to make nature “economically
useless or worthless,” following the manifesto’s credo that “nature unused is nature
spared.” If nature is not part of the economic system, it will not face any pressure to be
developed or destroyed for human ends. ‘Nature,’ as defined by the ecomodernists, is not
the “the all-encompassing singular Nature” of environmentalists, but rather “comprises
innumerable places, each with many stories that combine human and natural activities in
ways that add meaning to those places.” This reflects the theology outlined by Latour for
the BTI in that ‘nature’ is conceptualized in the plural, as a panoply of “new natures we
are constantly creating” (Latour, 2012). These new natures are not separate from nor
subservient to society but increasingly “attached,” to use Latour’s term, and humans are
unavoidably implicated in the responsibility of caring for them. Sagoff (2015) concludes
that “the theological hope of ecomodernism is that ... human beings will become the
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guardian spirits of the natural world.” ‘We are as gods,’ not only in our role as the
dominant force in the Anthropocene, but in terms of the relationship with our creation(s)
– attached to and responsible for, yet able to separate ourselves, hence the manifesto’s
rejection of the environmentalist premise that human society should harmonize with
nature.
One of the key tensions in An Ecomodernist Manifesto, and the BTI’s work more
generally, is between the strategic and political goals – in other words, between gaining
the support of their target audience and articulating a coherent philosophy. The manifesto
continues the BTI’s strategy of appealing to people concerned about environmental or
conservation

issues

but

uncomfortable

or

disillusioned

with

mainstream

environmentalism. The manifesto’s rhetorical move towards nature conservation can be
seen in this light, as one of the less politicized aspects of environmentalism. The aim of
protecting nature – even if it is a nature of our own creation – is less controversial, less
political, and avoids messy issues of inequality and power relations. The emphasis on
technological ahead of political solutions also plays into this depoliticizing tendency. In
an interview with business publication SNL Financial following the release of the
manifesto, Shellenberger states that political change is “in distant second place against
the main event, and that is technological change” (in Khan, 2015).
There are several changes evident in the manifesto as compared to The Death of
Environmentalism. DoE positioned climate change as the defining environmental issue of
our time (reflected in the report’s subtitle, Global Warming Politics in a PostEnvironmental World). The manifesto has a broader scope, and while climate change is
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frequently mentioned, it is mainly in the context of enabling a technologically-driven
shift in energy production. The insistence that environmental politics belongs to the
progressive left is also gone, replaced by a pragmatic centrism which criticizes the
extremes on both sides of the political spectrum. The BTI published an article referencing
a new political formation called the ‘up-wingers,’ an alliance between leftist technocrats
and libertarians. Their modernist, future-focused politics is set in opposition to the
backwards-looking ‘down-wingers,’ comprised of traditionalist conservatives and
Malthusian environmentalists (Breakthrough Staff, 2014a). More generally, though, the
ecomodernists position themselves as rational and pragmatic, with their politics shaped
by dialog and debate rather than adherence to a particular ideology. American liberalism
will have to “once again embrace collaboration and compromise” and progress
“depend[s] upon a social contract between the public, government, and industry”
(Nordhaus, Shellenberger & Mukuno, 2015). DoE insisted that post-environmental
politics would have to engage in values-driven political fights to “divide our opponents
and build our political power over time” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 27) while
criticizing mainstream environmental groups for being too technocratic. Ecomodernism,
while it has a philosophy and set of values behind it, presents a depoliticized and
technology-focused discourse. Although DoE does acknowledge political enemies of
environmental progress, a major commonality between the two approaches is that
environmentalists are viewed as the major obstacle towards achieving their goals.
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Conclusion: Democracy in the Anthropocene
The Breakthrough Institute’s contribution to American environmental discourse
has been important in recognizing the role of ecological risks to the constitution of
politics. Though the specific political outlook and policy platform has evolved over time,
the Institute (and in particular its principal voices Michael Shellenberger and Ted
Nordhaus) has consistently questioned the assumptions and conventional wisdom of
mainstream environmentalism. Environmentalists are often denounced by their political
opponents for their hypocrisy; for living comfortable modern lifestyles while insisting
that society must abandon such ways of living for the sake of the planet. While often
unfair, such criticisms are emblematic of a confusion within much environmental
discourse and a lack of specificity in terms of environmentalists’ orientation towards
technology and modernity. The introduction of an ecomodernist perspective to
environmental debates throws these issues into sharper relief. As science writer Fred
Pearce (2013) points out:
By raising questions about why mainstream environmentalists buy into
some aspects of modernism and some technologies, while resisting
others, the modernists force us to ask exactly what we want. And how we
think we can get it.
Part of the reason for the confusion in mainstream environmental discourse is the rising
prominence of global environmental risks, climate change chief among them, which are
conceptually different to other environmental issues such as land and wildlife
preservation or pollution. While these latter concerns remain relevant, they are situated
within a larger context of anthropocentric planetary change in which human actions
fundamentally alter global biophysical processes. The Breakthrough Institute aims to
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create a politics and a worldview which is consistent with this acknowledgement of
humans’ impact on the world, and provide some philosophical coherence to strategies for
living in the Anthropocene.
In order for the Institute to boost its profile and stand out in a crowded ideas
marketplace, it has chosen to define itself against mainstream environmentalism. A key
feature of their approach, from DoE through to An Ecomodernist Manifesto, has been the
often scathing attacks on environmentalists and environmental justice advocates. The
portrayals of environmentalists as anti-technology luddites who want to keep poor
countries from developing, or spiritualist tree-huggers denouncing modern conveniences
while reaping their benefits, are overly broad and often unfair generalizations. For the
most part the environmental community is the only target of such scorn from the BTI,
which otherwise pursues a pragmatic and non-confrontational politics. This is in contrast
to environmental groups such as 350 or Greenpeace who target those they see as
responsible for environmental wrongs, or those who delay taking action.
While reserving their attacks for those who would seem to be most closely
aligned with their cause may seem counterproductive, the BTI’s strategy aligns with their
political outlook in two ways. Firstly, it strengthens their organizational identity and
provides greater visibility for the institute and the idea of ecomodernism. By defining
themselves in opposition to environmentalism, the BTI takes advantage of the news
media’s propensity to cover infighting amongst erstwhile ideological allies (Roberts,
2011), as well as appealing to an audience wary of aligning themselves with
environmentalists. Secondly, ecomodernism holds that the major problem with
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environmental politics as it is currently practiced is how the issues are conceptualized and
defined. Environmental groups, as the agents primarily responsible for putting these
issues on the public agenda, are therefore seen as the principal obstacle rather than
particular

institutions

or

systemic

factors.

Through

viewing

modernity

and

industrialization as net positives, the ecomodernists are less likely to challenge the status
quo.
The ecomodernists’ emphasis on technological change and downplaying of the
importance of politics means that they do not often focus directly on questions of power
and inequality. The invention and adoption of new technologies is assumed to result in
beneficial outcomes for all and is concerned mainly with the aggregate good of humanity,
and is for the most part presented as an inevitable and value-neutral process. More
localized issues of differentials in access to technology and in whose interests it is being
deployed are absent. For such an all-encompassing discourse which takes into account
the relationship of humanity to the entire planet and aims to present a holistic vision for
life in the Anthropocene, ecomodernism is remarkably depoliticized. While the
assumptions of mainstream environmentalism are open to questioning, broader sociopolitical structures remain largely intact. Ecomodernism is not an endorsement of
neoliberalism or free-market capitalism; the Manifesto explicitly rejects the conflation of
modernization with “capitalism, corporate power and laissez-faire economic policies”
(Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 28) and notes that “we continue to embrace a strong public
role in addressing environmental problems and accelerating technological innovation” (p.
30). However, there is little indication that the ways in which political and economic
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systems operate – even if still in the service of advancing development, technology and
industrialization – need to change.
The depoliticized approach of ecomodernism – which, in Pepermans and
Maeseele’s (2014) terms, conceals the “underlying values, interests, and assumptions” of
social actors (p. 224) – was not always the outlook of the BTI. In DoE and other writings
around the same time, Shellenberger and Nordhaus accused environmentalists of being
too technocratic and focusing too heavily on policy rather than politics. This is not a
reversal of their position, but a shift in the type of changes they are advocating. DoE
called for a re-examination of the underlying morality which supports environmentalism,
and the Manifesto attempts to articulate a moral worldview which should guide policy
choices. But where DoE explicitly aligns their cause with liberal politics and urges
environmentalists to get involved in political battles, ecomodernism takes a step back
from partisan politics. This again strengthens their appeal to their target audience as well
as giving ecomodernism a more universal claim to relevance rather than aligning itself to
a particular political grouping.
The ecomodernists themselves, of course, see this aversion to partisanship and
politicization as a strength of their approach. In a Breakthrough Journal article on
‘wicked polarization’, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2013) write that it is necessary to
“disrupt the fault lines of our many intensely polarized debates and to disorient partisans
accustomed to knowing exactly what they are supposed to think about any issue.”
Positioning themselves with “pragmatic liberals and moderates” and in opposition to the
“anticorporate and antigovernment partisans” on the left and right respectively, they
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argue in favor of public debate which can reframe problems in novel ways and spur
creative, cooperative solutions. Communications scholar Matthew Nisbet (2014a), who
has written for the BTI website and notes that his own outlook is close to the
ecomodernists, identifies the ecomodernist model of social change as “public forums that
challenge assumptions create conditions for cooperation [and] innovation” (p. 814).
Responding to criticism that ecomodernists ignore politics, Nisbet (2015) argues in a post
for the Ecomodernist Manifesto website that “social change starts through critical selfreflection and challenging of our assumptions” with the aim of “getting a diversity of
people to act on behalf of the same goal but for different reasons.”
This conception of politics as a problem which can be solved through reasoned,
rational debate – when it is not rendered irrelevant by advances in technology – works to
obscure power dynamics in social and technological change. Bruno Latour – who, as
noted, has been sympathetic to the BTI’s agenda – remarked on the absence of politics in
a critique of the Manifesto, stating that “I will be convinced only when I have obtained a
detailed list of your friends and your enemies” (Latour, 2015, p. 224). Ecomodernism
cannot be a political movement, Latour argues, if it cannot define “who will get
mobilized, [and] against whom we have to fight” (p. 224). Reducing all political
differences to disagreements of opinion which can be resolved though reasoned
deliberation also glosses over questions of who has access to such deliberative spaces and
the structural inequalities that persist within them. As Nancy Fraser (1991) points out in
her critique of Habermas’ model of the public sphere, such inequalities cannot be
bracketed when “discursive arenas are situated in a larger societal context that is
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pervaded by structural relations of dominance and subordination” (p. 120). The
ecomodernists’ commitment to fostering a diversity of perspectives and willingness to
challenge commonly-held assumptions is laudable, and contrary viewpoints are
sometimes presented – for instance on the ecomodernism.org website, and in the BTI’s
annual conference (Latour’s [2015] critique of ecomodernism was written for this latter
event). Nonetheless, the continual dismissal by ecomodernists of environmentalists and
environmental justice advocates, often using broad stereotypes of hypocritical spiritualist
tree-huggers, does give less weight to particular groups and perspectives. Further to this,
ecomodernism’s pragmatic centrism, and embrace of solutions which largely uphold
existing structural arrangements, marginalizes voices which seek to challenge the status
quo.
While Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s (2007) book Break Through contained
strategies to build a movement, the BTI’s focus since then has in large part turned away
from directly addressing the place of citizens in environmental politics. An Ecomodernist
Manifesto talks of economic and technological processes, energy development, resource
use, and impacts on ecosystems. It is a deliberately macro-level perspective, and as such
avoids any discussion of the role played by people in the creation of a “great
Anthropocene.” The insistence that technological change precedes (and is superordinate
to) political change also minimizes the democratic processes which shape these
processes. In any case, widespread social change is not on the ecomodernists’ immediate
agenda; most of their proposals call for a continuation of existing trends and processes
which come with modernization, such as agricultural intensification, urbanization, and
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resource use efficiency. Widespread systemic political change is not particularly
necessary for their agenda as they are advocating for processes already in motion.
One of the central tensions of the Anthropocene is that between impact and
control. The reach of human impact extends throughout the entire planetary environment,
but our control of these impacts is uncertain and imprecise. Moreover, environmental
impacts arise out of particular political and economic formations, and are often driven by
subpolitical processes outside of the direct control of democratic institutions. Beck (1992)
saw risks as a potentially democratizing force, as their more universal impact would lead
to a reconsideration of the societal processes form which they resulted. This idea has
rightly been subject to much critique, as systemic inequalities are just as likely to be
reproduced in responses to risks. Nonetheless, in a world where environmental impacts
are embedded in sociopolitical systems, it is necessary to address the role of citizens in
democratically shaping these processes. While ecomodernism stresses the importance of
consciously creating the Anthropocene, of using the power that humans have to build a
world in which we want to live, this happens within the framework of industrialized
societies and alternatives are rarely considered. As such, the BTI’s ecomodernism aligns
more closely with Christoff’s (1996) ‘weak’ ecological modernization, despite it being
comprehensive in scope. The ‘modernization theology’ which embraces the tenets of
modernity requires a faith that the modern world is the best world; that the structures and
institutions of modernity are, with some adjustments, the same ones that will lead us to
overcome the crises for which they themselves are responsible. Rather than creating a
citizen-driven politics which integrates and takes account of humans’ impact on nature,
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the ecomodernists seek to decouple from nature, once again circumscribing the natural
world as separate from human affairs.
The rhetorical shift found in An Ecomodernist Manifesto towards decoupling
economy from environment in order to preserve nature introduces some conceptual
confusion into ecomodernist discourse, particularly when compared to previous writings.
Mixing traditional appeals for nature conservation with their technology-centric
modernism may enhance their appeal to particular audiences who do not yet want to give
up on the idea of a pristine nature. Fred Pearce, in a critique published in New Scientist,
writes that the ecomodernists “seem to be hooked on outdated notions of nature as
passive, pristine and only able to prosper apart from us” (Pearce, 2015). After
deconstructing nature, the ecomodernists are attempting to reinstate it, albeit in a
reconstituted, anthropocentric form that, while subject to human influences, exists as a
separate entity outside of human affairs. As Latour (2015) notes, the concepts of nature
and modernity are used to shortcut the political process – in the case of nature through
“creating a second power [that is] out of the reach of political assemblies” (p. 4). Rather
than recognizing the multitude of ways in which human society is entangled with nature,
ecomodernism attempts to once again draw a boundary separating human affairs from the
natural world. This boundary-making process in a sense recreates Latour’s (1993)
‘modern constitution’ by claiming that humans can be emancipated from nature while
ignoring the attachments they have created. What decoupling means in practical terms –
land use intensification, greater efficiency of resource use – will inevitably have
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consequences for the areas designated as ‘nature.’ The implication is that such impacts
will be minimized or ameliorated through further technological development.
Reinstating a human-nature boundary – which, by the ecomodernists’ own
definition, is largely arbitrary – minimizes the entanglements and attachments which are
constantly and unavoidably being created through human action. Together with the
prioritization of technology over politics, this has major implications for political agency.
If adapting to life in the Anthropocene is primarily technological, then much greater
attention needs to be paid to how this is implemented given disparities in economic and
political capital. Technology treated as a benign, apolitical force for the greater good
tends to reproduce existing inequalities, both within and between nations. The BTI is
increasingly focusing on issues of international development (e.g. Breakthrough Staff,
2014b, 2014c; Caine et al., 2014). If twenty-first century ecomodernism is to avoid a
similar path to twentieth century modernization theory, in which Western cultural and
economic dominance was reinforced under the auspices of development (e.g. Hardt,
1988), such issues of inequality will need to be directly confronted. Along with this, a
politics of the Anthropocene must be able to account for the integration of non-human
actors into political decision-making – to be able to exercise some form of democratic
control over the planetary biophysical systems which are inextricably connected to
human socio-technical ones. By de-emphasizing the role of democratic politics in
creating the Anthropocene, ecomodernism defaults to a faith in the political and
economic structures of industrial modernity as our hope for ecological salvation.
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1

Founded in 1999, Grist (www.grist.org) is a non-profit website which publishes
environmental news and commentary with an often irreverent tone. It won Webby
Awards for best online magazine in 2005 and 2006, and was ranked first on Time
Magazine’s list of ‘Top Green Websites’ in 2008 (Roston, 2008).
2

According to Little (2005b) in a feature about the Apollo Alliance for American
Prospect magazine, “Leaders of the Apollo program, who spent great effort trying to
build practical coalitions among environmental and labor groups, were embarrassed when
the ‘Death’ authors singled out Apollo for lavish praise while savaging the rest of the
environmental movement.” Shellenberger, a founding member, left the Alliance soon
after the publication of DoE.
3

It is interesting to note that this criticism of environmentalists is mainly at the individual
level, rather than focusing on social structures or institutions, while the solutions they
offer are at the level of the latter. The 350 group also critiques individual behaviour
change, while advocating structural and institutional change. In other words, both groups
criticize the inadequacy of individual change while advocating for the necessity of
structural reform.
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Chapter 6 – Gardening the Anthropocene: Conservation after the
end of nature

Introduction
In an April 2015 article for the New Yorker magazine, American novelist and
essayist Jonathan Franzen lamented what he saw as the eclipse of traditional conservation
concerns by climate change. By focusing all of their resources on the potential future
threats to wildlife, Franzen argued, conservation groups are ignoring pressing threats to
species and habitats in the present:
I came to feel miserably conflicted about climate change. I accepted its
supremacy as the environmental issue of our time, but I felt bullied by its
dominance. Not only did it make every grocery-store run a guilt trip; it
made me feel selfish for caring more about birds in the present than about
people in the future. What were the eagles and the condors killed by wind
turbines compared with the impact of rising sea levels on poor nations?
What were the endemic cloud-forest birds of the Andes compared with
the atmospheric benefits of Andean hydroelectric projects? (Franzen,
2015)
Franzen’s piece was widely derided by conservationists. Bird conservation organization
The Audubon Society, the major target of Franzen’s angst, dismissed it as “the sad
ravings of a man trying to escape his guilt-ridden Protestant Puritan heritage and justify
his consumerist lifestyle” (Jannot, 2015) and pointed out that addressing climate change
and conservation are complementary rather than competitive. Franzen’s essay and the
minor controversy it generated – Audubon also published a roundup of responses, both
positive and negative (National Audubon Society, 2015) – nonetheless reflect broader
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underlying tensions within the conservation movement. Questions over immediate
priorities, such as how best to protect species and ecosystems facing both short-term local
threats and long-term global ones, are symptomatic of deeper uncertainties over nature
conservation in the Anthropocene when human influence permeates every corner of the
biosphere. What is the nature we seek to preserve in an era when nature is said to have
ended?
This chapter examines these issues through looking at The Nature Conservancy
(TNC), the largest American environmental non-profit (by revenue and assets) and one of
the oldest, having been founded in 1951. As its name suggests, TNC was founded as a
conservation-driven organization, its original mission to solicit donations in order to buy
up land towards protecting it from development. The organization’s mode of operation
has changed over the years, following developments in environmental thought and
ecological science, even as place-based conservation efforts have remained central. The
rise of the concept of the Anthropocene and the emergence of climate change as the
central environmental issue of the last decade have presented a dilemma for TNC, as it
becomes less tenable to speak of protecting an unspoiled, pristine nature. In response,
TNC has taken an approach that maintains its establishment-oriented ethos and approach
to conservation while acknowledging wider global environmental trends. It has embraced
an ‘ecosystem services’ approach to conservation, where the value of natural resources is
quantified in terms of their monetary benefit to human activities. Senior figures in TNC
have also been at the forefront of a related intellectual movement, often referred to as
‘new conservation,’ which attempts to reconceptualize conservation for the Anthropocene
193

by emphasizing the eroded boundaries between humans and nature and promotes
conservation explicitly for human benefit. These shifts in emphasis within the
organization have caused tensions with its public advocacy and fundraising, as it attempts
to retain the loyalty (and generosity) of its member base through appeals to protect nature
while advancing a new paradigm for conservation practice.
Analysis includes 32 articles from the period 2011-2015 at the height of the
debates over new conservation. Articles are a mix of feature stories by environmental
journalists, and editorials or opinion pieces written by conservation practitioners. The
articles were sourced through web and Lexis Nexis searches for key terms, and through
links and references in the articles themselves, many of which were in direct conversation
with one another. The chapter also analyzes advertising and publicity campaigns by TNC
and how the ways in which the organization promotes conservation to the public is
consistent with the outlook of its senior figures. This includes the key sections of the
organization’s website encouraging people to get involved or donate money, and subsites focusing on specific campaigns or issues. The TNC website also includes a blog
entitled Conservancy Talk which features posts about TNC’s operations from Tercek and
other leaders in the organization. From 122 posts between 2013 and 2015, 23 which
include self-reflexive discussion of TNC’s approach were selected for analysis. Emails
sent to TNC’s members were also included in the analysis; out of 250 emails sent
between July 2013 and December 2015, 78 which focused on specific campaigns or
initiatives to protect nature were selected for analysis (see Table 4).
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Table 4: List of primary sources for chapter 6
Source Type

Details

Number

Book

Nature’s Fortune

News and commentary

Magazine or newspaper features

15

Op-eds or blogs

7

Academic journal editorials

9

Total

31

TNC publications and
publicity material

TNC website and promotional campaigns
‘Conservancy Talk’ blog posts

23

Emails to members

78

The origins and evolution of TNC
Though officially chartered in 1951, the roots of TNC date back to 1915 with the
formation of the Ecological Society of America (ESA), a professional organization of
ecological scientists. From its founding, ESA had faced tensions over whether it should
actively work to promote ecological preservation or simply serve as a venue for
ecological research. After much debate, the organization voted in 1946 to limit itself to
the latter mission and not get involved in advocacy or political causes. This resulted in a
small group of scientists, led by eminent ecologist and ESA’s first president Victor
Shelford, forming the Ecologists’ Union. This new group was to be dedicated to the
“preservation of natural biotic communities, and encouragement of scientific research in
preserved areas” (Farnham, 2007, p.161; see also Dexter, 1978). Renamed The Nature
Conservancy in 1950, the organization had an expansive vision from the outset. The land
conservation movement had been growing in the US at the time, spurred by concerns
over unchecked development in previously wild areas. However, most conservation had
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“centered on the large, spectacular, and scenic” (Birchard, 2005, p. 5). TNC instead
adopted a scientific approach, aiming to preserve nature in all of its variety, rather than
only that which was aesthetically appealing to humans. For George Fell, an early director
of TNC, the lands preserved by the Conservancy would be “living museums to the
primitive world of nature” (quoted in Birchard, 2005, p. 5). Fell envisioned a nationwide
network of nature preserves containing examples of ecosystems from every natural
region which would, he said at a board meeting in 1954, “have the size and strength to
take its rightful place in a country that does things on a gigantic scale” (quoted in
Birchard, 2005, p. 4).
From its humble yet ambitious start as an association of ecologists and
conservation enthusiasts, TNC evolved in the 1960s into a professionally-run
organization staffed by accountants and lawyers. This was a necessary development
given that TNC was essentially in the real estate business, buying up tracts of land to
prevent development. A headquarters was established in Washington, DC – despite a
suggestion from Fell that being based in a small, rural town would better reflect TNC’s
conservation philosophy, the DC base was chosen to lend greater prestige and, more
importantly, provide easier access to the power brokers and wealthy individuals
necessary for acquiring land and money (Birchard, 2005). From the beginning, TNC
adopted a non-confrontational approach, aiming to work with various constituencies –
landowners, politicians, corporations – in order to further its conservation goals. The
Conservancy, Birchard notes, “would never be against anything. It would buy and
preserve land, period – and nobody would then raise a stink about its work” (p. 57).
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Corporations, of course, were (and remain) a major source of donations for TNC’s
aggressive and expensive program of land acquisition, and so TNC’s strategy of putting
“pragmatism above idealism and cooperation above confrontation” (p. 77) was necessary
for keeping them on side.
As TNC grew to its dominant position in the American conservation sector, there
were two major shifts in its approach to conserving nature: from valuing land to valuing
biodiversity, and from keeping humans apart from nature to using nature to enhance
economic activity. By the early 1970s TNC was generating enough income to buy up
large areas of land. There was a lack of clear purpose, however, behind land acquisition
decisions, and in many cases the organization was simply buying up whatever
undeveloped land it could get its hands on. The hiring of Robert Jenkins as VicePresident for Science in 1970 brought ecological science back to the forefront of TNC’s
operations. Jenkins, like TNC’s founders an ecologist by training, favored an approach
centered on preserving genetic material and unique ecological systems rather than bulk
land purchases. Biodiversity became the primary metric by which TNC’s conservation
efforts were measured, and a rigorous assessment system was introduced to prioritize
land targeted for protection. The rarity of individual species and uniqueness of
ecosystems were valued over aesthetic criteria, with quantified scientific judgment
applied so as to purposefully exclude human stakeholders (and their subjective criteria)
from decision-making over which areas to protect (Birchard, 2005).
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A 1992 coffee-table book commemorating TNC’s 40th anniversary hints at some
of the implications of this shift to biodiversity as the primary criterion for conservation
work:
The Conservancy’s new mission thrust practicality into an environmental
arena that previously had been characterized by appeals to the public’s
sense of morality and love of beauty. Although morals and aesthetics still
apply, the emphasis turned to ‘save this plant because we may need it
someday’ instead of ‘save this plant because we have no right to kill it.’
(Grove & Krasemann, 1992, p. 31)
Preserving biodiversity was, of course, presented as a worthy goal in and of itself, and in
keeping with TNC’s original mission of protecting nature from development. Along with
this comes the idea that the islands of biodiversity in TNC’s preserves could be
potentially useful for human needs, whether as a store of genetic material which might
one day be exploited, or through providing ‘ecosystem services’ which benefit human
society. The idea of ecosystem services first came to prominence in the late 1970s (e.g.
Westman, 1977). Although not often presented at the time as a rationale for the focus on
biodiversity, the two concepts became closely linked in conservation discourse (Ridder,
2008). The shift toward biodiversity helped to lay the groundwork for TNC’s subsequent
embrace of an ecosystem services approach to conservation, as discussed below.
The second and related shift in TNC’s operating procedure began in the 1980s.
While the move towards biodiversity changed the organization’s priorities about which
land it should buy, it became increasingly clear that simply buying up land and locking it
away was not always a viable strategy for conservation. The boundaries of ecosystems do
not stop at the edge of the nature preserve, and so what happens in the surrounding areas
can be as important to conservation efforts as the preserve itself. Recognizing the
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importance of the wider region to conservation necessarily includes acknowledgement of
the presence and activities of humans. Where TNC had initially sought to enforce a sharp
human-nature dichotomy, buying land to spare it from the human-induced degradation
which was happening everywhere else, this strategy became increasingly untenable. Not
only did activities near the preserves impact what happened within them, but TNC’s land
acquisitions often caused disruptions and resulted in tensions with neighboring
communities. The organization found that it could no longer “acquire land, put a fence
around it, and call it good”, but instead had to “support the people who lived and worked
in a place so they would coexist harmoniously with the precious pieces of nature in the
same neighborhood” (Birchard, 2005, p. 94).
TNC thus broadened its scope, to encompass not only the lands it owned but the
broader set of social and institutional structures which have a bearing on nature
conservation. Still maintaining its non-confrontation approach, TNC began to engage
more with other stakeholders such as nearby communities, government agencies, and
corporations. While place-based conservation remained at the core of the organization’s
work, this was located within a broader context, such that by the late 1990s TNC had
shifted from “an institution defined by real estate deal-making to one mainly defined by
institutional deal-making” (Birchard, 2005, p. 102). This approach was codified in a
program entitled ‘Conservation By Design’ which, though it undergoes periodic
revisions, remains TNC’s framework for conservation. Whereas ecosystems were
previously TNC’s primary unit of conservation, the new approach emphasized larger
ecoregions, defined as “relatively large geographic areas of land and water delineated by
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climate, vegetation, geology and other ecological and environmental patterns” (TNC,
2001). Instead of protecting the isolated pockets of land on TNC’s preserves, the new
approach took a broader view, using ecoregions as “a framework for identifying the
individual places … that taken together would spell success: the conservation of all
viable, native species and communities” (Adams, 2006, p. 67).
The shift to an ecoregional conservation strategy was explicitly a move away
from using geopolitical boundaries as a basis for conservation, as the state-by-state
approach had previously done, and instead used ecological markers to define how an
array of local ecosystems fit together. The focus on conservation over wider areas
included a variety of human uses and impacts along with the specific sited target for
intervention. TNC had to take into account “other dynamics of the landscape, like
depletion or pollution of groundwater, that conservationists could not address just by
buying land” (Adams, 2006, p. 67). More generally, this approach meant that
conservation became as much about human activities as about what took place within the
preserves. Achieving the organization’s goals could no longer be achieved by creating
small pockets of pristine nature within an otherwise denuded and (for conservation
purposes) worthless landscape. Rather, conservation has to be managed within humandominated landscapes, and is subject to sociopolitical as much as environmental forces.
This necessitates interaction and engagement with a broad range of stakeholders and
interested parties whose actions have an impact on conservation activities. While TNC’s
original purpose was in essence to reinforce the boundaries between nature and society,
its trajectory over the decades has seen those boundaries gradually erode.
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A new conservation for the Anthropocene
The Nature Conservancy’s increasing acknowledgement of the inextricability of
biodiversity conservation from human activity coincided with, and was in part spurred
by, broader developments within environmentalism. The rise of climate change as the
major issue of environmental concern and the related emergence of the concept of the
Anthropocene rendered untenable the notion of a pristine nature isolated from human
interference. Nature has ended, and nowhere on the planet is free from some form of
human impact. TNC’s original goal of creating “living museums” was certainly
incompatible with this new reality. The organization had, though ‘Conservation by
Design,’ taken steps to recognize the role of humans in natural processes. However, a
more thorough reconceptualization of the purpose and goals of conservation would be
needed to better reflect the changing ideas of humans’ relationship to their environment.
Two of the key figures in TNC’s transformation are chairman and CEO Mark
Tercek and chief scientist Peter Kareiva. Tercek joined TNC in 2008 after a 24-year
career as an investment banker and managing director at Goldman Sachs. His biography
on TNC’s website notes that he is a “champion of the idea of natural capital – valuing
nature for its own sake as well as for the services it provides for people” (TNC, 2015a).
In 2013 he authored the book Nature’s Fortune: How Business and Society Thrive by
Investing in Nature (Tercek & Adams, 2013) which lays out the case for an ecosystem
services approach where private enterprise can profit through engaging in conservation.
Kareiva, an ecologist and evolutionary biologist by training, was TNC’s chief scientist
from 2002 until his departure in 2015. He became well known in conservation circles as a
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leading proponent of a movement called ‘new conservation,’ which argues that
conservationists should consider how their activities can benefit humans.
This ongoing redefinition of conservation in the Anthropocene, and TNC’s place
within it, resulted in much debate, sometimes acrimonious, within the conservation
community. The debates surrounding new conservation and ecosystem services were the
subject of some media coverage, mainly in the form of lengthy magazine and newspaper
feature stories, as well as op-eds, by the major players. In a blog post responding to one
such article in The New Yorker (Max, 2014), Tercek and Kareiva (2014) play down a
conflict between ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches to conservation, while defending TNC’s
approach in light of changing realities:
The Nature Conservancy continues to embrace ‘traditional’ strategies.
We still buy land, we arrange for easements with ranchers and logging
companies, we help nations establish marine protected areas. But we also
know that securing those ‘last great places’ (as our old motto had it) will
be to no avail if climate change renders them obsolete. ... Our newer
tactics – working directly with people on strategies that can benefit them
as well as nature – acknowledge that conservation today cannot succeed
without the support of those who depend directly on resources for their
livelihoods.
While a more conciliatory tone has been adopted by most players in the debate since
2014, TNC was at the center of many of the more heated exchanges between 2011 and
2014. The discourses of new conservation and ecosystem services are closely related,
though they often play out separately in public debate. As discussed below, new
conservation promotes an alternative vision for the purpose of conservation science and
advocacy that features humans at the center, while ecosystem services operates as the
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value system by which this ideology is implemented by evaluating nature’s contributions
to society in monetary terms.
New age, new tensions, new paradigm
Vigorous debates over conservation science and practice have long characterized
the field. As discussed in the above brief history of TNC, the organization has been at the
center of previous shifts in thinking, such as that from land preservation to biodiversity.
The debates around what came to be called ‘new conservation’ took place between 2011
and 2014, though questions of the purpose of conservation and the idea of preserving
nature for the benefit of humans had been present in conservation discourse and practice,
in various forms, for several decades prior. The concept of sustainable development,
which in the 1990s became the dominant conservation paradigm particularly in
developing countries, is premised on the notion of advancing human wellbeing while
simultaneously stopping the destruction of nature (Dryzek, 2005). Most conservation
organizations including TNC had been moving in this direction. The Conservation
Director for WWF International wrote in a 2006 history of that organization’s approach
to conservation of the shift to a more human-focused conservation ethic and the benefits
of working with diverse stakeholders, including corporations, in order to “examine
fundamental drivers rather than immediate symptoms” (Hails, 2006). The idea of the
Anthropocene and the end of an unspoiled nature free from human impact became more
prominent in conservation discourse in the 2000s (see Caro, Darwin, Forrester, LedouxBloom & Wells, 2012 for a summary). Caro et al. (2012) note that “with the catchword
Anthropocene in ascendancy, one might easily come away with the impression that
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nowhere on Earth is natural ... and indeed it is common to hear the phrase humans have
altered everything” (p. 185; emphasis in original).
The growing recognition of the Anthropocene and the impact, however small or
diffuse, of humans on almost all ‘natural’ ecosystems paved the way for a more explicit
rethinking of the purposes and goals of conservation. Kareiva, TNC’s Chief Scientist, had
been exploring these ideas, mainly in academic venues. A 2007 article in science
magazine Scientific American co-authored with environmental science professor and
frequent collaborator Michelle Marvier makes a case for a more human-centered
conservation and calls for increasing links between conservation and development,
chiding conservationists who “are in denial about the state of the world and must stop
clinging to a vision of pristine wilderness” (Kareiva & Marvier, 2007, p. 55). The article
states that “we and a growing number of conservationists argue that old ways of
prioritizing conservation activities should be largely scrapped in favor of an approach that
emphasizes saving ecosystems that have value to people” (p. 51).
In 2011, environmental writer Emma Marris published the book Rambunctious
Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World (Marris, 2011). A manifesto of sorts for
conservation in the Anthropocene, Marris argues against making a distinction between
wild ecosystems and those created or influenced by humans. Rather than thinking of
nature as a “pristine wilderness” and “something ‘out there,’ far away” (p. 1) she
advocates a new way of seeing nature that includes the plants and animals that are found
in cities, farms, gardens and highway medians; a mixture of native and introduced species
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thriving in human-created landscapes. The role of humans in creating and maintaining
these landscapes becomes a central and unavoidable issue in addressing conservation:
In 2011 there is no pristine wilderness on planet Earth. We’ve been
changing the landscapes we inhabit for millennia, and these days our
reach is truly global. ... We are already running the whole Earth, whether
we admit it or not. To run it consciously and effectively, we must admit
our role and even embrace it. We must temper our romantic notion of
untrammeled wilderness and find room next to it for the more nuanced
notion of a global, half-wild rambunctious garden, tended by us. (p. 2)
The book brought together views that had been expressed in academic settings over the
preceding decade. It set the stage for a more public and divisive debate that was to ensue
as the ‘new’ conservation was articulated and distinguished from ‘traditional’
approaches.
In 2012, Kareiva and Marvier, together with TNC director of science
communications Bob Lalasz, published an essay for the Breakthrough Institute’s journal
(Lalasz, Kareiva & Marvier, 2012). Entitled ‘Conservation in the Anthropocene: Beyond
Solitude and Fragility,’ it forthrightly makes the case that the current conservation
paradigm is failing, and that “conservationists will have to jettison their idealized notions
of nature, parks, and wilderness – ideas that have never been supported by good
conservation science – and forge a more optimistic, human-friendly vision.” The article
draws a sharp line between the old conservation and the new with some confrontational
rhetoric. The authors attack the hypocrisy of conservation icons such as John Muir,
Henry David Thoreau, and Edward Abbey, and point out the complicity of
conservationists in having indigenous people forcibly removed from their lands in the
name of nature protection.
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The new conservation they advocate is explicitly presented as a paradigm shift (a
term also used by Marris [2011]). The old ways must be abandoned, with a new, positive
and human-centric ethic taking their place:
Instead of scolding capitalism, conservationists should partner with
corporations in a science-based effort to integrate the value of nature's
benefits into their operations and cultures. Instead of pursuing the
protection of biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake, a new conservation
should seek to enhance those natural systems that benefit the widest
number of people, especially the poor. Instead of trying to restore remote
iconic landscapes to pre-European conditions, conservation will measure
its achievement in large part by its relevance to people, including city
dwellers. Nature could be a garden – not a carefully manicured and rigid
one, but a tangle of species and wildness amidst lands used for food
production, mineral extraction, and urban life. (Lalasz et al., 2012)
Following Marris, the article uses the metaphor of ‘nature as a garden’; a place which is
shaped and overseen by humans but within which nature can flourish in a multitude of
ways.
The use of such language seeks to break down the division between humans and
nature, positioning them both as part of the same interconnected system. New
conservation discourse aims as part of this to remove the valences traditionally associated
in conservation with the human and the natural, where the former is seen as negative and
the latter as positive and that any human intrusion into nature is to be avoided. The work
“pristine” is used four times in the article, always pejoratively as a mythic past to which
we cannot return: conservationists have an “intense nostalgia for wilderness and a past of
pristine nature” and “cannot promise a return to pristine, prehuman landscapes” (Lalasz
et al., 2012). The notion of an unspoiled wilderness which is disconnected from human
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impact of any kind is, the authors argue, a romantic fantasy which is hindering efforts to
both save species from extinction and enhance human wellbeing.
As discussed in chapter 2, there are debates amongst scholars as the when the
Anthropocene era began – whether it is a result of recently detectable planetary changes
such as the rise in carbon emissions, or if it can be traced to a much earlier time when
humans first started modifying their environment on a large scale via the invention of
agriculture. The article takes the latter view of a “long Anthropocene,” pointing out the
huge changes to landscapes and ecosystems caused by early humans and indigenous
populations:
The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for
centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists – places
‘untrammeled by man’ – never existed, at least not in the last thousand
years, and arguably even longer. (Lalasz et al., 2012)
Emphasizing the long history of human interventions and alterations in the natural world
further supports the argument deconstructing the human-nature dichotomy. By
challenging the idea that there ever was an untouched wilderness to preserve, the new
conservationists hope to build support for their agenda of moving conservation away
from nature protection and towards working in tandem with human development rather
than against it.
The essay by Lalasz et al. (2012) brought into the open and gave greater attention
to debates which had been happening within the conservation community for several
years. The controversy was not as publicly visible as that surrounding The Death of
Environmentalism (see Chapter 5), but generated coverage mostly in the form of
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commentary from the scientists themselves or lengthy feature articles written by
specialist science or environmental journalists. Journalist Hillary Rosner, in a 2013
feature for environmental magazine Ensia, notes that “the piece exposed a huge rift in the
conservation world and ignited a feud” (Rosner, 2013). While mainly focused on the
merits of the new conservationists’ arguments, the debate at times descended into
acrimonious name-calling. Ecology professor Stuart Pimm, infuriated with Kareiva and
TNC’s denigration of existing conservation work and close ties with industry, described
new conservation as “prostituting messages designed to greenwash industrial business-asusual” and compared its proponents to “whores” (Pimm, 2014, p. 151).1 There are
indications that the debate which emerged in public was only a small portion of a broader
disagreement which took place across the conservation world. In an editorial which
sought to put an end to hostilities that appeared in the leading scientific journal Nature,
TNC’s Heather Tallis and former National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
administrator Jane Lubchenco wrote that “what began as a healthy debate has, in our
opinion, descended into vitriolic, personal battles in universities, academic conferences,
research stations, conservation organizations and even the media” (Tallis & Lubchenco,
2014, p. 27).
Although heated debates are hardly uncommon within academia, part of the
reason this particular disagreement turned so vitriolic has to do with the mission of the
discipline of conservation biology. Emerging in the mid-1980s, it was defined from the
outset as a “crisis discipline” (Soulé, 1985) that was based on strong and explicit values
which held preserving biodiversity as a necessary and urgent moral good (Takacs, 1996).
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As Marris (2011) notes, the “scientists who are trained to be dispassionate are often the
most passionate and opinionated when it comes to what counts as nature and is worth
saving” (p. 3). The combination of scientific research with a moral purpose results in a
high level of defensiveness when its practitioners feel it is being threatened; it also makes
it easier for the new conservationists to portray them as unscientific and driven more by
“the spiritual and transcendental value of untrammeled nature” (Lalasz et al., 2012) rather
than what is actually in the best interests of both nature and people.
The public debate in the wake of the Lalasz et al. essay expectedly features
disputes over the major premises of their argument. In a series of responses also posted
on the Breakthrough Institute website, several authors point out that conservation work as
it is practiced already does many of the things the original essay calls for, in particular
working for the benefit of human communities. Lisa Hayward and Barbara Martinez
(2012) of the American Association for the Advancement of Science criticize the piece
for being “written in the tone of a polemic, effectively eliciting an emotional response”
and write that “the authors do not accurately represent contemporary conservation
leaders. They reinforce the misconception that modern conservation sets nature apart
from and above people.” Michelle Nijhuis, in a New Yorker feature story, notes that
conservationists have often used both “utilitarian and preservationist arguments to protect
tens of thousands of acres of wilderness, save species from extinction, and clean up
polluted neighborhoods and waterways” (Nijhuis, 2014). Similarly, Kierán Suckling of
The Center for Biological Diversity, an American conservation NGO, argues that
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American environmental groups have for many decades expended the
great majority of their resources on exactly the ‘new’ task Kareiva et al.
[sic] boldly assign them ... Kareiva et al.’s ‘conservationist’ straw man
would have fallen to pieces had they attempted to base it on the ongoing
work of actual conservation groups. (Suckling, 2012)
Michael Soulé, one of the founders of the journal Conservation Biology and one of the
more outspoken opponents of new conservation, called the argument that nothing is
pristine a “red herring”, stating that “every ecologist in the world knows that” (quoted in
Amos, 2014). As Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004) did with the environmental
movement in The Death of Environmentalism, Lalasz et al. (2012) construct a particular
vision of conservation in order to define themselves against it. Suckling (2012) argues
that having defined this vision of conservation, “they are catapulted to the equally ideal
antithesis of a world with only human impacts and interests. The real world of synthesis
escapes them.”
Other responses pointed out that conservation work is already moving in this
direction. Academic geographer Paul Robbins, in another response published by the BTI,
notes that the essay “gathers together the threads of decades of critique” of the “inherent
weaknesses and contradictions in traditional approaches to conservation – human
exclusion, romance with wilderness, colonialism” (Robbins, 2012). A lengthy feature
article in environmental policy trade publication Greenwire quotes former TNC president
Steve McCormick as saying that the new conservation message, while somewhat “outside
the mainstream of conservation [is] a logical extension of where the movement is going”
(quoted in Voosen, 2012). Tallis and Lubchenco (2014), in their Nature editorial calling
for peace between the two camps, call for a broadened idea of what conservation can and
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should be, and for embracing a diverse set of philosophies “from ethical to economic, and
from aesthetic to utilitarian” (p. 27). They also note that such diversity has “a longstanding history in modern conservation” (p. 27).
The view that emerges from these perspectives and attempts at reconciliation is
clearly more complex than a binary between old nature-focused conservation and new
people-focused conservation. Kareiva, as several of the articles note, has a reputation for
being provocative (Dunkel, 2011; Voosen, 2012). The efforts of the new conservationists
are to provide an intellectual and philosophical foundation for a set of ideas often found
in conservation practice but which exist in confused and frequently contradictory ways
with other approaches. Nonetheless, the passionate and often vitriolic debate over new
conservation shows that there are fundamental differences between the two sides. While
Kareiva and the other new conservationists were certainly intending to provoke a reaction
and stir debate within the field, the scathing and personal nature of many of the responses
indicates the degree to which many in the conservation community feel their work is
being threatened by these ideas.
Conservation discourse and practice
Communication is thus central to the debate, in terms of how the conservation
message is conveyed to the broader public. Tallis and Lubchenco (2014) argue that the
values in human-centric and nature-centric conservation “need not be in opposition ...
They can instead be matched to contexts in which each one best aligns with the values of
the many audiences that we need to engage” (p. 28). The intrinsic values of nature, in this
view, should thus still be used to draw the support of the traditional conservation
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audience, while “instrumental values will remain more powerful for other audiences, and
should be used in the many contexts where broadening support for conservation is
essential” (p. 28). This approach is certainly warranted if, as several of the responses to
the new conservationists attest, conservation practice is already working for human
benefit. If conservation is indeed incorporating both anthropocentric and nature-centric
perspectives, but is still constructed in broader public discourse primarily in terms of the
latter, then conservationists’ communication strategies should change to reflect the
diversity of the work being carried out.
The divides in the conservation community are not solely a matter of
communication, however, and are indicative of deeper political and ideological
commitments. Conservation discourse is intertwined with, and in some senses
constitutive of, conservation practice. The institutional, political, and social changes that
conservation scientists and advocacy groups are able to achieve, whether legal
protections for certain land areas or species, changes in corporate practice, or greater
public awareness of conservation issues, are a result of the meanings with which they are
associated. The capacity of conservation organizations to effect change in the world is
influenced by the broader discourse of what conservation is – the intentions and goals
that are ascribed to the conservation movement, which are shaped both by the actions of
conservation groups and the wider cultural currents in which they are situated. The aim of
the new conservationists is in essence to change the cultural meanings associated with
conservation, and it is this which is perceived as most threatening by traditional
conservationists. Adopting the new conservation approach changes the avowed public
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role of conservation from protecting nature to the exclusion of humans – even if the
actual work has benefits for humans – to supporting human development through
protecting nature. This is less a shift of what conservation does than what it means, and
points to why the reaction against Kareiva and the others was so strong even as many of
their prescriptions are already being carried out under the remit of traditional
conservation. Traditional conservationists fear that altering the discursive formation of
conservation will have an adverse impact on their ability to achieve their goals. Already
perceiving themselves as being under constant assault from the forces of development,
there is anxiety that changing the meaning of conservation to a field primarily concerned
with human wellbeing will only accelerate the loss of species and protected areas as well
as reduce conservationists’ institutional capacity to resist these processes.
The challenge posed by the new conservationists forces those they were attacking
in the mainstream conservation movement to defend their position and explain how a
‘nature-first’ approach could work in light of the changed reality brought on by climate
change and the Anthropocene. Much of the unease with the new conservation approach is
related to ethical concerns, and in particular the erasure of the “bright line saying that all
species must be saved” (Voosen, 2012). Environmental scientist John Lemons, writing on
Andy Revkin’s New York Times blog, argues that “Kareiva stresses only the importance
of instrumentally valuing lands for human benefit but ignores intrinsic values of
organisms, species, or ecosystems” (in Revkin, 2012). These critics of new conservation
make the point that a world dominated by humans does not mean that human life is more
valuable than other species, and that there is an ethical duty to protect species and
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ecosystems particularly when their existence is threatened by human impacts. Michael
Soulé, the conservation biologist and frequent sparring partner of the new
conservationists, most forcefully makes the case that nature has “inherent intrinsic value”
apart from whatever use humans have for it (quoted in Voosen, 2013). He pushes back
against the metaphor of nature as a garden, stating that it will necessitate the removal of
inconvenient species such as large predators and leave only fragile human-shaped
ecosystems, and concludes that “it’s not conservation, it’s humanitarianism.” In an
editorial for the journal Conservation Biology, he again reinforces the line between
human society and wild nature, and questions
whether monies donated to the Nature Conservancy and other
conservation nonprofit organizations should be spent for nature protection
or should be diverted to humanitarian, economic-development projects
such as those proffered by the new conservation on the dubious theory
that such expenditures may indirectly benefit biological diversity in the
long run. (Soulé, 2013, p. 896)
From this perspective the Anthropocene has a very different meaning. The fact that
humans dominate the planet is all the more reason to protect what remains of relatively
untouched ecosystems with all of their biodiversity. The recognition that humans have
control over the future of the natural world should not mean shaping it for our own ends,
but entails an ethical responsibility to keep intact ecosystems in all their complexity.
Fragility and resilience
One of the key conceptual areas of disagreement between the traditional and new
conservationists is over the relative fragility or resilience of natural systems. As Soulé’s
quotes indicate, conservation biology has generally seen ecosystems as vulnerable to
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collapse if subject to disturbance by humans, whether from local factors such as the
destruction of habitat or the introduction of new species, or from broader impacts such as
climate change. This is disputed by Lalasz et al. (2012) who argue that “ecologists and
conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature” and counter that nature
“is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human
disturbances.” They offer a range of examples of how nature is thriving in degraded
environments and make the claim that “as we destroy habitats, we create new ones ... The
history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only
to be at risk when the environment changes again.” The ecosystems that emerge as a
result of human-induced disturbances are seen as no less valuable than those in relatively
untouched areas. Indeed, new conservation argues against making this distinction, with
their view of the long Anthropocene having already altered planetary ecosystems over
thousands of years. The vast changes of the modern area are of degree rather than kind,
and species and ecosystems will continue to adapt to human interventions as they have
over thousands of years. The moral certitude which accompanied traditional conservation
is largely absent here, and the impact of humans is seen as being essentially no different
to ice ages, asteroid strikes, or any of the dynamic processes of environmental change
which characterize Earth’s geological history.
Emphasizing the resilience of nature ties into the new conservationists’ more
optimistic vision. Science journalist Keith Kloor writes in an article for the magazine
Issues in Science and Technology that while most ecologists “talk about the future
morosely,” Kareiva asks “what if we thought of the Anthropocene ‘as a creative event?
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What would emerge from it?’” (Kloor, 2015). Kareiva does not necessarily condone
drastic interventions, but “thinks that in some cases his peers conveniently overlook an
ecosystem’s resilience because it contradicts the fragile nature narrative that has shaped
environmental discourse and politics” (emphasis in original). The concept of resilience is
nonetheless subject to some critique. Lemons argues that “scientifically, the term is
‘fuzzy’” and that it is not a concept “that has much scientific utility because it is so valueladen” (in Revkin, 2012). The values attached to the notion of resilience are of concern to
traditional conservationists who, again, fear that emphasizing resilience over fragility will
open the door to unchecked development or ecosystem degradation if it is assumed that
nature will simply ‘bounce back.’ Hayward and Martinez (2012) write that “overstating
nature’s resilience ... provides an unacceptable starting point for negotiations with
business interests or policy makers.” Already feeling they are fighting a losing battle,
conservationists are understandably reluctant to adopt a discourse which suggests the
problems may not be as urgent or serious as they have been claiming.
The notion of “nature as resilient” links to a broader discourse of resilience that
has gained considerable currency in recent years. Though the term is used in a
multiplicity of different ways, it emphasizes the capacity of systems (both social and
natural) to withstand or recover from disturbances which are viewed as endemic to late
modern society. Walker and Cooper (2011) argue that “what the resilience perspective
demands is not so much progressive adaptation to a continually reinvented norm as
permanent adaptability to extremes of turbulence” (p. 156). The concept is seen as
empowering by some communities – indigenous groups, for instance, have claimed at
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global climate change forums that “their cultures and traditions are inherently resilient,
and that heightened vulnerability [to climate change] is a result of external agency”
(Nakashima, Galloway McLean, Thulstrup, Ramos Castillo & Rubis, 2012, p. 42).
However, there are also questions about the modes of governmentality that a widespread
adoption of resilience discourse might entail – for instance, whether it privileges climate
adaptation at the expense of mitigation, and whether the expectation of constantly living
with risk shifts responsibility to individuals to manage it and at least partly absolves from
responsibility the agents or institutions which caused it (Evans & Reid, 2014).
As O’Brien (2014) points out, “resilience in its increasingly normative invocation
risks becoming a legitimation of – even a spur to – increasing turbulence” (p. 3). Though
it emerged out of ecosystems science in the 1970s, resilience is often associated with
neoliberal forms of governance and is “abstract and malleable” enough to be applied to a
variety of social and ecological realms including high finance, defense, urban
infrastructure education, and sustainable development (Walker & Cooper, 2011, p. 144).
The new conservationists’ explicit adoption of resilience ties conservation to this broader
discourse. While their specific claims about the resilience of nature are grounded, albeit
sometimes contentiously, in ecosystems research, it also makes conservation compatible
with the broader capitalist political-economic order and incorporates many of the values
therein. Proponents of new conservation argue that this is necessary in order for
conservation to have a meaningful impact, while opponents counter that adopting the
values responsible for much environmental destruction compromises the fundamental
mission of conservation beyond recognition.
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New conservation and old capitalism
The discourses used to define conservation publicly have significant implications
for its politics and practice, and open different pathways for what conservation makes
possible. Most individuals and organizations involved in conservation are careful not to
use overly political language in defining their position, instead insisting that whatever
prescriptions they advocate are derived scientifically. Conservation nonetheless has
unavoidable political implications, relating as it does to how the institutions of human
society interact with the rest of the natural world. The longstanding tensions between
science and advocacy can be seen throughout the history of the conservation movement,
from TNC’s split from the Ecological Society of America, to conservation biology
defining itself as a “crisis discipline” (Soulé, 1985), up to the present debates.
Conservation as practiced for most of the 20th century had a wariness, if not outright
opposition, towards the dominant economic order, positioning itself as a check on the
excesses of industrial modernity. Even organizations like TNC which were ideologically
compatible with capitalism and courted the support of corporations still saw themselves
as protectors of what would otherwise be destroyed if the economic system were left to
its own devices. New conservation instead aims to integrate the goals of conservation into
the dominant economic paradigm, realigning the mission of conservation such that it is
compatible with the global political economy.
The recognition of the Anthropocene and the adoption of the perspective that
human and natural systems have converged into a global order affecting all planetary
processes means that the system must be shifted from within. There is no ‘outside’ on
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which to stand critiquing the impacts of development, no higher law of nature or preindustrial past to serve as a benchmark for guiding our actions, no “unified cosmos that
could shortcut political due process by defining once and for all which world we all have
to live in” (Latour, 2011, p. 8). The idea of choice figures prominently in new
conservation discourse, the idea that humans inevitably impact the natural world, so the
key question is to decide how rather than whether these impacts will be felt. Rather than
attempting to stop what is undesirable, the primary issue is how to engineer what is
desirable, as Rosner (2013) points out:
Not long ago, it would have been heretical to hear a conservationist talk
about letting some species vanish. But in the new, proactive world,
consciously making such decisions is a whole lot better than letting them
happen by default. How we choose remains an open question, yet it’s
increasingly apparent that we do in fact need to make choices.
Kareiva and Marvier (2012) echo this in an essay entitled ‘What is Conservation
Science?’ (which they deliberately position as an update to Soulé’s (1985) much-cited
‘What is Conservation Biology?’), writing that “Given the magnitude of human impacts
and change, conservation cannot look only to the past. Instead, it must be about choosing
a future for people and nature” (Kareiva & Marvier, 2012, p. 968).
Such choices depend heavily on values. As human and natural systems converge
in the Anthropocene, the institutions which govern human society must expand to
account for their impact on nature. In the case of 350.org and the climate activists (see
Chapter 4), this involves expanding the institutions of democratic governance and the
direct role of citizens in deciding how to shape the future. The new conservationists, by
contrast, turn to the market as the most influential force in the global political ecology.
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Rather than stand in opposition to capitalism, new conservation has chosen to view it as a
net positive, a system which has lifted millions out of poverty and, for better or worse,
reshaped the world. Kareiva and TNC’s CEO Mark Tercek, writing on the TNC website,
argue that “for all its flaws, capitalism has been an engine of innovation and
improvement in the quality of life in many nations – and corporations are major drivers
and shapers of today’s civilization” (Tercek & Kareiva, 2014). By attempting to integrate
conservation into the global capitalist order, they hope to harness this power to again
reshape the world. New conservationist writers, Kareiva in particular, make the point that
corporations are key actors in environmental processes:
If one considers the planet earth and asks what are the keystone species
for our global ecology, it is hard to conclude anything but major global
corporations. These major corporations influence land use, energy flow,
nutrient cycling, and the hydrological cycle at a level that surpasses any
biological species. Given this reality, if one is to manage for a sustainable
planet, it makes sense to work with and influence the behavior and
actions of corporations. (Kareiva, quoted in Revkin, 2012)
This approach obviously generated strong reactions within the broader
conservation community. Robbins (2012), in his critique on the BTI website, points out
that the structural incentives of capitalism are in many cases the primary cause of the
environmental destruction against which conservationists have traditionally fought, and
argues that “the surpluses that allow returns for investors, owners, and others have
historically rested on finding ways to undercut, underinvest, and undervalue both labor
and nature.” He chides the new conservationists for their “insufficiently articulated vision
of the economy” as they do not say how they will change the structure of the economy
for pro-conservation purposes when “the reasons for uneven economic development
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coincide with those for environmental destruction” (Robbins, 2012). Soulé, quoted in
Voosen’s (2013) Chronicle feature, views the adoption of the rhetoric of neoliberalism as
“surrender.” Similarly, Pimm, interviewed by Kloor (2015), argues that TNC’s desire for
corporate engagement – and corporate money – leads to “an unwillingness to ask hard
questions of big donors, or companies in which the organization has stakes as part of its
$2.1-billion in shares, mutual funds and other investments.”
Kareiva (2012) dismisses the “adolescent view that corporations are not to be
trusted.” He deploys a ‘bad apple’ argument in his contention that corporate harm to the
environment is not systemic: “Yes, some corporations do harm and behave badly, but so
do conservationists on occasion.” He further argues that the “sincere and passionate
conservationists” who are nervous about new conservation’s emphasis on corporate
partnerships “tend to interpret my views as a political ideology – as though I am some
sort of fawning capitalist. I actually have come to this conclusion from a purely scientific
perspective” (quoted in Revkin, 2012). Karieva’s position of claiming to be apolitical in
his embrace of corporations stems from the idea that they are such important actors in the
global ecosystem that it is impossible to achieve any meaningful change in this system if
they are ignored. Yet this does not fully account for the specific ways in which corporate
actors are to be engaged and the overall outlook of new conservation. The activists of 350
also recognize the tremendous power of corporations in global ecology, but rather than
working with them seek instead to limit corporate power through building citizen
involvement and strengthening democratic institutions. Both approaches are valid
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responses to environmental challenges, and are in some ways complementary, but both
are driven by the value systems of their respective proponents.
Ecosystem services
The value system of the human-centered new conservation is based on identifying
and quantifying the benefits that nature provides to people. This approach comes from a
field known as Ecosystem Services, wherein the benefits that natural systems provide to
humans – whether financial, health-related or recreational – are analyzed and compared
to determine how conservation or restoration efforts should proceed. From being a
relatively obscure academic pursuit in the 1990s, ecosystem services has since grown
rapidly in environmental and conservation discourse. Voosen (2013) writes that it is now
the “defining frame of conservation science,” displacing biodiversity as the primary
metric used by conservation practitioners. Redford and Adams (2009) argue that
ecosystem services has become “the central metaphor within which to express
humanity’s need for the rest of living nature” (p. 785). By emphasizing the importance of
ecosystems to human well-being and economic output, advocates of this approach aim to
make conservation more relevant to corporations and policy-makers and make it easier
for conservation goals to be integrated into business practice. The concept has been
widely deployed in infrastructure planning – for instance, in calculating the benefits of
the natural water filtration provided by forests in the catchment area for a city’s water
supply, or the role that coastal wetlands play in mitigating the damage caused by large
storms. Increasingly this involves putting a dollar figure on the value that natural
processes provide in comparison to the alternatives – clearing the forest and building a
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water treatment plant, or destroying the wetland and building a seawall, in the previous
examples. Advocates intend to demonstrate the previously uncounted value that nature
provides to human endeavors, the so-called ‘natural capital.’ In so doing they seek to
identify ‘win-win’ scenarios where governments or businesses can save money while also
sparing natural areas from development.
The ecosystem services approach fits well with the ideas of new conservation. If
conservation in the Anthropocene does not distinguish between human and non-human
nature, then it makes sense to base conservation practice on the benefits of conservation
to people. While the ecosystem services approach forms the basis of new conservation’s
value system, the two are not reducible to one another. The ecosystem services approach
has a broader reach and is more widely accepted (though still controversial) throughout
conservation science and practice than is new conservation. Indeed, new conservation
arose in part as a way of providing some direction and philosophical coherence to a field
which was quickly adopting an ecosystem services approach without, as Redford and
Adams (2009) argue, always having a clear idea of where it would lead.
Many of the objections to new conservation are echoed in criticisms of ecosystem
services, particularly those relating to the reduction of conservation goals to economic
metrics. The principle critique of the ecosystem services approach is that it is not
effective in cases where economic and conservation imperatives do not overlap. In an
article published in Nature, biologist Douglas McCauley (2006) argues that ecosystem
services strategies “offer little guidance on how we are to protect the chunks of nature
that conflict with our interests or preserve the perhaps far more numerous pieces of nature
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that neither help nor harm us” (p. 27). Critics often point out that while ecosystem
services models work in some instances, economic and conservation imperatives often
push in opposite directions and in such cases it is usually the profit motive that wins out
(Redford & Adams, 2009; Ridder, 2008).2 While ecosystem services is often justified on
the basis that it fits into existing political-economic frameworks and can be used as a
basis for political decision-making, McCauley (2006) points out that politicians “are just
as accustomed to making decisions based on morality as on finances” (p. 28). It should
also be noted that taking an anthropocentric view of conservation does not necessarily
mean embracing ecosystem services either. Marris (2011), a key figure in popularizing
the ideas of new conservation, echoes many of the above critiques of ecosystem services
in the short section she devotes to the issue. She contends that most conservationists who
advocate for an ecosystem services approach actually believe in the intrinsic value of
biodiversity, but “see ecosystem services as a way to get it protected when the people in
charge don’t share their feelings” (p. 166). The ecosystem services concept is thus “better
conceptualized as a tool to achieve other goals rather than a goal unto itself” (p. 167), part
of the ‘menu’ of options open to conservationists to pursue once the idea of returning to a
pristine wilderness is abandoned.
Nonetheless, the ecosystem services approach has been adopted as the primary
conservation strategy by TNC, and it fits in well with the organization’s longstanding
business-friendly approach to conservation. TNC’s chairman and CEO Mark Tercek, who
joined the organization in 2008, spearheaded the increasing focus on ecosystem services
and natural capital. In the book Nature’s Fortune: How Business and Society Thrive by
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Investing in Nature (Tercek and Adams, 2013), Tercek writes of how he applied his Wall
Street career and experience as an investment banker to nature conservation:
I started asking the same questions about ecology as my MBA training
had taught me to apply to corporate finance: What is nature’s value? Who
invests in it, when and why? What rates of return can an investment in
nature produce? When is protecting nature a good investment? Isn’t
conservation really about building natural capital? (Tercek & Adams,
2013, p. xii) 3
In TNC he found what he saw as the ideal organization to pursue these objectives, writing
that “TNC reminded me of an investment bank – but one whose client was nature itself”
(p. xii). Acknowledging the unease that many environmentalists have about “putting a
value on nature,” Tercek argues that while the intrinsic values of nature are important,
there are “other, perhaps less lofty but no less important reasons” for conservation and
that “valuing nature does not mean replacing one set of compelling arguments for
conservation with another, but it provides an additional and important rationale for
supporting the environment” (p. xiii). Bringing a business perspective to conservation
allows for the role nature plays in economic activity to become more visible. Tercek
notes the complications of the word ‘nature’ and states that the human/nature dichotomy
needs to be broken down. The goal of this approach is to make businesses “realize that
conservation – protection of nature – is a central and important driver of economic
activity, every bit as important as manufacturing, finance, agriculture, and so on” (p. xiii).
Tercek, aiming for a broader audience outside the conservation community, is less
confrontational than Kareiva in his calls for a change in approach to conservation. The
primary focus of the book is the contribution of private enterprise to environmental
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protection. The book does argue, though less forthrightly than Kareiva, for a conception
of conservation with humans at the center:
The ‘Isn’t nature wonderful?’ argument can leave the impression that
nature offers solely aesthetic benefits, or worse, that nature is a luxury
only rich people or rich countries can afford. We need to get business,
government, and individuals to understand that nature is not only
wonderful, it is also economically valuable. Indeed, nature is the
fundamental underpinning to human well-being. ... Saving nature means
saving wild species and wild places, but it also means saving ourselves.
(Tercek & Adams, 2013, pp. xiv-xv)
Most of the examples and case studies Tercek presents in the book are fairly
straightforward demonstrations of the ecosystem services approach, such as restoring
oyster beds and coastal wetlands to protect cities from storms, or putting a price on
carbon emissions to better reflect their environmental impact. Underlying this is a
recognition of the need to change the way humans think about their role in the
environment, at a time when “the scale of human activities is no longer dwarfed by the
planet itself” (p. 196). Rather than view nature in only sentimental terms or as a
collection of commodities, Tercek argues that
we depend on nature in far more complex ways than we knew, and
natural capital is not inexhaustible. Conservation and business need a
more sophisticated and nuanced calculation, one based on sound financial
principles and a deeper appreciation for how nature contributes to
economic and ecological well-being. When conventional economics
leaves natural capital out of the equation, both ecosystems and the
economies built upon them are imperiled. (p. 196)
He again stresses the intrinsic values of nature protection, and suggests that these values
are crucial for the ecosystem services approach to function, arguing that “the case for
investing in nature is inspiring and optimistic” (p. 197). He also writes that we are
entering “an age of care, or stewardship” where humans must play an active role in
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shaping the environment, responsible for creating and maintaining the “vibrant and lifesustaining” (p. 198) natures on which we depend.

Pristine nature in TNC’s public campaigns
Where Tercek’s book moderates the more radical-sounding elements of new
conservation, TNC’s outreach and publicity materials present an even more confused
picture. If the idea of a human-centered conservation in a world where pristine nature
does not exist spurs such controversy and ill-feeling amongst conservation professionals,
the reaction of the broader public is likely to be similarly contentious. An organization
like TNC can ill-afford to alienate its supporters. As the biggest environmental nonprofit
in the United States, it relies heavily on financial support from a large number of
individual contributors. Over half of TNC’s revenue in 2015 came from dues and
contributions, with 46% of this – over a quarter of a billion dollars – coming from
individual donations and bequests (TNC, 2016a). A further 12%, or $65 million, comes
from corporate donors, with most of the remainder from foundations. In presenting itself
to the public, particularly its donors or those inclined to donate, TNC obviously has to
communicate a message and a vision of conservation which resonates – and which
motivates people to give money. The idea of saving natural spaces or endangered species
has a powerful resonance with a lot of people. This is especially so in contrast to the
language of new conservation and its emphasis on humans and hybrid natures, and the
economistic cost-benefit analyses of ecosystem services. It should be no surprise then
that discourses of ‘old conservation,’ the protection of wild places from human
interference, should still be present in TNC’s efforts to reach the public.
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It is useful to distinguish between two main forms of public communication
disseminated by TNC. One is the marketing and promotional material, which has the
principal goal of encouraging people to donate to the organization. This includes TNC’s
advertisements, emails to members, and the main pages of its website. The other mode of
communication is more informational, describing the Conservancy’s work and
operations. This includes the deeper sections of the website, blog postings written by
TNC’s leadership and scientists, and the organization’s membership magazine. While
still serving the purpose of promoting TNC and encouraging donations, these
communication activities present a less visible account of the organization’s activities but
one that is more reflective of their actual work.
The marketing and promotional material TNC uses to solicit donations draws
heavily on ideas of pristine nature and untouched wilderness. The organization uses the
slogan “Protecting Nature. Preserving Life.” While vague enough that it can be applied to
a variety of conservation activities, the use of the words ‘protecting’ and ‘preserving’
imply a fragile and vulnerable nature which is to be kept in its original state. This
becomes more apparent when examining the text and imagery in TNC’s marketing. An
internet advertising campaign from 2015, created by ad agency True North, features the
tagline “There is no second Nature. $50 can help save the only one we’ve got” and a
large button with the words “DONATE NOW.” The images in two of the ads feature
scenes of nature; one of forested hills shrouded in mist, the other a low-angle photograph
of a grizzly bear walking through a forest. A third advertisement has an image of a
monkey in a tree with its arm caught in a plastic six-pack holder. The ads present a view
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of nature as a single, unified entity under threat from human destruction. Emphasized is
the fragility of nature and the possibility of its disappearance – nature degraded as a result
of human influence ceases to be ‘nature’ anymore, and once lost it cannot be replaced.
This is in contrast to the discourse of new conservation which, although stressing the
importance of healthy ecosystems, dispenses with the notion of a pristine, fragile nature
which must be kept separate from human activities. New conservation instead promotes a
vision of natures plural, of adaptable and resilient ecosystems which are no less worthy
because they exist as a result of human influence.
The idea of protecting pristine nature from destruction by humans is seen in most
of TNC’s communication materials where the aim is primarily to solicit donations. The
home page of the organization’s website states their mission: “Conserving the lands and
waters on which all life depends” and that “Every acre we protect, every river mile
restored, every species brought back from the brink, begins with you” (TNC, 2016b); the
latter phrase being repeated on the site’s main donation page. Though broad enough to be
interpreted in line with new conservation, the emphasis again is on protecting nature
under threat. For people unaware of new conservation thinking, such statements do little
to change the perception that conservation is still about, as Kareiva and Marvier (2007)
derisively put it, “clinging to a vision of pristine wilderness” (p. 55). A similar
perspective is evident in TNC’s fundraising emails which get sent to members two to
three times per week. These messages frequently emphasize the vulnerability of
threatened ecosystems and the necessity of acting quickly to preserve them. A series of
five emails in June 2015 called for urgent action to protect and restore Appalachian
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Spruce forests. Under the banner heading “Help Restore Shattered Landscapes,” the
emails talk of how humans “destroyed this iconic landscape” and the need to “bring back
forests like this to their former majesty” (TNC, email, June 23, 2015). There is no
mention of the societal benefits of the forest or the ecosystem services it provides, with
the focus on restoring the landscape to its state before humans intervened. The aesthetic
beauty of forest is a major theme, along with its innocence which is derived from its
separation from humans. Another email stresses the vulnerability of forest creatures while
also again drawing on aesthetic appeals:
Your gift will help animals like hares, black bears and flying squirrels, as
well as the saw-whet owl – one of the cutest creatures you've ever seen.
About seven inches long, with a reddish-brown back, a white belly, they
even remind some people of kittens. (TNC, email, June 27, 2015)
There is no question of the ‘how’ of nature conservation; the course of action is always
self-evident. Nature is either an unspoiled wilderness apart from human intervention, or a
degraded landscape in which case the role of humans is to restore it to its former, pristine
state.
These fundraising messages emphasizing the fragility of unspoiled wilderness are
not necessarily a misrepresentation of TNC’s activities. The organization does conduct a
large amount of ecosystem restoration work. As Voosen (2012) indicates, there has been
some internal skepticism within TNC about Kareiva’s philosophy and the overall
direction of the organization. Protecting and restoring natural habitats – however defined
– is an important part of TNC’s work and is not something that new conservationists
would be against. Clearly, though, there is a disjuncture between how TNC’s leadership
talks about conservation and how the organization represents itself to its donors. What is
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mostly as stake here is the discourse, the assumed relationships between humans and the
natural world in TNC’s communications. This is not to say that it is only the way TNC
talks about conservation which is disputed; much of the conservation work discussed by
Tercek in his book and by Kareiva and others deeper in TNC’s website fit squarely in the
new conservation paradigm – but this work is not mentioned in fundraising campaigns.
When soliciting donations, TNC selects certain aspects of their operations, for the most
part those to do with ecosystem restoration, and represents them in a certain way,
emphasizing the beauty and fragility of nature and its separation from humans.
There have been some attempts by TNC to change the discourse in its outreach
and fundraising to reflect the ideas of new conservation and ecosystem services. As
described above, Tercek’s book and associated publicity strongly pushed the idea of
ecosystem services and integrating conservation into corporate practice. While still
paying homage to the intrinsic values of nature, Tercek advocated for a vision which put
the material (usually monetary) values of nature at the center – and which in so doing
highlighted the interconnections and interdependency of humans and nature rather than
their separation. TNC has engaged in other outreach efforts which move away from the
traditional conservation approach.
TNC’s Massachusetts office commissioned a series of advertisements, along with
a website, on the theme of ‘The Future of Nature.’ The advertisements, created by
Portland, ME advertising agency Kemp Goldberg, were displayed in outdoor and public
transit locations in Boston in 2013, and well as in Boston editions of high-end national
magazines. According to TNC’s then-New England Marketing Director, the campaign
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was intended to “address the false choice between human wellbeing and conservation,
and insist that we can have healthy people and healthy nature” (Fitzpatrick, 2014). The
ads ask “What is the #futureofnature?” and present two options seemingly in opposition –
People or Wildlife, Loggers or Forests, Fishermen or Fish, Ecology or Economy. Each
option has an empty check-box and is overlaid on an image representing it. The ads then
invite people to “talk about it at futureofnature.org”.4 The website presents the same
images on a rotating display, but each pairing is accompanied by a short paragraph
discussing how both options are essential. For example, the Loggers/Forests image states
that
We all need healthy forests, for the water they filter, the carbon they store
and more. That's why The Nature Conservancy protects wild forests. We
also support sustainable forestry that provides jobs, useful products and
the revenues that can help landowners keep forests as forests. Your
support helps us keep forests healthy and productive for wildlife and
people from Maine to the ancient forests of Chile. (TNC, 2016c)
The passage contains hyperlinks (indicated by underlined words) to other parts of the
TNC website showing examples of the organization’s work in these areas. A section
under the heading “Explore Solutions With Us” further reinforces the idea that human
welfare and nature protection should not be seen as separate. It states that “too often, we
put ourselves in the position of making choices between a healthy economy and a healthy
natural world” and that “when people remember that nature is all around us, and that we
are part of it, we can let go of polarized thinking and find solutions that work” (TNC,
2016c). Though an initiative of TNC’s Massachusetts office and limited to this region,
the campaign represents an innovative effort to encourage people to think differently
about the meaning of conservation. By stressing the importance of protecting threatened
232

lands and species while also highlighting the linkages between these natural systems and
human society, the campaign is attempting to gently introduce ideas of new conservation
to a public which may be skeptical.
In early 2015, American public television broadcaster PBS screened a five-part
nature documentary series entitled Earth: A New Wild. The series is hosted by former
TNC lead scientist M. Sanjayan, and TNC’s work is featured in several episodes
(Sanjayan, 2015). The show’s stated aim is “to explore how humans are inextricably
woven into every aspect of the planet’s natural systems,” and present human-nature
interactions in a new way:
Sanjayan reveals that co-habitations with animals can work – and be
mutually beneficial. ... Distinguishing itself from nearly all other nature
films, however, the series turns the cameras around, showing the world as
it really is – with humans in the picture. (PBS, 2015)
TNC played an active role in promoting the show, creating a microsite within their
website under the name ‘A New Hope for a New Wild.’ The site is organized into
sections corresponding to the themes of the show’s episode – Plains, Oceans, Forests,
Water, and Our Home. Each section contains stories of how TNC’s work helps both
human and non-human communities thrive together. The Plains section, for instance,
talks about them as “a place where these fragile landscapes work because we are a part of
them” and uses the example of how cattle ranching in the American West can help
restore prairies (TNC, 2015b). The site (and the show) is deliberately crafted to present a
positive, uplifting message. An email to supporters about the site states that “we want to
share the optimism that we have for our future, and tell our stories in a new way” (TNC,
email, January 2, 2015). According to digital design firm Viget, which created the site,
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TNC “strived to tell a new narrative, with a more positive outlook on conservation and
the future of the earth to contrast the negative messages often associated with the state of
conservation” (Viget, 2015). As well as showcasing TNC’s work, the site also contains a
substantial amount of user-generated content, allowing visitors to share their own stories
about how they are “co-existing with nature in a positive way” (Viget, 2015) and a photo
competition where people could submit images encapsulating the idea of the ‘new wild’
where “people and nature flourish together” (TNC, email, January 2, 2015).
As with the Future of Nature campaign, the New Wild site (and the documentary
series with which is it associated) is intended to shift common perceptions of what
conservation is and does. The image-heavy site is overwhelmingly dominated by natural
landscapes, most of which also include people or human structures: a young boy on
horseback on a vast Mongolian steppe; a scientist in a small boat taking samples above a
coral reef. The aesthetic beauty and inherent value of nature are emphasized, but the
active role of humans in managing and caring for nature is the primary focus. For the
most part the site does not talk directly in terms of natural capital or ecosystem services,
or the ways nature can be of direct material value to humans. There are oblique
references to how humans and nature can “live and thrive together” (TNC, 2015c) or that
“it’s just as valuable to protect nature for people as it is to protect it for its intrinsic
beauty” (TNC, 2015d).
The site was intended, according to its designers, as “the hub for TNC and user
stories alike that tell positive anecdotes of man and nature thriving together” (Viget,
2015). There is a facility for people to submit their own stories about how they are
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“keeping hope alive” in the new wild. These are all tweet-length (144 characters) and
relegated to a single page, which was removed in May 2015, while the stories which
showcase TNC’s own work are by far the main focus. The one visible source of usergenerated content on the New Wild site is a photo competition, in which people are
encouraged to submit their “best images of our human connection to nature” (TNC,
2016d). The overwhelming majority of images featured on the site are shots of wildlife or
scenic landscapes, with no people or human structures visible. Most of the few images
which do include people are in the context of outdoor recreation – kayakers on a scenic
river, a hiker standing under a waterfall. While the entry guidelines for the competition
are fairly broad, the difference between the user-submitted photos and the images used by
TNC to illustrate the concept of the New Wild is an indication that TNC’s audience
primarily appreciates nature for its separation from the human world, an unspoiled place
to experience in contrast to civilization.
Obtaining an accurate picture of the views of TNC’s supporters and donors is
obviously not possible. The fact that TNC, which spend almost $65 million on
fundraising in 2015 (TNC, 2016a), almost exclusively draws on a discourse of a pristine
nature when soliciting donations suggests that such a message resonates most clearly with
their target audience. This is not surprising given that this discourse has long been
dominant within the conservation movement and the jarring shift that the ‘humans first’
ethos of new conservation appears to represent.
This conflict is occasionally made visible. In 2011 TNC’s members’ magazine
(called Nature Conservancy) published a profile of Kareiva entitled ‘Beyond Man vs
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Nature’ (Dunkel, 2011). While including plenty of praise for his efforts and approach, the
article emphasizes Kareiva’s “heretical” views and the controversy he has created in the
conservation field. The article opens with Kareiva’s admission that
he’s “not a biodiversity guy.” That’s right. The ecologist who leads some
500 scientists at the worldwide organization whose mission statement
extols safeguarding “the diversity of life on Earth” does not believe
species preservation should be Job One. What deserves higher billing?
“The ultimate goal,” Kareiva says, “is better management of nature for
human benefit.” (Dunkel, 2011)
A link to the article was posted on TNC’s Facebook page, and appears to have provoked
a strong reaction amongst some Conservancy supporters. Of the sixty-six comments
posted in response to the link, thirty-three are negative while only seven express some
degree of support for Kareiva and his ideas (TNC, 2011a). A number of people comment
that the values of the conservancy no longer match their own, and several threaten to
withdraw their support. One writes that “if my beliefs about environment no longer match
the goals of TNC I suppose I will stop donating my money” (Hohne, 2011), while
another states that “If this is now the thinking of the Conservancy, you can count me as
an ardent opponent” (Sitler, 2011). The most prominent objection commenters have is to
Kareiva’s assertion that human needs should come before those of other species, with
several chiding the “arrogance” of this worldview and stating that the needs of humans
and other species should be regarded equally: “we animals are all in this existence
together” (Noon, 2011); “animals have a right to the earth as much as we do” (Nicholson,
2011). Such views are only representative of people who took the time to comment. That
said, the negative reaction was noticed and a TNC staffer posted in the comment thread
seeking to reassure people about the organization’s evolution: “we do speak out more
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forcefully now about the need to take people into account. But we still save a lot of
nature” (TNC, 2011b).

Conclusion
Clearly there are inconsistencies in how TNC talks about its operations and nature
conservation more generally in different venues. This can result in conflict when these
inconsistent approaches come into contact with one another, particularly when the
differences are addressed as bluntly as Kareiva does. Somewhat ironically, one of the
reasons Kareiva cites for a human-centered approach to conservation is that it will reach
new audiences and get more people involved in TNC’s work. Dunkel (2011) summarizes
Kareiva’s view that the conservation movement is “certain to conk out if we keep talking
about biodiversity, says the guy who shuns the word. So Kareiva will keep preaching
people: conservation of the people, by the people, for the people.” The risk, of course, is
that this approach drives away the Conservancy’s existing supporters who see an
organization which no longer reflects their values. This is obviously recognized by
TNC’s marketing staff who for the most part continue to emphasize saving fragile nature,
particularly when soliciting donations. Attempts by TNC to reconcile the competing
positions, or at least talk about human wellbeing alongside nature preservation, are more
subtle and cautious than Kareiva’s pronouncements but the organization is making some
steps towards trying to shift people’s thinking.
Although the contrast between the versions of conservation can appear jarring,
particularly when the differences are presented in such a stark and provocative manner as
Kareiva does, there is a certain amount of overlap between new conservation and the idea
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of traditional conservation practice as it is articulated by TNC in their marketing
materials. This is primarily seen in the concept of stewardship. Though originating in
Christian discourse, the idea of stewardship has been widely applied in both religious and
secular approaches to environmentalism. It centers on the notion that nature should be
cared for and looked after by humans, its resources able to be used for human needs but
with this a responsibility that it be left in a viable state for future generations (Palmer,
1992). TNC’s founding ethic was out of a concern to protect land from development and
destruction, and preserve natural ecosystems for future generations. The idea of
responsible stewardship is evident in most of the organization’s fundraising appeals. The
subject line of one of the spruce forest restoration emails discussed above states that
“This is Our Responsibility Now” and that “the future of degraded landscapes like these
is up to you” (TNC, email, June 6, 2015). Humans, in this view, have a duty of care, to
look after nature and to restore landscapes we have damaged back to their ‘original’ prehuman state.
The new conservation approach also views humans as responsible for nature, but
the major difference with earlier approaches is that there is no pre-existing benchmark to
which nature must be restored. Tercek sums up his book stating that we are entering
an age of care, of stewardship. As stewards of the land have long known,
with care even badly damaged places can be renewed, perhaps not as
exact replicas of what they were, but vibrant and life-sustaining
nonetheless. (Tercek & Adams, 2013, p. 198)
Dunkel (2011), paraphrasing Kareiva’s position in Nature Conservancy magazine, writes
that focusing on the benefits nature provides people will make us “better stewards of
nature in the long run.” Traditional stewardship presumes that humans are taking care of
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the environment on behalf of a higher power, whether it be God or ideas of a balanced
and unified nature which is separate from the human world and cannot tolerate any
disruption. New conservation, while keeping the idea of care and responsibility for
nature, removes the notion of our actions being subservient to a higher law – indeed, “we
are as Gods, and we might as well get good at it” (Brand, 1968).
This is not the radical break it might seem. As Palmer (1992) points out in her
critique of the concept of stewardship, as it loses its overtly religious connotations in
environmental discourse, it becomes less clear on behalf of whom humans are acting as
stewards:
stewardship often seems to be used in political discourse without
anything corresponding to a ‘master.’ ... ‘steward and ‘master’ may
become telescoped into one, and when spoken of, stewardship actually
means a form of mastery, in that we decide when the rest of the natural
world should be used, and for what. (p. 84)
The claim of new conservation to reorient conservation work around human priorities is
more of an evolution of prior trends than a departure. While the romantic and aesthetic
aspects of conservation remain prominent particularly in public-facing discourse, TNC’s
history shows a steady progression towards an increasingly anthropocentric conservation.
Palmer notes that stewardship is most often described in financial terms; the “idea of
resources, which we must use carefully, look after as if for someone else, encourage to
grow” (p. 72). TNC’s embrace of biodiversity as a key conservation metric allowed for
nature to be viewed as a collection of resources, and this paved the way for the
emergence of the ecosystem services approach and the valuing of nature according to its
benefits to humans. Institutionally, TNC’s moves from simply buying up land to an
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ecoregional conservation strategy meant recognizing the role that humans play within
ecosystems. The organization’s non-confrontational strategy of working closely with
corporations also lent itself to valuing nature for human purposes.
Despite these shifts in TNC’s approach, the ways in which the organization
communicated about conservation continued to draw extensively on the discourse of
pristine, unspoiled nature. This understanding of how conservation should work, that
nature needs to be protected from human influence, remained as pervasive amongst
conservation professionals as it did with the public more broadly. The debates which
erupted over new conservation reveal how conservation practice had become increasingly
disconnected from the ideas that conservationists commonly used to justify their work.
This was exacerbated by a number of broader trends: the emergence of climate change as
a dominant environmental issue, the rise of the idea of the Anthropocene and the growing
recognition that returning nature to a pre-human state is impractical if not impossible.
The aim of the new conservationists is in part to reorient the field with a new outlook to
better align it with these changes and with changes in conservation practice often not
reflected in conservation discourse; their grenade-throwing a deliberate effort to provoke
debate and reflection. Amos (2014) quotes Kareiva’s co-author Michelle Marvier: “You
don’t have innovation and real change when everybody’s saying, Hey we’re doing such a
great job.”
Nonetheless, despite claims that it is based on science, the new conservationist
discourse does entail political commitments which go beyond simply recognizing
humankind’s inescapable impact on the planet. While debates over the reasons for
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conserving nature go back at least to the early 1900s, the field has historically defined
itself in opposition to forces of development and profit-seeking. Much of the resistance to
new conservation arises from a concern that adopting the rhetoric of anthropocentrism
and defining conservation work in terms of what it provides to humans will erode hardwon gains. The continued advocacy by conservationists for the intrinsic values of nature
can be seen as strategic as much as it is ideological. As several participants in the debates
point out, many of the approaches advocated by new conservationists are already used in
conservation work, and there were repeated calls for the need for a diversity of
approaches in achieving conservation goals. But by publicly standing up for the intrinsic
value of nature, conservation advocates are making claims for the continued relevance of
their field against the relentless advance of economic efficiency and market-driven
growth which necessitated the emergence of nature conservation in the first place. The
financialized language of ecosystem services and the emphasis put by Kareiva on
working with rather than against corporations risks, in this view, subsuming the efforts of
conservationists under the logic of markets and corporate practices.
The need for new political formations to better account for the influence of
humans over planetary processes and non-human ecosystems is not unique to new
conservation. Indeed, this commitment is also shared by both 350’s climate activists and
the Breakthrough’s ecomodernists. There are, though, key differences in how new
conservation sets out to achieve this. Unlike ecomodernism, which reinscribes the
boundary between humans and nature, new conservation recognizes the attachments and
entanglements and encourages political uptake of the complex interdependencies in the
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Anthropocene. And unlike the climate activists, who seek to minimize the influence of
corporations in environmental subpolitics, new conservation acknowledges the immense
power of corporate actors in shaping the state of the planet but instead pushes them to do
better through working within existing political-economic structures.
The idea of choice is key to the new conservationist approach – choosing a future
for people and nature in line with a particular set of values. If this means choosing to let
certain species go extinct or habitats get destroyed, this is better, goes the argument, than
letting it happen by default. The magnitude of human impacts on the planet is such that
such outcomes are inevitable, but bringing nature into politics (writ broad) at least allows
some control over them. How to decide which bits of nature are worth saving is a
question of values, and the approach of new conservation to making such decisions – to
value what is best for human needs, according to the ecosystem services provided –
comes with certain priorities and assumptions about social organization. That TNC is at
the center of this movement is not surprising given their long history of working with
corporations and taking a non-confrontational, market-based approach to conservation.
Still, the tensions and debates both within and outside of the organization show the extent
to which the idea of a wild, non-human nature still has a hold on people’s imagination
and can evoke a powerful response. For those like Soulé (2013), acknowledging human
impacts in the Anthropocene should drive us to protecting what little we have not yet
destroyed instead of viewing nature as a side effect of improving human wellbeing.
Despite the calls for a diversity of approaches to conservation, these tensions are unlikely
to be resolved so easily especially given the power dynamics involved. A strong human242

centered conservation movement and widespread adoption of ecosystem services by
corporations would have many benefits, both for humans and (certain) other species. But
much would be lost if the representatives of nature in the politics of the Anthropocene
speak only with a human voice.

1

Pimm’s remarks were made in a book review in the journal Biological Conservation.
The journal’s editors later apologized for the “inappropriate language” (Primack &
Broerse, 2014, p. 288), while Pimm himself was entirely unrepentant (Ferguson, 2014;
Nijhuis, 2014).
2

McCauley (2006) also makes what amounts to an ecomodernist argument against
ecosystem services, writing that “conservation based on ecosystem services commits the
folly of betting against human ingenuity” (p. 28). Human technological innovation will
often produce cheaper or more efficient means of providing the services once obtained
from nature, which can reduce society’s overall ecological impact – “decoupling” in
ecomodernist terms. This marks one of the key splits between ecomodernist and new
conservation approaches, which otherwise appear similar. Ecomodernism promotes a
separation of humans from nature, while new conservation sees humans and nature as
inextricably intertwined (see Sagoff, 2015 and Chapter 5).
3

Although co-authored with environmental writer Jonathan Adams, the book is written in
the first person from Tercek’s point-of-view.
4

The futureofnature.org domain is no longer active, but as of 2016 the site remains
online at http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/
massachusetts/future-of-nature.xml
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion

I am weary of the old and tiresome and banal question “Why save the
wilderness?” The important and difficult question is “How? How save
the wilderness?” (Abbey, 2006, p. 93)

The three case studies discussed here represent different approaches to
conceptualizing and addressing the same problem: in a world where human actions play a
decisive role in shaping the physical environment of the planet, how do we create a
politics which can channel these impacts into constructing a viable future? The globalscale environmental crises that threaten to cause so much disruption, climate change and
its associated impacts principal among them, are an outcome of human society; mostly
Western industrial society. They are the unexpected outcomes, the externalities, of the
political and economic systems which spawned them. These systems were not designed
with such externalities in mind, and as such they are unable to incorporate and address
them when they arise. The processes that result in climate change are distributed
throughout society, the results of uncountable actions in the everyday lives of millions of
people across the globe – often unaware of their impacts and unable to make any
meaningful change even if they are.
Subpolitical processes, the private actions which have together have enormous
public implications, are for the most part not subject to the direct control of democratic
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political institutions. They are nonetheless influenced by broader cultural currents, and it
is here that advocacy groups who recognize the challenge of the Anthropocene seek a
place to intervene. This is not only about how people communicate about the
environment, the words and symbols used to define the world around us and our place
within it. Rather, it is the constitutive function of discourse which is at issue; the
interaction of communicative acts and power structures, the ways in which the actions
that result in climate change are reinscribed discursively, which campaigners seek to
disrupt. Important here is the process of boundary-making: defining or redefining who
and what is included and excluded from political concern, and calling into question the
established cultural categories of nature and society. The Anthropocene is often depicted
as humans taking control of natural processes and systems. What this means is that these
natural processes and systems have to be integrated into human social organization, as
nature-society boundaries are broken down and redefined. Establishing control over these
social processes thus becomes equally important. One way or another, human actions are
shaping the future of the entire planet, at present largely by forces outside of any form of
deliberate oversight or control. The challenge for climate change campaigners is in
articulating how to make these choices, in order to gain the ability to more consciously
construct a future for the planet and its inhabitants.
This dissertation sought to understand these processes through answering two
broad research questions. Firstly, what is the contribution of advocacy groups to public
discourse on climate change and politics in the Anthropocene? Secondly, what are the
implications of these different discursive formations – not only for how humans relate to
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the natural world, but the extent to which they challenge or support social structures
bound up in these relationships and alter the power dynamics of who gets a say in
deciding the future of the planet?
Each of the three organizations analyzed here approached the problem in a
different way, and with differing implications for the democratic governance of planetary
impacts. As risks are inseparable from their representations, the ways in which
environmental risks are defined, represented and circulated has implications beyond each
organization’s messaging or tactics. The risk definitions which become hegemonic in
particular spheres affect individual and institutional responses to perceived crises. The
discourses advanced in the three case studies have very different implications and
potential material impacts. In an age where human actions are inextricably tied to
biophysical processes, risk discourses form an integral part of an ongoing feedback loop
between human impacts on the environment and their effects.
The critical discourse analysis of organizational material and news media
coverage allows for the political commitments of the three approaches to be interrogated,
and their relationships to political and economic power structures to be traced. The
analysis drew from a wide range of sources, including three books by key figures
associated with the organizations; campaign and publicity material including their
websites, 59 blog postings and articles, and 100 emails to members; and news media
coverage including 188 newspaper and magazine reports and op-eds (see Chapter 3). The
following sections recapitulate the key findings from the three chapters, and then evaluate
them according to the comparative benchmarks identified in chapter 3: their
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conceptualization of nature-society boundaries, their attitudes towards dominant sociopolitical institutions, the contextual level at which climate change is presented and
attribution of systemic or individual responsibility, and the role of the public in
addressing environmental issues and building a common future.

Summary of case studies
For the climate activists of 350 (Chapter 4), direct intervention in subpolitical
economic processes is their major aim. The organization sees climate change not as the
inevitable outcome of modernity but as arising from an economic and social system
designed to benefit particular interests at the expense of others. Their social justicecentered approach emphasizes the need to change these structural incentives; otherwise
the same inequalities will be reproduced in any responses to climate change. The Fossil
Free divestment campaign identified an important example of the type of systemic issue
that contributes to climate change and yet remains largely free from oversight or
accountability: that large institutional investors such as university endowments and
pension funds help finance fossil fuel extraction through their investments in extractive
industries. Positioning fossil fuel companies as the primary enemy of the campaign
serves an important strategic function in that it not only provides a target to be defeated,
but also illustrates the lack of democratic influence over the corporate practices that have
a huge impact on the public.
So while the divestment campaign is ostensibly about economic issues, this is a
means towards broader political transformation, with the contention that economic
structures and institutions should be responsive to public concerns. This accounts for the
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heavy emphasis on the moral dimensions of climate change by the campaign. The major
moral transgression that the divestment activists highlight is not the direct impacts of
climate change or humanity’s collective environmental sins, but the influence of
corporate power over democratic processes. This is seen through their efforts to remove
the ‘social license’ of fossil fuel companies so as to exclude them from the political
process. The campaign thus deploys a politicized morality, where the moral urgency is
linked to political change and the debate is about competing visions of social
organization – a choice between the current system where unaccountable corporate power
shapes the future of the planet, or an alternative where such decisions are made in a more
democratic fashion. Changing these structures of governance and control are 350’s
fundamental political goals, hence why the campaign does not define itself in terms of
specific policy outcomes such as passing a carbon tax. The process of movementbuilding is often positioned as an end in itself by the campaigners, creating a force that
can challenge the subpolitical power of corporations through collective mobilization.
Legislative action is seen as important, but the campaign first seeks to change the
structural conditions within which this takes place so as to make it more responsive to
citizen demands. Climate legislation would thus be an outcome of a broader push towards
creating a new politics. Divestment as a tactic has a number of advantages for this type of
campaign: it allows for the mobilization of citizens at a local level across the country, in a
way that lobbying Congress directly does not, and the hundreds of separate campaigns
targeting different institutions allow for victories to be claimed and give the broader
movement a sense of momentum.
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The Breakthrough Institute (BTI; Chapter 5) is also attempting to redraw political
boundaries to encompass human impacts in the Anthropocene, though as a think-tank
they are less concerned with achieving direct political change. The organization and its
leaders, Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, seek to change the discourse around
environmental issues amongst policy-makers and thought leaders. Their approach is
characterized by an enthusiastic embrace of the Anthropocene, with a positive view of the
potential for human innovation and technology to create a better future. From their initial
rise to prominence following the publication of The Death of Environmentalism in 2004
up to the release of An Ecomodernist Manifesto in 2015, the BTI have positioned
themselves in opposition to what they view as the mainstream of environmentalism.
Casting themselves as a more hopeful, pragmatic and realistic alternative, the BTI has
launched attacks on environmentalists: as hypocrites who denounce modern technology
as anti-environmental and seek to deny it to poor countries, while at the same time
benefiting from it personally. This approach strengthens their organizational identity and
helps gain media attention, and broadens their appeal to an audience who may be
skeptical of associating with environmental groups while still concerned about climate
change. This also highlights one of their central contentions which has been a feature of
their output over the organization’s lifetime: that climate change and other global-scale
environmental crises are conceptually different to other issues with which the
environmental movement is concerned, and should be treated differently. Rather than
seeking to minimize human impact on the environment, the ecomodernism welcomes
humans’ role as the dominant force on the planet and argues that we should maximize our
249

potential to shape it into the world we wish to live in. While initially erasing any
distinction between humans and nature, more recent work has sought to recreate these
boundaries, with the argument that dependence on technology and innovation can fulfill
the modernist promise of a separation from the natural world.
The BTI’s reinstatement of the human-nature boundary, together with the
emphasis on technology over politics, has large implications for democratic governance
in the Anthropocene. Technology is not politically neutral, and there is a risk that existing
inequalities will be replicated if broader social structures are not on the ecomodernist
agenda for change. Most of the specific proposals put forward by the BTI and its allies
call for a continuation of the existing trends and processes which come with
modernization, such as agricultural intensification, urbanization, and resource use
efficiency. Along with its compatibility with existing institutional formations and
capitalist economic structures, an ecomodernist future threatens to recreate the system
that resulted in environmental destruction in the first place. Nonetheless, through their
various interventions into public debates over environmental issues, the ecomodernists do
force other actors to reconsider their assumptions and beliefs.
If the Anthropocene forces a reconceptualization of the boundary between
humans and nature, this clearly has significant implications for groups whose mission is
to protect nature from the threat of human development. The Nature Conservancy (TNC;
Chapter 6), as one of the oldest, largest and most establishment-oriented conservation
organizations may seem an unlikely candidate to lead a revolution in conservation theory
and practice. Yet over the last several years, TNC has been at the center of often
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acrimonious debates over the goals of the conservation movement. Led primarily by
TNC’s chief scientist Peter Kareiva with the support of CEO Mark Tercek, the ‘new
conservation’ promoted by the organization upends traditional approaches to
conservation. It argues that in a world where a pristine, untouched wilderness cannot be
said to exist, the goals of conservationists should be to manage nature in line with the
best outcomes for humans. Despite seemingly being in opposition to the rest of the
conservation movement, this approach is the culmination of several trends that were
already well-established within conservation. The idea of ecosystem services, which
quantifies the value that natural systems provide to humans, is increasingly used by
conservationists to build support for habitat protection amongst policymakers and
businesses. And the increasing recognition of the pervasive impact of humans throughout
the biosphere, and with it the growing discourse of the Anthropocene, had led to debates
over what the ultimate goals of conservation should be. The advocates of new
conservation, arguing that these trends were incompatible with old ideas of nature
conservation, extended them into creating a new framework for conservation practice.
As with the BTI, the confrontational tone of new conservationist writing was
intended to provoke debate and critical reflection. Still, the vitriolic backlash it sparked –
and the reluctance of TNC to incorporate these ideas into its own marketing and
fundraising materials – suggests the discursive power that ideas of nature and wilderness
still hold. Conservationists traditionally positioned themselves as a bulwark against the
continued expansion of human impacts on the non-human world; to suggest that nature
and society are now one and that nature should be entirely at the service of humans seems
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to many in the conservation movement less like progress than surrender. There are
political implications to the new conservation agenda, and the embrace of ecosystem
services and desire to work with corporations in advancing conservation goals risks
making the field subordinate to a market-based discourse where corporate interests
become decisive in conservation practice.

Comparisons across cases
The nature-society binary
The Anthropocene brings with it a destabilization of the boundaries between the
categories of society and nature. Beyond the dependence of humans on the environment,
or the impacts of human actions on ecosystems, the Anthropocene necessitates a
recognition of the interconnectedness of the two. Earlier discourses of human-nature
relationships remain prevalent and retain influence amongst the three organizations’
publics, and they adopt various strategies in defining their approach in line with or in
opposition to prior conceptualizations. In all three cases, the increasing entanglements
between the human and natural worlds are part of the organizations’ guiding
philosophies, though this manifests in different ways. The fossil fuel divestment activists
try to avoid any talk of nature in their campaigning. The major moral transgression
identified by the campaigners is fossil fuel companies’ influence on politics. The impacts
of climate change, when mentioned, are put in terms of its effects on humans. The
campaign resists associations with traditional environmentalist concerns. The branding
guidelines prohibit the use of the color green (the campaign’s official colors are blue and
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orange) (350.org, 2014b). And while Fossil Free, and parent organization 350, forms
alliances with other environmental groups, they also active in working with social justice
organizations and unions, and linking the campaign to fights to overturn racial, economic
and gender inequalities. Still, through their actions, the divestment campaigners seek a
reconfigured politics in which human impacts on the environment are taken into account;
their major focus is on the human institutions which can bring about these changes.
Founder Bill McKibben’s writing more directly acknowledges the entanglements
between human society and the non-human world. His book The End of Nature (1989)
was among the first to articulate what we now call the Anthropocene, and his 2010 book
Eaarth is named for the ‘new’ planet humans have created.
Despite the acknowledgement of the erosion of human-nature boundaries, the
position expressed by McKibben and the climate activists more broadly tend to see this in
a negative light. This view is closest to the ‘fall’ narrative of mainstream
environmentalism (Latour, 2012), in which human impacts on nature are to be avoided to
the greatest extent possible. McKibben (2010), for example, calls for a retreat from
globalism towards more locally-based economies and a reduced dependence on
technology. While setting itself apart from traditional environmentalism, the climate
activist movement holds on to the idea of an essential nature which is – or should be –
separate from human concerns. Not often stated explicitly, it is assumed that any actions
humans take in the biosphere should be in the service of restoring it to what it was before
it was altered by human civilization. This is evident in the name of the organization 350,
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which aims to reduce the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to something
approaching pre-industrial levels.
The Breakthrough Institute, as noted above, has had shifting ideas about humannature relationships. However, their approach is always based on the idea that humans
should embrace their dominance over planetary systems, with the key question of
determining how to best channel our impacts. This recognition of humans’ role, along
with the BTI’s desire to distance themselves from the mainstream of environmentalism,
is at a broad level shared with 350, although they take it in very different directions.
These broad commonalities resulted in collaborations early in the history of both
organizations, though as discussed in Chapter 5 the tensions soon became evident. The
BTI’s shift back towards emphasizing the intrinsic values of nature (though within an
anthropocentric worldview) may have a strategic aspect to it. As TNC’s example shows,
such values remain popular with the public. The organization uses ideas of pristine,
untouched wilderness even as key players insist that such a concept has outlived its
usefulness and is irrelevant to contemporary conservation concerns.
All three case studies show in different ways the tensions inherent in the concept
of nature in the Anthropocene. Though humans dominate the planet and it is conceptually
impossible to separate a non-human natural world from human society, the idea of nature
remains popular – and discursively powerful. There is a long history in conservation and
environmental discourse of the idea of protecting nature from humans, from 19th century
romanticism through the writings of Thoreau, Muir, Abbey and up to Bill McKibben, as
well as through the work of organizations like the Sierra Club and TNC. The idea has
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been a driver of much conservation and environmentalism, and though the latter
especially focused on harms to humans as well as the natural world, the idea that such
efforts are working in the service of something bigger than mere human concerns has
been and remains important.
The human-nature split is largely a creation of Western modernity, as Latour
(1993) shows, and even if it had no basis in fact could still be treated as such. Modern
risks in the Anthropocene render this untenable, as we have seen. But this does not mean
the concept of nature can, or should, be abandoned; it just has to be renegotiated in light
of current circumstances. This is not easy, of course, and TNC has seen the pushback that
happens when they try this both from the public and the conservation community. The
BTI’s emphasis on preserving nature likely comes from a similar impulse. Nature, as
Latour (2015) notes, can serve to shortcut the political process by establishing a power
beyond the reach of human institutions. However, removing nature from the equation and
saying that all actions should be for the benefit of humans often means supporting
dominant institutions and the political-economic status quo. The value of the idea of
nature may then be in offering a justification for action which is outside of these
institutions and is not constrained by their requirements.
Attitudes towards dominant institutions
Addressing climate change means confronting the economic and political
structures which gave rise to its causes and continued impacts. Again, the three case
studies have different approaches to confronting these issues, although with certain
commonalities. The divestment campaign is the most forthright of the three in terms of its
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willingness to take on political and economic interests. The campaign’s work within
established institutional channels – selling off fossil fuel stocks, urging politicians to take
actions – are a means towards a broader systemic upheaval which would see a
realignment of structural priorities and incentives. The actions of the campaigners are
situated within a wider critique of capitalism and the harms and inequalities it produces,
and they link the campaign for climate justice to other systemic issues such as racial
justice and poverty.
The BTI is not as oppositional towards the political-economic status quo. The
writings of Shellenberger and Nordhaus do stress the need for a conceptual rethinking of
institutional formations, though most of the concrete policy proposals they support take
place within the bounds of existing structures. This can be seen from their early focus on
policy goals such as vehicle emission standards, up to more recent efforts in accelerating
modernization processes in developing countries. Their political positioning has shifted
over time. The Death of Environmentalism and Break Through were situated explicitly on
the (American) political left, part of an effort to restore muscular progressive ideals to the
political landscape during the George W. Bush presidency. This along with the
commitment to rethinking the goals and processes of environmentalism led to some
environmental justice advocates being initially supportive of Shellenberger and
Nordhaus’ work, though this was not to last. In more recent output the BTI, while
eschewing political labels, has positioned itself more towards the center, writing of the
need for government-supported research and development of new energy technologies
but for the most part taking a depoliticized and technocratic approach to change. While
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not explicitly endorsing laissez-faire or neoliberal economics this approach does tend to
leave power relationships and systemic inequalities largely unquestioned (except where
they can be blamed on environmentalists). Their embrace of the concept of the ‘long
Anthropocene,’ the idea that human impacts on the global biosphere started with the
emergence of agriculture rather than the industrial revolution, also deflects responsibility
from institutional arrangements and onto humanity as a whole.
TNC is again very clear in its institutional commitments. The organization has a
long history of a largely apolitical and non-confrontational approach, working with
corporations and large stakeholders on conservation initiatives. This carries over into the
debates around new conservation. As with ecomodernism, the approach expresses a
general support of the current economic system, but with a greater emphasis on marketbased approaches and the importance of corporations. At times, this is positioned as a
logical conclusion to draw for scientific rather than ideological reasons, in terms of the
need to work with the large actors (i.e. corporations) which play such a large role in
climate change and environmental impacts more generally. While a valid approach, this
is certainly not inevitable, and leaves certain things unaccounted for – such as what
caused environmental problems in the first place.
Systemic versus individual responsibility
The global scope of climate change, along with its diffuse causes and uncertain
impacts, mean that it is difficult for advocates to communicate to their publics and to find
a point of intervention on which to base their campaigns. All three organizations
recognize the need for systemic rather than simply individual action in order to properly
257

deal with environmental risks. For the divestment campaign, as an activist group they
seek to directly mobilize people to take action against the corporate interests they see as
blocking progress. The model of networked localism employed by 350 in this and their
other campaigns allows people to get involved in very local actions in their communities,
which are then linked together as part of a global movement. Climate change is presented
as a global threat, and the impacts – when mentioned – are related to the harms faced by
people around the world. But the small, localized campaigns offer a venue for people to
get involved, which builds the campaign’s political power and attempts to counter the
feelings of helplessness many people experience in the face of climate change (Lorenzoni
et al., 2007).
TNC and the BTI do not involve the public in their advocacy to the same extent as
350. While the BTI’s early efforts focused on reinvigorating the American left, their
more recent focus has been on fomenting a shift in ideas amongst policy-makers and
opinion-leaders. The ecomodernists and the divestment campaigners both focus on the
need for institutional shifts rather than individual lifestyle or consumption changes. But
where the divestment movement calls for a radical realignment of political and economic
structures, ecomodernism advocated more incremental shifts within existing institutional
formations. TNC takes a similarly non-oppositional approach to politics, with the
discourse of ecosystem services generally concordant with free-market economics as
discussed above. The role of the public is for the most part limited to providing
donations, and TNC’s website offers examples of individual actions people can take to
reduce their environmental footprint through their purchasing habits. The pristine nature
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seen in TNC’s public communications position the issues at a remove from people’s
everyday lives, and while new conservation is expressly human-centric in its approach to
conservation it remains largely depoliticized. Both the ecomodernists and the new
conservationists tend to generalize human impacts in the Anthropocene to humanity as a
whole, while the climate activists point to the role of specific economic and political
formations.
The role of the public
A key question which underlies all of these issues is how the three approaches
propose to decide on the direction of human impacts in the Anthropocene.
Acknowledging humanity’s dominant position on the planet requires taking responsibility
for our impacts on humans and non-humans alike. This has important implications for
democratic governance; how the Earth is brought into politics and how societies decide
on a common future for the planet. This poses dramatic challenges for politics as it is
usually practiced, and the three areas discussed above begin to show just how
complicated governing for the Anthropocene will be. The renegotiation of human-nature
boundaries means that politics will have to expand to encompass new entities as humans’
role in the biosphere becomes unavoidable (e.g. Latour, 2010). The dominant political
and economic structures of modernity will likewise have to be reconceptualized,
especially in terms of the subpolitical processes which are influential in shaping the
conditions for life on Earth yet are not subject to democratic oversight. And the global
nature of environmental risks in the Anthropocene and the proliferation of
interconnections between various human and non-human systems at different geographic
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and temporal scales exposes the limitations of political governance based around the
nation-state (Beck, 2009).
The divestment activists are the most forthright of the three case studies in
defining a place for the public in the politics of the Anthropocene. They attempt to
subject human impacts on the Earth to greater democratic control, and their focus on
issues of social justice and inequality challenges power relationships. The BTI likewise
seeks greater control over human impacts. In much of their output, however, particularly
more recent work in the shift to ecomodernism, the public is not given an especially
prominent role. The emphasis on technological development over politics elides
disparities in access to new technologies, and control over how they are implemented.
For the new conservationists, the insistence on human-centric conservation would seem
to open a space for the public. However, as it is presented by key figures within TNC, the
new conservation discourse is also largely depoliticized and aligns with existing politicaleconomic structures.
Politics in the Anthropocene requires making choices about the type of world we
wish to create. All three organizations put forward a vision of a possible future where
humanity’s impacts on the planet are directed to more beneficial ends. Issues of choice
and control, however, relate not only to society’s impacts on the non-human, but to the
institutions which determine those impacts. The relative lack of attention, in particular
from the ecomodernists and new conservationists, to democracy and participation
threatens to reinforce power inequalities and injustices. For the climate activists, how to
transform or recreate social institutions to take account of subpolitical processes will be
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an ongoing negotiation. No single strategy or discourse or political structure will alone be
adequate for comprehending the vastly complex undertaking of shaping the future of an
entire planet. Yet accepting the ‘dreadful burden of choice’ that our impacts are in any
case unavoidable speaks to the need for processes to ensure that our choices are
deliberate and informed.
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